{"id":111097,"date":"2025-01-22T06:00:00","date_gmt":"2025-01-22T05:00:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.futuribles.com\/le-pic-petrolier-catastrophe-imminente-ou-horizon-sans-cesse-repousse\/"},"modified":"2025-06-13T16:48:41","modified_gmt":"2025-06-13T14:48:41","slug":"le-pic-petrolier-catastrophe-imminente-ou-horizon-sans-cesse-repousse","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.futuribles.com\/en\/le-pic-petrolier-catastrophe-imminente-ou-horizon-sans-cesse-repousse\/","title":{"rendered":"Peak oil: imminent disaster or an ever-postponed horizon?"},"content":{"rendered":"
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Are we running out of oil? Or will oil soon become an obsolete energy source, with production capacity permanently exceeding demand? The best experts are clear on the answer to these questions, but they do not agree with each other.<\/h6>\n\n\n\n

The origins of the peak<\/h2>\n\n\n\n

The origins of the controversy can be traced back to the mid-1950s, when the hypothesis of \u201cpeak oil\u201d was first mooted, i.e.<\/em> the idea that production would reach a plateau, followed by a decline on a slope symmetrical to that of the growth that preceded the peak. The notion of a peak was coined in 1956 by the geophysicist Marion King Hubbert. His analysis focused on the United States and he predicted that, given estimated reserves and accumulated historical production figures, production would peak in the mid-1970s and then follow a bell-shaped curve that came to be known as the \u2018Hubbert curve\u2019.<\/p>\n\n\n

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\n Figure 1. The original Hubbert curve\n <\/p>\n <\/div>\n

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Source: <\/em>Hubbert<\/span> M. King, \u201cNuclear Energy and Fossil Fuels<\/a>\u201d, Shell Development Company, reprinted in Drilling and Production Practice, <\/em>American Petroleum Institute, 1956.<\/p>\n\n <\/div>\n\n\n

This prediction had a strong impact on the analyses carried out at the time on the relative contribution of fossil fuels and nuclear energy to the world\u2019s long-term energy supply. In fact, from the late 1960s onwards, in the face of very buoyant oil consumption, growth in US production began to slow (see figure 3 below)<\/em>. And the oil shocks of 1973-1974 and 1979-1980 \u2014 following the publication of the Club of Rome report[1]<\/a><\/sup> \u2014 seemed to provide resounding confirmation of a \u201cchange of world\u201d linked to the increasing scarcity of oil.<\/p>\n

The world was indeed changing. But the new reality happened to be complex, because at the time of the shocks, the oil industry had already set about finding new deposits, which were more difficult to access, but which were becoming economically exploitable as a result of price rises following the shocks and technological advances (3D seismic, deep and multidirectional drilling, etc.). The oil industry was indeed given a new lease of life by oil from Alaska, the North Sea, the Gulf of Mexico and the Gulf of Guinea. It was then that it was clearly stated that the known reserves of conventional oil were only a small part of the reality of this industry.<\/p>\n

From proven reserves to hypothetical resources<\/h2>\n

In 1973, a \u201cSummary of United States Mineral Resources\u201d[2]<\/a><\/sup> was published, co-authored by Vincent McKelvey, then Director of the United States Geological Survey (USGS). It contains the \u2018McKelvey diagram\u2019, which distinguishes between oil that is economically exploitable at current prices and oil that is not, so as between known reserves and estimated resources. Although less well known than the Hubbert curve, the McKelvey diagram is essential to a proper understanding of the economics of oil and other resources. In particular, it links the geophysical and economic dimensions of the natural resources problem. It shows how, within a limited non-renewable resource potential, exploitable reserves can be rebuilt \u2014 to a certain extent \u2014 by exploration and technical progress.<\/p>\n\n

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\n Figure 2. The original McKelvey diagram (1973)\n <\/p>\n <\/div>\n

