{"id":83044,"date":"2022-09-06T08:00:00","date_gmt":"2022-09-06T06:00:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.futuribles.com\/relocalisations-industrielles-ou-relocalisations-a-proximite\/"},"modified":"2024-10-31T14:46:28","modified_gmt":"2024-10-31T13:46:28","slug":"relocalisations-industrielles-ou-relocalisations-a","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.futuribles.com\/en\/relocalisations-industrielles-ou-relocalisations-a\/","title":{"rendered":"Industrial Relocalisation: Reshoring or Nearshoring?"},"content":{"rendered":"
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Following the gridlock or seizure of certain logistics chains as a result of the health crisis and the war in Ukraine, many countries, particularly in Europe, have become aware of the importance of controlling certain strategic supplies. After decades of unbridled globalisation, often marked by the relocation of industrial activities from industrialised to developing countries (offshoring), is it time for industrial relocalisation (also known as reshoring or backshoring)? Yes and no, says V\u00e9ronique Lamblin: yes, there has been a trend towards the reshoring of industrial activities in France, Europe, and the United States over the past few years, and it seems likely that the crises mentioned above could reinforce that trend. But for the time being, these movements towards reshoring are not resulting in the creation of large numbers of jobs\u2026 This analysis sheds light on the industrial reshoring that has been observed over the past ten years, and emerging trends on the (geo)economic level.<\/h6>\n\n\n
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<\/h2>\n

Foresight Analysis<\/em> no. 274, 6 September 2022.<\/p>\n

This analysis was finalized in August 2022. It has been translated from French by Sam Ferguson.<\/p>\n\n <\/div>\n<\/div>\n\n\n\n

All OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development) countries, with the exception of South Korea, have experienced industrial decline in recent decades, partly owing to technical progress, but also connected to industrial offshoring either to Asia or to nearby countries with lower labour costs. A report published by France Strat\u00e9gie in December 2020[1]<\/a><\/sup> points out that France is the G7 country that has undergone the greatest process of deindustrialisation, followed by the UK.<\/p>\n\n\n

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\n Figure 1. Share of industrial value added in the economy, 1991-2018 (in current prices)\n <\/p>\n <\/div>\n

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Source:<\/em> Aussilloux<\/span> Vincent (general rapporteur), Les Politiques industrielles en France<\/em>, op. cit.<\/em><\/p>\n\n <\/div>\n\n\n\n

Since 1980, French industry has lost half of its workforce (2.2 million jobs) and now accounts for only 10.3% of total employment. The decline became steeper after 2000. The major French industrial groups have chosen to offshore operations rather than moving upmarket, to the point that employment in foreign subsidiaries of French groups now corresponds to 62% of their industrial employment in France, compared with 38% in Germany, 26% in Italy, and 10% in Spain.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Although no country completely gave up on industrial policy during these years \u2013 they all worked to support innovation, research and development (R&D), and industrial cooperation \u2013 industrial strategies as such (focused on sectors, projects, etc.) became less common in Europe.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

In France<\/h2>\n\n\n\n

In recent years, France, like other European countries, has relaunched its industrial policy. A National Industry Council (CNI) was set up in 2013, leading in 2015 to the initiative \u201cIndustry of the Future\u201d,[2]<\/a><\/sup> which aims to provide a framework for industrial strategy and the digital transition. From 2018, an Innovation Council has set strategic priorities for the allocation of investments from the Innovation and Industry Fund (FII), which has an endowment of \u20ac10 billion and is committed to spending \u20ac250 million annually. Finally, in September 2020, between two lockdowns, the government launched an investment plan with a budget of \u20ac100 billion (including \u20ac40 billion from European funds), the France Relance plan;[3]<\/a><\/sup> spending is to be spread over a two-year period, between 2020 and 2022: \u20ac30 billion on the environment and energy transition, \u20ac34 billion for business competitiveness, and \u20ac36 billion for territorial cohesion. Various calls for projects have been published, to which companies can apply. In particular, the plan has a budget of \u20ac1 billion for relocalisation (also known as reshoring or backshoring), to be spent on subsidies by means of a call for projects (direct aid for a project can be up to \u20ac800,000). The calls for projects may relate to \u201ccompetitiveness\u201d in strategic sectors, \u201cthe environment\u201d, and \u201cterritorial cohesion\u201d, and include themes such as \u201cEntrepreneurship within territories\u201d (aimed at revitalising economic activity in city centres) and \u201cLocal manufacturing\u201d (aimed at promoting manufacturing activity in vulnerable territories, including small- and medium-sized towns, rural areas, and priority urban districts marked by poverty or social problems). This plan was followed in 2021 by the France 2030 plan.[4]<\/a><\/sup><\/p>\n\n\n

