{"id":101315,"date":"2024-10-04T06:00:00","date_gmt":"2024-10-04T04:00:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.futuribles.com\/la-population-du-monde-vers-un-declin-a-long-terme\/"},"modified":"2025-01-17T18:18:22","modified_gmt":"2025-01-17T17:18:22","slug":"la-population-du-monde-vers-un-declin-a-long-terme","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.futuribles.com\/en\/la-population-du-monde-vers-un-declin-a-long-terme\/","title":{"rendered":"The world\u2019s population, on course for long-term decline"},"content":{"rendered":"
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The Population Division of the United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affair (UN DESA\/POP) recently released new population estimates and projections for the world, and 237 countries or areas and various groupings thereof.[1]<\/a><\/sup> Covering the period 1950-2023 and based on various existing sources of information,[2]<\/a><\/sup> the estimates provide a highly instructive insight into population dynamics and the predominant trends at work. The outlook covers the period 2024-2100 and, like the previous ones, is based on the assumption of continued human progress, according to which the trend towards higher life expectancy can only continue, while fertility can only decline where it is highest.[3]<\/a><\/sup><\/h6>\n\n\n\n

The methodology used to produce these prospects is even more complex than previously, but it still assumes the total independence of key factors in demographic change. So, whether a country\u2019s net migration (immigrants minus emigrants) is zero or several million, this is assumed to have no effect on fertility: as if immigrant women instantly adopt the fertility behaviours of the host country. Furthermore, as in previous versions, future demographic trends are anticipated without taking local realities into consideration or reflecting on the conditions for their occurrence.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

A pure in vitro<\/em> demography exercise, then, illustrating \u2014 to a greater or lesser degree, according to the various variants \u2014 the theory of global demographic convergence, the UN\u2019s recent population prospects are no more designed to describe the future demographics of the world than are previous ones. They are simply intended to outline a few possible scenarios, all else being equal, and to provide food for thought on the long-term issues and deadlocks associated with certain combinations of factors.<\/p>\n\n\n<\/div>\n

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The demographic future of the world according to the WPP2024<\/em><\/h2>\n

The 2024 Revision once again favours the component method, with forecasts based on assumptions about the three elements that determine population trends based on a given structure by sex and age: fertility, mortality and net migration. Fertility, considered to be a major factor in demographic dynamics, again gives rise to the development of three patterns of change, each associated with the same two patterns of change in mortality and net migration. The three associations of components are then broken down according to the situation and trends specific to the geographical entities under consideration, and constitute the three basic variants (low, medium, high) of the prospects.[4]<\/a><\/sup><\/p>\n

In comparison with the 2022 Revision the 2024 update simply refines the trends previously anticipated, using more recent data. In terms of fertility, the three scenarios \u2014 medium, low (medium less one-half child), and high (medium plus one-half child) \u2014 produce the same global total fertility rate (TFR) values for the year 2100, with decimal-level corrections made upwards or downwards for discrete geographical regions (Table 1). In terms of mortality, life expectancy is still expected to rise but not by as much as previously projected: the difference ranges from a reduction of less than one half-year globally to a reduction of more than two years in some regions and sub-regions (Caribbean, Micronesia). As for international migration, excluding Africa where negative net migration levels have been revised upwards (with even more departures than arrivals now anticipated), the UNPD\u2019s prediction \u2014 although totally contrary to observations \u2014 suggests an overall reduction in net migration numbers in the future.<\/p>\n\n <\/div>\n

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\n Voir aussi<\/span>\n
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\n \n \"\"<\/a>\n <\/span>\n \n World Population: Trends and Prospects<\/a>\n \n \n \n <\/use>\n<\/svg>\n <\/a>\n <\/span>\n
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26 December 2022<\/div>\n PARANT Alain<\/a>\n
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\n Table 1. Total fertility rate (TFR), life expectancy at birth for both sexes (E0<\/sub>) and net migrants estimated in 2023 and projected in 2100, worldwide and by major region or sub-region\n <\/p>\n <\/div>\n

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Reading: <\/em>the values in red are absolute differences (in children per woman, years of life, and thousands of net migrants) between the 2024 revision value and the corresponding value in the 2022 revision.<\/p>\n

For net migration, a negative difference combined with a negative 2024 Revision value reflects an increase in negative net migration; a negative difference combined with a positive 2024 Revision value indicates a reduction in positive net migration. A positive difference combined with a negative 2024 revision value reflects a decrease in negative net migration; combined with a positive 2024 revision value, it indicates an increase in positive net migration numbers.<\/p>\n

Source: <\/em>UN DESA\/POP, WPP 2024<\/em><\/a>, op. cit<\/em>.<\/p>\n\n <\/div>\n\n\n\n