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Source: <\/em>Brobst<\/span> Donald A., Pratt<\/span> Walden P. and McKelvey<\/span> Vincent E., op. cit.<\/em><\/a><\/p>\n\n <\/div>\n\n\n<\/div>\n

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Since then, the debate between geologists and economists on the depletion of oil (and other natural resources) has not ceased, with both sides accusing each other of ignoring whether physical constraints or economic adjustment mechanisms through prices. Emblematic of this debate are, on the one hand, the positions taken by the ASPO (Association for the Study of Peak Oil<\/a>), which is well represented in France, notably by geologists from TotalEnergies, and, on the other hand, those of \u2018standard\u2019 economists. The latter indeed consider that the issue is a non-problem, since the adjustment of supply and demand through prices will ensure the reproduction of reserves and the proper regulation of the quantities produced and consumed.<\/p>\n

Up until now, the facts seem to prove the economists right: as price shocks and counter-shocks have occurred, proven oil reserves have steadily increased. As we know, assessing reserves is a strategic issue for governments and oil companies alike, so we need to remain cautious. But over the last 40 years, global reserves have increased 2.5-fold, from 682 billion barrels (Gbl) in 1980 to 1,301 Gbl in 2000 and 1,732 Gbl in 2020.[3]<\/a><\/sup><\/p>\n\n <\/div>\n

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\n Voir aussi<\/span>\n
\n
\n \n \"\"<\/a>\n <\/span>\n \n The Inescapable Decline of Oil<\/a>\n \n \n \n <\/use>\n<\/svg>\n <\/a>\n <\/span>\n
\n
26 June 2021<\/div>\n AUZANNEAU Matthieu<\/a>\n
\n 10 p.\n <\/div>\n <\/div>\n\n
\n \n \n Futuribles Journal\n <\/a>\n Environment<\/a>\n Science and Technology<\/a>\n Society<\/a>\n <\/div>\n <\/div>\n<\/div>\n <\/div>\n <\/div>\n <\/div>\n<\/div>\n
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From cheap oil to difficult and unconventional oil<\/h2>\n

Two phenomena explain this continuous increase in oil reserves: firstly, the take-off of production in new oil-producing provinces shortly after the shocks and, more recently, the development of unconventional hydrocarbons. This is illustrated by the US production curve (figure 3). It begins with the first production peak in 1970, followed by an initially rapid decline, which was then slowed by the start-up of production from fields in Alaska and the Gulf of Mexico. Shale oil production began to appear in 2008, made possible by hydraulic fracturing. In 2015, US production caught up with that of Saudi Arabia and Russia, at 12 million barrels per day (mb\/d). In 2023, it will be 19 mb\/d (2.7 times its 2008 level[4]<\/a><\/sup>)!<\/p>\n\n

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\n Figure 3. Oil production by the three giants, United States, Saudi Arabia, Russia (in terawatt-hours)\n <\/p>\n <\/div>\n

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Source: <\/em>Our World in Data<\/em><\/a>, <\/em>graph produced on 17 January 2025.<\/p>\n\n <\/div>\n\n\n

The arrival of unconventional resources \u2014 shale oil and gas \u2014 has turned the world\u2019s hydrocarbon markets upside down. In this new state of the world, the United States has become a major supplier for Europe, creating new dependencies, while Russian hydrocarbons must increasingly be sold rather to Asia and China.<\/p>\n

In the peak oil debate, it is impossible to ignore the importance of unconventional resources. Does this mean that the problem of scarcity has disappeared once and for all? Probably not, because we know that unconventional deposits are depleted much more quickly than conventional deposits… However, while production started at least 20 years ago in the United States, the second peak, that of unconventional resources, is not yet in sight. Moreover, we know that unconventional resources are very significant in the rest of the world, including in countries that produce conventional hydrocarbons, and even in Europe.[5]<\/a><\/sup><\/p>\n\n

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\n Figure 4. World oil resources (in Gt)\n <\/p>\n <\/div>\n