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For the year 2020, the Trendeo consultancy, which records employment and investment data, indicated that for the first time cases of reshoring in France (30 in total) exceeded cases of offshoring (25). In the past, the ratio was more like one company reshored for every ten companies offshored. But even though more operations were reshored than offshored in 2020, the actual number of offshored jobs (1,718) exceeded the number of reshored jobs (1,655). Moreover, 77% of cases of reshoring involved an industrial activity and more than half of these were carried out by small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs).[5]<\/a><\/sup><\/p>\n\n\n\n

For the period 2010 to 2019, Trendeo identifies between 10 and 20 cases of reshoring per year. In 2021, 84 cases were identified over the first 11 months of the year.[6]<\/a><\/sup> Out of a total of 114 companies that have reshored their activities to France since September 2020, around 50 received financial aid from the state. In 2021, three times as many sites of activity were created as were closed. It is notably SMEs, rather than large companies, that are bringing their activities back to France. However, these cases of reshoring generate few new jobs overall: over the period 2009-2021, on average, a case of offshoring corresponded to a loss of 80 jobs in France, while a case of reshoring created 30 jobs.<\/p>\n\n\n

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\n Figure 2. Change in the number of offshoring and relocalisation operations in France, 2009-2021, in number of operations and in number of jobs created \n <\/p>\n <\/div>\n

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N.B.:<\/em> there is a difference in scale between the two graphs: the y axis of the graph for offshoring is at a considerably larger scale than the y axis of the graph for reshoring, to allow for the larger numbers of jobs lost compared with the jobs gained through reshoring.<\/p>\n

Source: <\/em>Silbert<\/span> Nathalie, op. cit.<\/em><\/p>\n\n <\/div>\n\n\n\n

The example of Rocket, a manufacturer of wood and chipboard screws, is revealing: a quarter of the company\u2019s production of screws, previously offshored to Taiwan, will be moved back to the Ardennes region of France by 2025. This is a major industrial investment, supported by a subsidy of \u20ac800,000 from the national Recovery Plan and the Grand Est regional authority. Yet this reshoring project will generate only around 30 direct and indirect jobs.[7]<\/a><\/sup><\/p>\n\n\n\n

In fact, from 2009 to 2021, fewer than 9,000 jobs have been reshored to France, which accounts only for 0.5% of new jobs created over that period. Reshoring remains a marginal phenomenon, despite the positive results seen over the past year. But this recent phenomenon does not only concern France, and Trendeo observes that it is a global trend.[8]<\/a><\/sup><\/p>\n\n\n\n

In Europe, the Data Produce a Complex and Incomplete Picture<\/h2>\n\n\n\n

As shown by a Eurofound report about economic reshoring in Europe between 2014 and 2018,[9]<\/a><\/sup> there were very few academic publications on this subject before 2012;[10]<\/a><\/sup> these studies have grown in number between 10 and 20 per year since 2017, which is still very few for Europe (although the Eurofound report does not claim to identify all studies on the subject). Already before the Covid-19 pandemic there had been a surge in cases of reshoring in the EU-27 plus Norway and UK, but almost half of the number of cases of reshoring to France (253 cases recorded) involved companies returning from another EU country (6% of returns came from either Germany or Poland), ahead of cases of reshoring from Asia (30% of relocalisations came from China, the highest figure for a single country). At the sectoral level, 85% of cases of reshoring involved industrial production, and particularly the production of clothing, food processing, and the manufacturing of machinery and equipment. The UK, Italy, and France recorded the highest number of cases of reshoring over the five year period, followed by Denmark, Norway, and then Germany. Most cases of reshoring were carried out by large companies (those with more than 250 employees).[11]<\/a><\/sup><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Three types of relocalisation or reshoring are analysed in this study:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

