In international relations, unilateral sanctions are the imposition of social or material costs in response to (perceived) wrongdoing. They are adopted by states pursuant to their own national or executive powers, or by an organization against non-member states. These policy tools are based on a rational-choice approach to state behaviour, which views state decision-makers as rational actors motivated by maximising their interests. The rationale behind sanctions is that they change behaviour by manipulating the target’s (the state subjected to sanctions) cost-benefit analysis and thereby persuade it to choose the less costly alternative.
However, it is often acknowledged that sanctions are ineffective at changing behaviour. To make up for this, it is then said that they serve multiple purposes. For instance, they can deter or constrain behaviour, and they have an important symbolic function. As sanctions are generally justified in normative terms, they signal commitment to international norms. For this reason, despite their lack of success in changing behaviour they are seen as an important enforcement tool in international law.
Current events suggest that sanctions are not going anywhere, particularly while the United States (US) and the European Union (EU) are enthusiastic wielders of this instrument. This is made evident by the ‘unprecedented’ sanctions regime against Russia (one of many examples), which they justify as a mean to defend ‘the rules-based international order’. From their perspective, unilateral sanctions are an appropriate foreign policy tool to uphold international norms and values. However, these measures’ long-term impact could have important structural consequences on th