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Source: <\/em>Total, 2014, in <\/em>Le Solleuz<\/span> Antoine and Gantois<\/span> Olivier, op. cit.<\/em><\/a><\/p>\n\n <\/div>\n\n\n<\/div>\n

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The unknown of demand<\/h2>\n

Resources are therefore abundant, provided we are willing to pay the price (or rather the cost of production). There remains the other great unknown, that of future demand, absolutely linked to that of long-term energy forecasting, in the context of the fight against climate change. Few subjects have given rise to so many modelled prospective studies, whether by scientific bodies such as the IPCC,[6]<\/a><\/sup> international organisations such as the International Energy Agency (IEA)[7]<\/a><\/sup> or the European Commission[8]<\/a><\/sup> and, finally, numerous research companies such as Enerdata[9]<\/a><\/sup> in France. It is not possible to explore all their diversity here.<\/p>\n

But there are two key points. Firstly, in the global energy outlook, everything depends not only on the ambition of climate policies, but also on the ability of governments to implement these policies (it is here necessary to make a clear distinction between the \u201cambition gap\u201d and the \u201cimplementation gap\u201d). Uncertainties lead to huge differences in projections for the various variables, and are largely irreducible, as the outcome will depend on future policy choices. We can therefore only classify the various projections into two categories: \u201crealistic\u201d or \u201cvoluntarist\u201d in terms of reducing fossil fuel consumption.<\/p>\n

On the other hand, even in the IEA\u2019s central projections (STEPS, Stated Policies Scenarios), <\/em>it appears that the policies already underway in the various regions of the world should lead to a plateau in oil consumption around 2030. The uncertainties here relate above all to the substitution of gas for oil, the electrification of uses and the development of electric vehicles (figure 5).<\/p>\n\n <\/div>\n

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\n Voir aussi<\/span>\n
\n
\n \n \"\"<\/a>\n <\/span>\n \n World Energy Outlook 2024<\/a>\n \n \n \n <\/use>\n<\/svg>\n <\/a>\n <\/span>\n
\n
25 November 2024<\/div>\n PAPON Pierre<\/a>\n
\n 6 min.\n <\/div>\n <\/div>\n\n
\n \n \n <\/use>\n<\/svg>\n\n Read, Seen, Heard\n <\/a>\n Economics<\/a>\n Environment<\/a>\n <\/div>\n <\/div>\n<\/div>\n <\/div>\n <\/div>\n <\/div>\n<\/div>\n
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\n Figure 5. Global oil demand in the STEPS and key sensitivities, 2015-2035 (in mb\/d)\n <\/p>\n <\/div>\n

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Source: <\/em>IEA, World Energy Outlook 2024<\/em><\/a>, <\/em>p. 173.<\/p>\n\n <\/div>\n\n\n<\/div>\n

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How will producers respond to a fall in oil prices?<\/h2>\n

Two states of the energy world are therefore possible in the medium term (2030): the first would be one in which the combination of policies already implemented and technical progress in the electrification of uses lead to a peak in demand, or even, in the long term, to a collapse in oil consumption if we move closer to the objective of carbon neutrality; the second would be one in which, even if climate policies limited the growth in demand for oil in the North, the pressure of unsatisfied energy needs in the countries of the South would lead to strong tensions between supply and global demand.<\/p>\n

In the first case, that of a peak in demand, what would be the response of the producing countries: would they restrain their capacity to sustain a high price, corresponding to their financing needs, by reducing their investments and\/or production? Or would they instead engage in a sauve-qui-peut<\/em>, trying to liquidate their stocks while oil still has a value? This would be an attempt to maximise discounted revenues, according to the lessons of the neoclassical economic theory of natural resource management. This hypothesis seems unlikely to us, since the brief price wars that have been waged in the past have been much more to discourage competition from expensive oil than to optimise oil revenues over time. Of course, we cannot rule out a price war of oil against low-carbon technologies (renewables and nuclear), but it would be more difficult to wage because their competition with oil is indirect and systemic.<\/p>\n