– activities that had previously been offshored by a European company and that are brought back to their country of origin in Europe (\u201creshoring\u201d, also known as \u201cbackshoring\u201d);<\/p>\n\n\n\n

– activities that had previously been offshored by a European company to a non-European country and that are then moved to a European country other than the country of origin (\u201cnearshoring\u201d), but note that in many other papers nearshoring may just mean a move to a location closer to the country of origin;<\/p>\n\n\n\n

– activities that had previously been offshored by a non-European company and that are then moved to a European country (this can be considered as foreign productive investment).<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The vast majority of the cases listed (234 out of 253) correspond to the first type of relocalisation (reshoring, in the strict sense). The consequences of these cases of relocalisation in terms of job creation are not only limited in scale, but also poorly documented. Information was available for only 99 out of the 253 cases (less than 40%), and these 99 cases created 12,840 jobs over four years. Assuming that the undocumented cases created proportionally the same number of jobs, this would amount to a total of 32,000 new jobs created over four years, or an average of 8,000 jobs per year across the EU-27 plus Norway and UK.<\/p>\n\n\n

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\n Figure 3. Annual number of cases of reshoring in the European Union\n <\/p>\n <\/div>\n

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Source:<\/em> Eurofound, European Reshoring Monitor, in Future of Manufacturing in Europe. Reshoring in Europe<\/em>, op. cit.<\/em> p.29.<\/p>\n\n <\/div>\n\n\n\n

Company leaders who were interviewed on this subject highlighted several different motivations for reshoring: above all they mention the opportunities that it presents for company restructuring, followed by concerns related to transport times, automation, quality control, and the \u201cmade in\u201d effect. Since the beginning of 2020, the Covid-19 pandemic and associated lockdowns have disrupted supply chains. Not only are industries focusing attention on the resilience of their supply chains, but also governments have recognised the associated risks, and have therefore launched initiatives to reshore production of strategically important goods, including medical equipment and medicines, electric batteries in Europe, and semiconductors in the US.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

However, recent trends in employment figures in Europe[12]<\/a><\/sup> show that reshoring and the creation of new companies are failing to compensate for job losses caused by offshoring, downsizing, and company closures. As Figure 4 shows, over 18 months, between 2019 and the first half of 2020, industry lost almost 186,000 jobs across the EU, the UK, and Norway (the companies with the highest losses are found in the German automotive industry), whereas the figure for the creation of new jobs stands at less than 57,000.<\/p>\n\n\n

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\n Figure 4. Announced job creation and losses by major sectors in the EU-27 + UK and Norway, over 18 months (year 2019 + H1 2020)\n <\/p>\n <\/div>\n

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Source:<\/em> Labour Market Change. ERM Report 2020<\/em>, op. cit.<\/em><\/p>\n\n <\/div>\n\n\n\n

It is estimated that 74% of job losses (all sectors combined, the losses amount to 365,000 jobs) are linked to internal company restructuring, 21% are the result of company closures, and the remaining 5% are divided between mergers and acquisitions (2%), reshoring and subcontracting (1%), and offshoring. Only 2% of job losses are clearly the result of the offshoring of operations outside Europe, representing a loss of about 10,000 jobs over 18 months.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

It seems clear that the reshoring of value chains provides better security and resilience for an industrial activity. However, considering the differences in labour costs, companies only undertake to reshore manufacturing operations to Europe if the process is highly automated and, consequently creates few new jobs.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The United States Has Been Reshoring for Longer, and at Greater Scale than in Europe<\/h2>\n\n\n\n

In the US,[13]<\/a><\/sup> well before the Covid-19 pandemic, Donald Trump cut taxes on corporate profits from 35% to 21% in 2018 (and reduced taxes on funds reshored from abroad), and introduced a protectionist policy that increased taxation on imports so as to encourage investment within the US. In February 2021, Joe Biden, who took office in the midst of the pandemic, signed an Executive Order[14]<\/a><\/sup> aiming to \u201ccreate more resilient and secure supply chains for strategic and critical goods\u201d. This includes pharmaceutical ingredients, critical minerals, semiconductors, and batteries, especially for electric vehicles.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The trend towards the reshoring of production is documented in the US, but data from the US are not entirely comparable to those from Europe, since the number of jobs created by reshoring is added to those created by foreign direct investment (FDI), all of which are recorded by a private association, the Reshoring Initiative.[15]<\/a><\/sup> According to this association, more than 100,000 new jobs have been created each year since 2016 as a result of these two factors. Reshoring has notably been supported since 2015 by a major retailer, Walmart,[16]<\/a><\/sup> which has committed to significantly increasing its purchases from US suppliers in order to support domestic industrial employment (which it highlights in its \u201cMade in USA\u201d marketing program).<\/p>\n\n\n

