The return of war to European soil, coupled with indifference on the part of the United States toward protecting its Allies, has considerably altered the security landscape in Western Europe. Confronted with two superpowers in possession of the world’s largest nuclear arsenals, a growing number of observers and political actors believe Europe must substantially reinforce its defence capabilities. In France, nuclear deterrence is regularly advanced to highlight Paris’s strategic importance on the global stage and, in a context of heightened aggressiveness from Moscow, in addition to the potential reintroduction of military service announced at the end of November 2025, there has emerged a marked inclination to expand the national nuclear arsenal, so as not to fall behind in the arms race.
In the view of Benoît Pelopidas, there is nothing automatic or necessary in the need to increase the size of the nuclear arsenal or participate in the arms race. In this article, he identifies and rectifies three false, but commonly accepted notions which make such necessity of rearmament look self-evident: (1) that these weapons provide protection, when ballistic missiles made such protection impossible over six decades ago; (2) that the size of existing nuclear arsenals is necessary for deterrence, which is historically incorrect and ignores the emergent deterrent potential of conventional weaponry; and (3) that the possession of nuclear weapons is beneficial in all possible futures: on the contrary, it is irrelevant in some and harmful in others. Thus, the type and level of nuclear armament that is deemed desirable stems from subjective bets on the future, which need to be made explicit in the strategic debate. After clarifying these three points, Pelopidas invites France and Europe to take the multiple threats they face into account instead of focusing on one only and not to address each in isolation. He argues that this is particularly important given the carbon footprint of the arms race and its effects on the perceived desirability of nuclear weapons. He therefore proposes a redefinition of ‘strict sufficiency’ as a criterion for determining the appropriate dimensions of national defence infrastructures, beyond the singular focus on nuclear forces. This proposal could guide French and European public policy, as well as their diplomatic proposals to other nuclear-armed states, with the support of constituencies concerned about the effects of climate change.
This article has been translated in English and you can download its translation.
