Ukraine, the Middle East, major works policy…, since 2022, the proliferation of domestic and foreign issues requiring the support — or arbitration — of the United States has fuelled fears among many observers of American defence policy of a “strategic overstretch”. This concept, theorised by the historian Paul Kennedy in The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers,[1] is based on a simple idea: empires mainly die when the cost of imperial expansion far exceeds their capacity to mobilise resources to absorb unforeseen shocks. While the risk of a collapse is not imminent, it can no longer be ruled out in the medium term.
Has Washington reached the limits of its international commitments? Considering the policy of major works launched in the wake of the Covid-19 pandemic (Infrastructure Investments and Jobs Act, CHIPS and Science Act, Inflation Reduction Act, etc.), the public debt — forecast at 135% of gross domestic product (GDP) in 2025 — and the multiplication of military engagements since 2022, more and more experts think so. In a column published in January 2024, Foreign Policy openly worries about the possibility of a stall: “Self-evidently, the United States cannot meet its obligations to 50 allies at once, much in the same way that a bank cannot return all its deposits in one go”, writes the author, James Crabtree; “its ability to do so depends crucially on ensuring sufficient confidence to avoid the geopolitical equivalent of a bank run ».[2]
Last July, candidate Trump himself used a banking metaphor to illustrate his vision of international relations: “I think Taiwan should pay us for defense. You know, we’re no different than an insurance company. Taiwan doesn’t give us anything.” Will his return to the White House accelerate the strategic readjustments that many see as inevitable?
Reserves at an all-time low
While Washington still dominates global military spending, at US$916 billion out of an estimated global total of US$2,443 billion, its pledge of “unwavering” support for Israel and