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\n Figure 5. Annual number of job announcements related to reshoring and FDI, US, 2010-2020\n <\/p>\n <\/div>\n

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Source:<\/em> Reshoring Initiative 2020 Data Report.<\/em> URL: https:\/\/reshorenow.org\/blog\/reshoring-initiative-2020-data-report\/<\/a>. Accessed 26 August 2022.<\/p>\n\n <\/div>\n\n\n\n

The figures of the Reshoring Initiative suggest that, in the US, 2020 was a record year,[17]<\/a><\/sup> as reshoring alone (without FDI) brought back 110,000 jobs.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The reasons given for the reshoring of operations to the US in 2020 are, of course, particularly related to the consequences of the pandemic, and especially the interruption of supply chains. Over the period of 2010-2020, the greatest numbers of cases of reshoring to the US, in terms of the number of jobs produced, concerned the production of transport vehicles, electronic products, and electrical products. Over the same period, in 46% of cases production was reshored from China (but 30% of cases do not list the country from which operations were reshored).<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The boom in reshoring could well be even more significant in the US in 2021,[18]<\/a><\/sup> given the announcements made by major groups. In March, Intel announced plans to build two semiconductor plants in Arizona. Last December, Toyota and General Motors announced plans, respectively, for a battery plant in North Carolina (employing 1,750 people) and for a battery plant and increased production of electric cars in Michigan. The company U.S. Steel also has plans to build a new plant in Alabama or Arkansas.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

But there are counter-examples: since 2016, Adidas has decided to close two highly automated factories, known as \u201cspeed factories\u201d, in Germany and the US respectively, while setting up the same type of high-tech factories in Vietnam and China in 2020.[19]<\/a><\/sup> The reasons given by the firm relate to the know-how present in Asia and the proximity of the new factories to their suppliers.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Conclusion<\/h2>\n\n\n\n

It is clear that both the Covid-19 pandemic, which revealed weaknesses in supply chains, and consumer demand for companies to become greener, are pushing companies to reduce their transport footprint and to reshore their operations. There are obvious benefits from being \u201cclose to the customer\u201d and offering products that are \u201cmade locally\u201d. The main difference from the past is that these reshored operations are now manufacturing locally for the domestic market alone, rather than for export to distant markets.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

In addition to \u201creshoring\u201d or \u201cbackshoring\u201d, in English the term \u201cnearshoring is also used (as defined above, the relocation of production from a distant country to a nearby country). Indeed, although the crisis revealed the dependency of European customers on production in Asia, and confronted companies and politicians with the risks inherent in long-distance supply chains, the trend could be towards nearshoring rather than reshoring \u2013 for example, to Mexico in the case of the US, or to Eastern Europe or the southern shore of the Mediterranean in the case of Western European countries \u2013 in order to address problems of logistics and proximity while also maintaining low production costs (through lower labour costs and economies of scale), at the same time as reducing dependency on supplies from China or other Asian countries. In fact, this movement of production to locations close to wealthy markets has existed for a long time in the case of bulky products (which are therefore difficult to transport) such as cars: European car manufacturers have for a long time invested in production in Eastern Europe (Dacia in Romania, Renault in Slovenia, Volkswagen\/Skoda in the Czech Republic), and US manufacturers have moved production to \u201cmaquiladora\u201d factories in Mexico. More recently, the \u201cZero-COVID\u201d policy and associated port congestion have disrupted production in China, where labour costs are no longer as low as they used to be, all of which has contributed to a trend for large companies to move their production out of the country.[20]<\/a><\/sup> This is the case for Nike, Mango, Inditex (Zara), and Adidas, which are moving (nearshoring) their production to countries such as Turkey, Portugal, Morocco and Spain.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