In the second case, where demand remains very dynamic due to the pressure of needs in the countries of the South, would we return to a logic of peak production due to physical constraints? This seems unlikely because, even if the American oil model cannot be reproduced, there are substantial resources all over the world. On the other hand, in such a case, we would have to expect considerable price instability, with high levels allowing and encouraging the mobilisation of very expensive fossil fuels. This would be an additional factor in global economic and geopolitical instability.<\/p>\n

Whether the future is one of peak demand or new oil and gas shocks, geopolitical uncertainty is now extreme. For importing countries and Europe, reducing consumption of fossil fuels through energy sufficiency policies is probably the best way of preserving economic sovereignty.<\/p>\n\n <\/div>\n

\n
\n Voir aussi<\/span>\n
\n
\n \n \"\"<\/a>\n <\/span>\n \n The decarbonation \/ energy efficiency \/ sobriety triptych in energy transition scenarios<\/a>\n \n \n \n <\/use>\n<\/svg>\n <\/a>\n <\/span>\n
\n
19 December 2024<\/div>\n LE BEC Antoine<\/a>\n
\n 8 min.\n <\/div>\n <\/div>\n\n
\n \n \n <\/use>\n<\/svg>\n\n Signposts\n <\/a>\n Environment<\/a>\n Science and Technology<\/a>\n Society<\/a>\n <\/div>\n <\/div>\n<\/div>\n <\/div>\n <\/div>\n <\/div>\n<\/div>\n
\n\n\n\n

<\/p>\n\n\n

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To find out more<\/h2>\n

Three recent contributions<\/strong><\/p>\n

Auzanneau<\/span> Matthieu (interview), \u201c\u2018Hors de la sobri\u00e9t\u00e9, point de salut\u2019 : une strat\u00e9gie du faible face \u00e0 la vuln\u00e9rabilit\u00e9 \u00e9nerg\u00e9tique\u201d, Revue internationale et strat\u00e9gique, <\/em>no. 136, winter 2024.<\/p>\n

Boussena<\/span> Sadek and Locatelli<\/span> Catherine, Les Producteurs face \u00e0 l\u2019obsolescence annonc\u00e9e du p\u00e9trole, <\/em>Grenoble: ed. Campus ouvert, 2022.<\/p>\n

Charbonnier<\/span> Pierre, Vers l\u2019\u00e9cologie de guerre, <\/em>Paris: La D\u00e9couverte, 2024.<\/p>\n

A few references<\/strong><\/p>\n

\u201cPic p\u00e9trolier<\/a>\u201d, Connaissance des \u00e9nergies, <\/em>7 June 2024.<\/p>\n

\u201cR\u00e9serves et production de p\u00e9trole dans le monde\u201d<\/a>, Connaissance des \u00e9nergies, <\/em>27 June 2024.<\/p>\n

Le Solleuz<\/span> Antoine and Gantois<\/span> Olivier, \u201cImmense Remaining Oil Reserves and the Challenge of Reducing Consumption<\/a>\u201d, Polytechnique insights, <\/em>17 January 2023.<\/p>\n

Mouterde<\/span> Perrine, \u201c\u00c9nergies fossiles : la baisse de la demande est-elle vraiment en vue\u00a0?<\/a>\u201d, Le Monde, <\/em>14 October 2024.<\/p>\n\n <\/div>\n<\/div>\n\n\n\n

\u2014\u2014\u2014\u2014\u2014\u2014\u2013
N.B.:<\/em> this article has been translated from French by DeepL, and revised by the author and Futuribles.<\/span><\/p>\n\n\n

    \n
  1. \n

    Meadows<\/span> Donella et alii, The Limits to Growth<\/em>, New York: Universe Books, 1972. \u2191<\/a><\/p>\n<\/li>\n

