{"id":99040,"date":"2024-09-19T06:00:00","date_gmt":"2024-09-19T04:00:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.futuribles.com\/pourquoi-les-prospectivistes-se-sont-ils-trompes-concernant-lukraine\/"},"modified":"2025-11-06T11:04:21","modified_gmt":"2025-11-06T10:04:21","slug":"pourquoi-les-prospectivistes-se-sont-ils-trompes-concernant-lukraine","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.futuribles.com\/en\/pourquoi-les-prospectivistes-se-sont-ils-trompes-concernant-lukraine\/","title":{"rendered":"Why were the forecasters wrong about Ukraine?"},"content":{"rendered":"
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In the long history of strategic surprises, the first high-intensity war of the 21st<\/sup> century has taught us a great deal about the cognitive biases that regularly cloud the judgement of decision-makers.<\/h6>\n\n\n<\/div>\n
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Faced with the massive deployment of Russian troops near Ukraine\u2019s borders \u2014 by autumn 2021, Moscow had massed almost 90,000 soldiers near the Ukrainian border \u2014 many, if not most experts, predicted a decoy designed to obtain symbolic concessions or to seize a small portion of the Ukrainian territory by means of a fait accompli,<\/em> as was the case with Crimea in 2014. The latter were stunned by Vladimir Putin\u2019s decision to attempt the total annexation of the country on 24 February 2022. From military exercises to sabotage to false flags \u2014 false incidents designed to lead the Ukrainian government to launch a war it never wanted \u2014 Ukraine has faced an intense campaign of pre-invasion actions designed to break the morale of its population and army in the run-up to 24 February. Faced with such an accumulation of alarming signals, how can we explain the persistent scepticism of certain international decision-makers who have had access to crucial information? What does this reveal about the capacity of nations to respond effectively to serious and imminent threats?<\/p>\n\n <\/div>\n

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\n Voir aussi<\/span>\n
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\n \n How to Think the Unpredictable? On Nassim Nicholas Taleb’s The Black Swan<\/a>\n \n \n \n <\/use>\n<\/svg>\n <\/a>\n <\/span>\n
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1 December 2007<\/div>\n GRANRUT Charles (du)<\/a>\n
\n 10 p.\n <\/div>\n <\/div>\n\n
\n \n \n <\/use>\n<\/svg>\n\n Article Revue\n <\/a>\n Economics<\/a>\n <\/div>\n <\/div>\n<\/div>\n <\/div>\n <\/div>\n <\/div>\n<\/div>\n
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The paradox of rationality<\/h2>\n\n\n\n

In an article published in the journal Security Studies<\/em><\/a>, researchers Jonas Driedger and Mikhail Polianskii provide an \u00ab in-depth analysis of experts\u2019 perceptions \u00bb to the war in Ukraine. Their aim? To understand why their forecasts were wrong. Several assumptions are at stake.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The main one is the use of utility-based predictions, which suggest that the Russian regime is intrinsically cautious. Following the example of Eugene Chausovsky<\/a>, many experts believe that the regime has shown itself to be \u201crather conservative and risk-averse, with a strong cost-benefit analysis\u201d in its use of armed force. If he had taken this view, he would naturally have been inclined towards limited intervention \u2014 or no intervention at all \u2014<\/a> because of the enormous costs such a project would entail, such as severe economic sanctions, international isolation and a protracted war that could weaken Vladimir Putin\u2019s regime.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