In fact, according to a study from the European Parliament\u2019s External Relations Department,[21]<\/a><\/sup> it is simply unrealistic to expect large-scale reshoring for economic reasons with the help of digital technologies. Although past examples show that automation and additive manufacturing (that is, 3D printing) have created opportunities for reshoring to rich countries, digital technologies (and all the tools associated with \u201cIndustry 4.0\u201d) also improve the power of companies to control production over long distances. While proximity to the final customer is increasingly important for companies, there is no doubt that they also have an interest in setting up business in emerging countries, which will ultimately have an even greater need than rich countries to equip themselves with manufactured products. Reshoring will therefore be limited to the production of goods for the local market, rather than for export.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

New environmental policies will also reinforce the trend towards reshoring: the energy transition, carbon taxation, and especially carbon taxation at borders (which has been considered by the EU), would all encourage the development of shorter value chains, situated either locally or in close proximity.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Geopolitics is perhaps the most decisive factor in relocalisation. It seems clear that the competition between China and the US will push both states to secure their value chains for products that are strategically important for their economies, probably through public purchases of national production. It remains to be seen what path the EU and European countries will choose: will Europe manage to act together to (re)build itself as an industrial hub in its own right? Even if it does, and if production activities are moved closer to consumers in Europe, it is highly unlikely that the jobs thereby created would compensate for the loss of industrial jobs due to offshoring and automation. <\/p>\n\n\n

    \n
  1. \n

    Aussilloux<\/span> Vincent (general rapporteur), Les Politiques industrielles en France. \u00c9volutions et comparaisons internationales, <\/em>France Strat\u00e9gie, report to the National Assembly, November 2020. URL: https:\/\/www.strategie.gouv.fr\/sites\/strategie.gouv.fr\/files\/atoms\/files\/fs-2020-rapport-politique_industrielle-novembre.pdf<\/a>. Accessed 25 August 2022. \u2191<\/a><\/p>\n<\/li>\n

  2. \n

    See the dedicated CNI page. URL: https:\/\/www.conseil-national-industrie.gouv.fr\/comites-strategiques-de-filiere\/solutions-industrie-du-futur<\/a>. Accessed 25 August 2022. \u2191<\/a><\/p>\n<\/li>\n

  3. \n

    Website: https:\/\/www.economie.gouv.fr\/plan-de-relance<\/a>. Accessed 25 April 2023. \u2191<\/a><\/p>\n<\/li>\n

  4. \n

    The France 2030 plan provides \u20ac30 billion over five years, of which \u20ac8 billion for the energy sector, \u20ac4 billion for decarbonised transport, \u20ac2 billion for food, and \u20ac2 billion for space and the seabed. \u2191<\/a><\/p>\n<\/li>\n

  5. \n

    Zapalski<\/span> \u00c9milie, \u201cEn 2020, les \u2018amortisseurs\u2019 ont r\u00e9ussi \u00e0 att\u00e9nuer les effets de la crise\u201d, Localtis \/ Banque des territoires, 8 February 2021. URL: https:\/\/www.banquedesterritoires.fr\/2020-un-bilan-economique-moins-sombre-que-prevu-dapres-trendeo<\/a>. Accessed 25 August 2022. \u2191<\/a><\/p>\n<\/li>\n

  6. \n

    Silbert<\/span> Nathalie, \u201cLa voie \u00e9troite des relocalisations d\u2019activit\u00e9s en France\u201d, Les \u00c9chos<\/em>, 7 December 2021. URL: https:\/\/www.lesechos.fr\/economie-france\/conjoncture\/la-voie-etroite-des-relocalisations-dactivites-en-france-
    1370247<\/a>. Accessed 25 August 2022.     \u2191<\/a><\/p>\n<\/li>\n

  7. \n

    Roussange<\/span> Guillaume, \u201cLes vis techniques Rocket bient\u00f4t produites dans les Ardennes\u201d, Les \u00c9chos,<\/em> 25 January 2022. URL: https:\/\/www.lesechos.fr\/pme-regions\/grand-est\/les-vis-techniques-rocket-bientot-produites-dans-les-
    ardennes-1381787<\/a>. Accessed 26 August 2022.     \u2191<\/a><\/p>\n<\/li>\n