Population decline: a long-term affair<\/h2>\n\n\n\n

Under the assumptions formulated by the UN DESA\/POP, it appears that only a very sharp decline in fertility (low variant) would lead to a decrease in the world population. However, this would not occur until 2054, with a peak of 8.95 billion inhabitants, an increase of some 900 million (+11%) compared with 2023 (Figure 1). By 2100, the world\u2019s population will have fallen to 7 billion, its 2010 level.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Assuming a smaller decline in fertility (medium variant), the world population increases to 10.3 billion, reaching its peak in 2084 and prevailing practically until 2100 (10.2 billion). Assuming \u2014 and this is highly unlikely \u2014 that fertility rises almost across the board (the only exception being Africa), the number of humans rises steadily until it reaches 14.4 billion in 2100. Logically, these results do not differ much from those of the 2022 Revision, the range being just a little tighter at the bottom and the top.[5]<\/a><\/sup><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Clearly, defusing the \u201cP Bomb\u201d[6]<\/a><\/sup> is going to take than some people claim or hope, which will mean, all other things being equal, a future increase in the world\u2019s ecological footprint.<\/p>\n\n\n

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\n Figure\u00a01. Estimated world population from 1950 to 2023, and projected from 2024 to 2100 according to three variants\n <\/p>\n <\/div>\n

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Source: <\/em>UN DESA\/POP, WPP 2024<\/em><\/a>, op. cit<\/em>.<\/p>\n\n <\/div>\n\n\n\n

Towards a reversal in the age pyramid<\/h2>\n\n\n\n

Population ageing is a phenomenon that today affects all regions of the world, regardless of their level of development. This phenomenon is set to increase significantly over the coming decades, particularly, assuming the current mortality trend persists, if fertility starts to decline more sharply. Inevitably, the peak of the age pyramid for the world\u2019s population is going to swell and the pyramid itself will start to invert (Figure 2).<\/p>\n\n\n

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\n Figure 2. Estimated age pyramid for 2023 and projections for 2100 (world population), based on three variants (per 10,000 total population)\n <\/p>\n <\/div>\n

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Source: <\/em>UN DESA\/POP, WPP 2024<\/em><\/a>, op. cit<\/em>.<\/p>\n\n <\/div>\n\n\n\n

Even assuming a very substantial rebound in fertility rates in areas where they are currently below the replacement level[7]<\/a><\/sup> and a decline at the slowest anticipated pace, the proportion of Earth\u2019s population aged under 15 would fall from 25% to 21.4%, while the proportion aged 65 or over would rise from 10% to 18.3%. In parallel, the median age[8]<\/a><\/sup> would rise from 30.4 to 35.6, with all the world\u2019s major regions experiencing the same trend (Table 2).<\/p>\n\n\n

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\n Table 2. Population ageing: estimates for 2023 and natural trends for 2050 and 2100, worldwide and by major region\n <\/p>\n <\/div>\n

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Source: <\/em>UN DESA\/POP, WPP 2024<\/em><\/a>, op. cit<\/em>.<\/p>\n\n <\/div>\n\n\n\n

This population ageing, because of the extent to which it will continue to grow, will constitute a formidable and sprawling challenge, both for the most developed countries, which have for too long and profoundly ignored it despite repeated warnings, and for the societies of the least developed countries, which suffer from frequently deficient governance and very inadequate wealth creation.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Migration, a fast-growing adjustment variable<\/h2>\n\n\n\n

The demographic dynamics that are taking shape over the next few decades are such that migration will become an increasingly important adjustment variable. For proof of this, we need only look at the natural growth rates (excluding migration) \u2014 the primary indicators of the intrinsic dynamics \u2014 forecast for the various countries of the world.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

By 2050, there will already be a clear divergence between the most developed countries (including China), particularly in Europe, and the less developed countries, particularly in Africa, Central Asia and Western Europe (Map 1). But the trend continues and the gaps are widening inexorably. While countries such as Italy, Spain, Poland and Greece in Europe, and Japan and China in Asia, could record an almost 50% contraction of their population between 2023 and 2100, others could see theirs more than double over the same period (Yemen, C\u00f4te-d\u2019Ivoire, Uganda, Sudan, Afghanistan, Niger, Mali), or even more than triple (Angola, Tanzania, Democratic Republic of Congo) (Map 2).<\/p>\n\n\n

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\n Map 1. Population change 2023-2050 excluding migration (%)\n <\/p>\n <\/div>\n

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Source: <\/em>UN DESA\/POP, WPP 2024<\/em><\/a>, op. cit<\/em>.<\/p>\n\n <\/div>\n\n\n

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\n Map 2. Population change 2023-2100 excluding migration (%)\n <\/p>\n <\/div>\n

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Source: <\/em>UN DESA\/POP, WPP 2024<\/em><\/a>, op. cit<\/em>.<\/p>\n\n <\/div>\n\n\n\n

A decline or very strong growth in the number of people, combined with increasingly pronounced ageing, will not be the only factors behind a sharp rise in future international migration. But alongside economic, political and environmental factors, they will play their full part, with a predictable rise in competition between countries (receiving countries among themselves, sending countries among themselves, receiving countries and sending countries among themselves) and tensions for the various human communities concerned.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\u2014 \u2014 \u2014 \u2014 \u2014 \u2014 \u2013
N.B.:<\/em> this article has been translated from French by DeepL, and revised by the author \/ INED.<\/span><\/p>\n\n\n