While these predictions proved correct \u2014 Russia did indeed pay a huge human, financial and reputational price \u2014 they underestimated Vladimir Putin\u2019s regime\u2019s growing appetite for risk-taking as a long-term trend. Through the attack on Georgia, the intervention in Syria and the annexation of Crimea in the same year, analysts concluded that there was a desire to carry out limited interventions \u2014 and therefore to be cautious with regard to Western strategic rivals. But there is another conclusion to be drawn: Moscow\u2019s foreign policy has tended to be increasingly adventurous, disregarding international conventions and human losses, and inclined to \u201cprioritize strategic gains over economic effects<\/a>\u201d.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Jonas Driedger and Mikhail Polianskii attribute these errors by Western experts to the \u201cavailability heuristics\u201d, a bias identified in psychology, which leads individuals in situations of uncertainty to place too much confidence in past events \u2014 in this case the apparent success of the annexation of Crimea and the Donbass by fait accompli<\/em> in 2014. These experts saw this intervention as a limited, low-cost operation for Russia, and projected the same caution onto the situation in 2022, without anticipating the more adventurous evolution of Vladimir Putin\u2019s policy.<\/p>\n\n\n<\/div>\n

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Tale of Self-deception<\/h2>\n

As the signs of a large-scale offensive became increasingly obvious, the idea of a bluff persisted. In addition to Vladimir Putin\u2019s increasingly threatening speeches, The Washington Post, <\/em>in an investigation of<\/a> the months leading up to the start of the war, mentions that by the end of 2021, the Biden administration was sharing very precise intelligence on Russian intentions with its allies. However, some European countries, notably Germany and France, still had doubts about the veracity of this information<\/a>, a mistrust provoked by their inability to understand why Vladimir Putin would try to invade a large country like Ukraine with just a few tens of thousands of soldiers, and reinforced by the memory of Colin Powell\u2019s manipulations in 2003 concerning the presence of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq. Only the British and the Baltic states were prepared to react and arm Ukraine, according to the investigation.<\/p>\n

In the face of these obvious facts, the Kremlin, for its part, kept up its deceptive signals in its language, designed to maintain a strategic ambiguity conducive to the surprise effect. Take, for example, a conversation between Ben Wallace, the British Defence Secretary, and his Russian counterpart, Sergue\u00ef Cho\u00efgou, in Moscow on 11 February 2022, in which the latter stated that Russia had \u201cno plans to invade Ukraine\u201d.<\/p>\n

If we widen the focus of our analysis, we can attribute this indecision on the part of Westerners to a desperate desire for peace and the temptation to see all Russian actions as confirming that desire. This bias was noted by the renowned futurist Roberta Wohlstetter in an article with the revealing title \u201cThe Pleasures of Self-deception<\/a>\u201d, published in 1979. Wondering why the British preferred to believe that Germany was trying to avoid an arms race in the 1930s, despite clear signs of aggressive rearmament, she referred to the phenomenon of \u201csuicidal prophecies\u201d: the temptation is strong for experts and decision-makers to play down information that does not fit into individual or collective representations (wishful thinking). While situations of cognitive dissonance tend to be minimised or ignored, ambiguous information is brought into line with preconceptions about the strategic environment. In an investigation into the surprise attack on Pearl Harbor, Wohlstetter used the same model to highlight the cognitive errors of American decision-makers, who considered the possibility of an assault on the fleet based in the Hawaiian archipelago to be illogical and absurd, despite intelligence indicating just such an intention.<\/p>\n\n <\/div>\n

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\n Voir aussi<\/span>\n
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\n \n \"\"<\/a>\n <\/span>\n \n Cognitive Biases: Between Necessity and Danger<\/a>\n \n \n \n <\/use>\n<\/svg>\n <\/a>\n <\/span>\n
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26 December 2018<\/div>\n TOSCANI Pascale<\/a>\n
\n 8 p.\n <\/div>\n <\/div>\n\n
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How can we rethink the foresight method in the face of strategic change?<\/h2>\n\n\n\n

When analysing strategic breakthroughs in retrospect, commentators have the unfortunate tendency to present them as more predictable than they actually were. This trompe-l\u2019\u0153il<\/em> effect is often followed by a \u201cnever again\u201d attitude that does not stand up to the test of reality, as new ruptures emerge, turning certainties upside down. With hindsight, it seems clear that the \u201cvictims\u201d had substantial information that events were imminent. The war in Ukraine is no exception. Beyond the lessons specific to the conflict, a number of issues are emerging for the foresight method:<\/p>\n\n\n\n