  8. \n

    Cristiani<\/span> J\u00e9r\u00f4me, \u201cReindustrialisation: la relocalisation \u00e7a marche et \u00e7a profite aux PME, dixit Trendeo\u201d, La Tribune<\/em>, 8 December 2021. URL: https:\/\/www.latribune.fr\/economie\/france\/la-relocalisation-des-industries-est-en-marche-et-profite-aux-pme-selon-trendeo-897988.html<\/a>. Accessed 26 August 2022. \u2191<\/a><\/p>\n<\/li>\n

  9. \n

    Future of Manufacturing in Europe. Reshoring in Europe: Overview 2015-2018,<\/em> Eurofound, 2019. URL: https:\/\/www.eurofound.europa.eu\/sites\/default\/files\/ef_publication\/field_ef_document\/fomeef18010en.pdf<\/a>. Accessed 26 August 2022. \u2191<\/a><\/p>\n<\/li>\n

  10. \n

    Note that the prospect of increased relocalisation was addressed in the 2007 Vigie Report<\/em> by Futuribles International. See Chapter 2, \u201cGlobalisation of the labour market\u201d. URL: https:\/\/www.futuribles.com\/fr\/document\/chapter-2-du-rapport-vigie-2007-la-mondialisation\/<\/a>. Accessed 26 August 2022. \u2191<\/a><\/p>\n<\/li>\n

  11. \n

    The results of the study on more than 250 companies do not allow an assessment of the employment created. Only partial employment figures, on a limited number of cases, are available in the Eurofound report. \u2191<\/a><\/p>\n<\/li>\n

  12. \n

    Labour Market Change. ERM Report 2020: Restructuring across Borders<\/em>, Eurofound, Research Report, 2021. URL: https:\/\/www.eurofound.europa.eu\/sites\/default\/files\/ef_publication\/field_ef_document\/ef20024en.pdf<\/a>. Accessed 26 August 2022. \u2191<\/a><\/p>\n<\/li>\n

  13. \n

    Miyuki<\/span> P.S. Cheng et al., \u201cReturn to USA: Impact of Reshoring Announcements and Reshoring Risks on Market Valuation\u201d, SSRN Electronic Journal<\/em>, January 2020. URL: https:\/\/anderson-review.ucla.edu\/wp-content\/uploads\/2021\/02\/Tang_reshoring-2020-Oct-1-CL-edited.pdf<\/a>. Accessed 26 August 2022. \u2191<\/a><\/p>\n<\/li>\n

  14. \n

    \u201cFact Sheet: Securing America\u2019s Critical Supply Chains\u201d, White House, 24 February 2021. URL: https:\/\/www.whitehouse.gov\/briefing-room\/statements-releases\/2021\/02\/24\/fact-sheet-securing-americas-critical-supply-chains\/<\/a>. Accessed 26 August 2022. \u2191<\/a><\/p>\n<\/li>\n

  15. \n

    According to its survey, one million jobs were created between 2010 and 2020, or 7% of industrial employment. The Reshoring Initiative\u2019s listings include more than 3,700 companies. See URL: https:\/\/reshorenow.org\/companies-reshoring\/<\/a>. Accessed 25 April 2023. \u2191<\/a><\/p>\n<\/li>\n

  16. \n

    See \u201cThe Reshoring Initiative and Walmart Launch Effort to Help Suppliers Reshore\u201d, BusinessWire<\/em>, 19 August 2015. URL: https:\/\/www.businesswire.com\/news\/home\/20150819006200\/en\/Reshoring-Initiative-Walmart-Launch-Effort-Suppliers-Reshore<\/a>. Accessed 26 August 2022. \u2191<\/a><\/p>\n<\/li>\n

  17. \n

    The figures for the second half of 2020 are extrapolated, so a margin of error is possible. \u2191<\/a><\/p>\n<\/li>\n