  2. \n

    Brobst<\/span> Donald A., Pratt<\/span> Walden P. and McKelvey<\/span> Vincent E., \u201cSummary of United States Mineral Resources<\/a>\u201d, Geological Survey Circular, <\/em>no. 682, USGS, 1973. \u2191<\/a><\/p>\n<\/li>\n

  3. \n

    Source: <\/em>Statistical Review of World Energy<\/em><\/a>, by the Energy Institute. \u2191<\/a><\/p>\n<\/li>\n

  4. \n

    Ibid.<\/em> \u2191<\/a><\/p>\n<\/li>\n

  5. \n

    Le Solleuz<\/span> Antoine and Gantois<\/span> Olivier, \u201cImmense Remaining Oil Reserves and the Challenge of Reducing Consumption<\/a>\u201d, Polytechnique insights, <\/em>17 January 2023. \u2191<\/a><\/p>\n<\/li>\n

  6. \n

    See \u201cAR6 Scenario Explorer and Database hosted by IIASA<\/a>\u201d, IPCC (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change), 2022. \u2191<\/a><\/p>\n<\/li>\n

  7. \n

    See its World Energy Outlook 2024<\/em><\/a>. \u2191<\/a><\/p>\n<\/li>\n

  8. \n

    In the Global Energy and Climate Outlook <\/em><\/a>published each year by the Joint Research Centre (JRC). \u2191<\/a><\/p>\n<\/li>\n

  9. \n

    See its work for 2050: \u201cGlobal Energy Forecasts: EnerFuture<\/a>\u201d. \u2191<\/a><\/p>\n<\/li>\n<\/ol><\/div>","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

    Are we running out of oil? Or will oil soon become an obsolete energy source, with production capacity permanently exceeding demand? The best experts are clear on the answer to these questions, but they do not agree with each other. The origins of the peak The origins of the controversy can be traced back to … Continued<\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":25,"featured_media":101401,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_acf_changed":false,"_seopress_titles_title":"","_seopress_titles_desc":"","_seopress_robots_index":"","_seopress_robots_follow":"","_seopress_robots_imageindex":"","_seopress_robots_snippet":"","_seopress_robots_primary_cat":"none","_seopress_robots_breadcrumbs":"","_seopress_robots_freeze_modified_date":"","_seopress_robots_custom_modified_date":"","_seopress_robots_canonical":"","_seopress_social_fb_title":"","_seopress_social_fb_desc":"","_seopress_social_fb_img":"","_seopress_social_fb_img_attachment_id":0,"_seopress_social_fb_img_width":0,"_seopress_social_fb_img_height":0,"_seopress_social_twitter_title":"","_seopress_social_twitter_desc":"","_seopress_social_twitter_img":"","_seopress_social_twitter_img_attachment_id":0,"_seopress_social_twitter_img_width":0,"_seopress_social_twitter_img_height":0,"_seopress_redirections_value":"","_seopress_redirections_enabled":"","_seopress_redirections_enabled_regex":"","_seopress_redirections_logged_status":"both","_seopress_redirections_param":"","_seopress_redirections_type":301,"_seopress_analysis_target_kw":"","footnotes":""},"categories":[195],"tags":[133,202],"keyword":[878,849,850,1004,1626,1129,1003],"class_list":["post-111097","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-signposts","tag-economie-et-emploi-en","tag-environnement-en","keyword-consommation-en","keyword-energie-en","keyword-prevision-etude-de-cas-en","keyword-indicateurs-en","keyword-modelisation-en","keyword-petrole-en","keyword-production-en"],"acf":[],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.futuribles.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/111097","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.futuribles.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.futuribles.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.futuribles.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/25"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.futuribles.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=111097"}],"version-history":[{"count":5,"href":"https:\/\/www.futuribles.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/111097\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":112141,"href":"https:\/\/www.futuribles.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/111097\/revisions\/112141"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.futuribles.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/101401"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.futuribles.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=111097"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.futuribles.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=111097"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.futuribles.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=111097"},{"taxonomy":"keyword","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.futuribles.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/keyword?post=111097"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}