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  1. \n

    UN DESA\/POP, World Population Prospects 2024<\/em><\/a> (WPP2024),<\/em> New York: United Nations, 2024. \u2191<\/a><\/p>\n<\/li>\n

  2. \n

    For the population estimates (total population and by sex and age) and the values required to produce demographic indicators, the UN DESA\/POP drew on information from population censuses (1,910 censuses conducted across the world since 1950), from population registers, from civil registration and vital statistics systems (which exist, with varying levels of effectiveness, in 169 countries), from 3,189 national demographic surveys, and from the many administrative files available.\u00a0 \u2191<\/a><\/p>\n<\/li>\n

  3. \n

    However, a rebound is anticipated once levels reach a \u201cfloor\u201d that varies by country, for example: equal for example to: 0.77 children per woman in Italy, 1.0 in Germany, 1.14 in France, etc.; 0.36 in South Korea, 0.59 in China, 0.78 in Japan, etc. \u2191<\/a><\/p>\n<\/li>\n

  4. \n

    Ten other variants have been developed by the UN DESA\/POP. Based on the nullity, constancy or a particular pattern of evolution of one or more components, they respond to the need to test the sensitivity of the outlook to a particular factor, or to provide quantified assessment elements for more complex or school combinations. \u2191<\/a><\/p>\n<\/li>\n

  5. \n

    The low, medium and high variants gave, respectively, for 2100: 8.4 billion people (decline from 2054), 10.4 billion (decline from 2087) and 14.8 billion (uninterrupted growth). \u2191<\/a><\/p>\n<\/li>\n

  6. \n

    To borrow the title of Paul R. and Anne H. Ehrlich\u2019s book: The Population Bomb,<\/em> New York: Ballantine Books, 1968. \u2191<\/a><\/p>\n<\/li>\n

  7. \n

    Under the mortality conditions currently prevailing in the most socio-economically developed countries, the replacement of female generations of childbearing age (aged between 15 and 49) is assured when average fertility is 2.1 children per woman. But in Africa, where the mortality calendar is generally earlier, replacement by numbers requires a fertility rate of 2.3 children per woman. \u2191<\/a><\/p>\n<\/li>\n

  8. \n

    The age that half of the population has not yet reached and the other half of the population has reached or passed. \u2191<\/a><\/p>\n<\/li>\n<\/ol><\/div>","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

    The Population Division of the United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affair (UN DESA\/POP) recently released new population estimates and projections for the world, and 237 countries or areas and various groupings thereof.[1] Covering the period 1950-2023 and based on various existing sources of information,[2] the estimates provide a highly instructive insight into population … Continued<\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":25,"featured_media":97970,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_acf_changed":false,"_seopress_titles_title":"","_seopress_titles_desc":"","_seopress_robots_index":"","_seopress_robots_follow":"","_seopress_robots_imageindex":"","_seopress_robots_snippet":"","_seopress_robots_primary_cat":"none","_seopress_robots_breadcrumbs":"","_seopress_robots_freeze_modified_date":"","_seopress_robots_custom_modified_date":"","_seopress_robots_canonical":"","_seopress_social_fb_title":"","_seopress_social_fb_desc":"","_seopress_social_fb_img":"","_seopress_social_fb_img_attachment_id":0,"_seopress_social_fb_img_width":0,"_seopress_social_fb_img_height":0,"_seopress_social_twitter_title":"","_seopress_social_twitter_desc":"","_seopress_social_twitter_img":"","_seopress_social_twitter_img_attachment_id":0,"_seopress_social_twitter_img_width":0,"_seopress_social_twitter_img_height":0,"_seopress_redirections_value":"","_seopress_redirections_enabled":"","_seopress_redirections_enabled_regex":"","_seopress_redirections_logged_status":"both","_seopress_redirections_param":"","_seopress_redirections_type":301,"_seopress_analysis_target_kw":"","footnotes":""},"categories":[195],"tags":[212],"keyword":[1412,850,1254,1041,1168],"class_list":["post-101315","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-signposts","tag-societe-en","keyword-vieillissement-en","keyword-prevision-etude-de-cas-en","keyword-tendances-lourdes-en","keyword-monde-en","keyword-population-en"],"acf":[],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.futuribles.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/101315","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.futuribles.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.futuribles.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.futuribles.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/25"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.futuribles.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=101315"}],"version-history":[{"count":5,"href":"https:\/\/www.futuribles.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/101315\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":101353,"href":"https:\/\/www.futuribles.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/101315\/revisions\/101353"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.futuribles.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/97970"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.futuribles.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=101315"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.futuribles.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=101315"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.futuribles.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=101315"},{"taxonomy":"keyword","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.futuribles.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/keyword?post=101315"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}