  18. \n

    Schwartz<\/span> Nelson D., \u201cSupply Chain Woes Prompt a New Push to Revive U.S. Factories\u201d, The New York Times<\/em>, 5 January 2022. URL: https:\/\/www.nytimes.com\/2022\/01\/05\/business\/economy\/supply-chain-reshoring-us-manufacturing.html<\/a>, accessed 26 August 2022; and Kessler Sabrina, \u201cWhy US Companies Are Reshoring their Business\u201d, DW Made for Minds, 8 December 2021. URL: https:\/\/www.dw.com\/en\/why-us-companies-are-reshoring-their-business\/a-60054515<\/a>. Accessed 26 August 2022. \u2191<\/a><\/p>\n<\/li>\n

  19. \n

    Ziady<\/span> Hanna, \u201cAdidas Is Closing Hi-tech Sneaker Factories in Germany and the US\u201d, CNN Business, 12 November 2019. URL: https:\/\/edition.cnn.com\/2019\/11\/12\/business\/adidas-speedfactory-plants-closing\/index.html<\/a>. Accessed 26 August 2022. \u2191<\/a><\/p>\n<\/li>\n

  20. \n

    Villa\u00e9cija<\/span> Raquel and S\u00e1nchez<\/span> Dina, \u201cBusiness. Au revoir la Chine, bonjour l’Europe\u201d, Courrier international<\/em>, 12 May 2022. URL: https:\/\/www.courrierinternational.com\/article\/entreprises-au-revoir-la-chine-bonjour-l-europe<\/a>. Accessed 26 August 2022. \u2191<\/a><\/p>\n<\/li>\n

  21. \n

    Post Covid-19 Value Chains: Options for Reshoring Production Back to Europe in a Globalised Economy<\/em>, European Parliament, 2021. URL: https:\/\/op.europa.eu\/en\/publication-detail\/-\/publication\/84b08680-8150-11eb-9ac9-01aa75ed71a1\/language-en<\/a>. Accessed 26 August 2022. \u2191<\/a><\/p>\n<\/li>\n<\/ol><\/div>","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

    Following the gridlock or seizure of certain logistics chains as a result of the health crisis and the war in Ukraine, many countries, particularly in Europe, have become aware of the importance of controlling certain strategic supplies. After decades of unbridled globalisation, often marked by the relocation of industrial activities from industrialised to developing countries … Continued<\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":16,"featured_media":29100,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_acf_changed":false,"_seopress_titles_title":"","_seopress_titles_desc":"","_seopress_robots_index":"","_seopress_robots_follow":"","_seopress_robots_imageindex":"","_seopress_robots_snippet":"","_seopress_robots_primary_cat":"none","_seopress_robots_breadcrumbs":"","_seopress_robots_freeze_modified_date":"","_seopress_robots_custom_modified_date":"","_seopress_robots_canonical":"","_seopress_social_fb_title":"","_seopress_social_fb_desc":"","_seopress_social_fb_img":"","_seopress_social_fb_img_attachment_id":0,"_seopress_social_fb_img_width":0,"_seopress_social_fb_img_height":0,"_seopress_social_twitter_title":"","_seopress_social_twitter_desc":"","_seopress_social_twitter_img":"","_seopress_social_twitter_img_attachment_id":0,"_seopress_social_twitter_img_width":0,"_seopress_social_twitter_img_height":0,"_seopress_redirections_value":"","_seopress_redirections_enabled":"","_seopress_redirections_enabled_regex":"","_seopress_redirections_logged_status":"both","_seopress_redirections_param":"","_seopress_redirections_type":301,"_seopress_analysis_target_kw":"","footnotes":""},"categories":[179],"tags":[133],"keyword":[1287,950,845,1034],"class_list":["post-83044","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-foresight-analysis","tag-economie-et-emploi-en","keyword-economie-industrielle-en","keyword-politique-industrielle-en","keyword-commerce-international-en","keyword-protectionnisme-en"],"acf":[],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.futuribles.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/83044","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.futuribles.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.futuribles.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.futuribles.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/16"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.futuribles.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=83044"}],"version-history":[{"count":5,"href":"https:\/\/www.futuribles.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/83044\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":99223,"href":"https:\/\/www.futuribles.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/83044\/revisions\/99223"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.futuribles.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/29100"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.futuribles.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=83044"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.futuribles.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=83044"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.futuribles.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=83044"},{"taxonomy":"keyword","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.futuribles.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/keyword?post=83044"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}