{"id":100692,"date":"2024-11-14T06:00:00","date_gmt":"2024-11-14T05:00:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.futuribles.com\/les-etats-unis-et-ladministration-trump-face-au-syndrome-de-la-surextension-strategique\/"},"modified":"2024-12-20T10:00:24","modified_gmt":"2024-12-20T09:00:24","slug":"les-etats-unis-et-ladministration-trump-face-au-syndrome-de-la-surextension-strategique","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.futuribles.com\/en\/les-etats-unis-et-ladministration-trump-face-au-syndrome-de-la-surextension-strategique\/","title":{"rendered":"The United States and the Trump administration facing the strategic overstretch syndrome"},"content":{"rendered":"
\n
Ukraine, the Middle East, major works policy…, since 2022, the proliferation of domestic and foreign issues requiring the support \u2014 or arbitration \u2014 of the United States has fuelled fears among many observers of American defence policy of a \u201cstrategic overstretch\u201d. This concept, theorised by the historian Paul Kennedy in The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers,[1]<\/a><\/sup><\/em> is based on a simple idea: empires mainly die when the cost of imperial expansion far exceeds their capacity to mobilise resources to absorb unforeseen shocks. While the risk of a collapse is not imminent, it can no longer be ruled out in the medium term.<\/h6>\n\n\n<\/div>\n
\n
\n
\n

Has Washington reached the limits of its international commitments? Considering the policy of major works launched in the wake of the Covid-19 pandemic (Infrastructure Investments and Jobs Act, CHIPS and Science Act, Inflation Reduction Act, etc.), the public debt \u2014 forecast at 135% of gross domestic product (GDP) in 2025 \u2014 and the multiplication of military engagements since 2022, more and more experts think so. In a column published in January 2024, Foreign Policy<\/em><\/a> openly worries about the possibility of a stall: \u201cSelf-evidently, the United States cannot meet its obligations to 50 allies at once, much in the same way that a bank cannot return all its deposits in one go\u201d, writes the author, James Crabtree; \u201cits ability to do so depends crucially on ensuring sufficient confidence to avoid the geopolitical equivalent of a bank run\u00a0\u00bb.[2]<\/a><\/sup><\/p>\n

Last July, candidate Trump himself used a banking metaphor<\/a> to illustrate his vision of international relations: \u201cI think Taiwan should pay us for defense. You know, we’re no different than an insurance company. Taiwan doesn’t give us anything.\u201d Will his return to the White House accelerate the strategic readjustments that many see as inevitable?<\/p>\n\n <\/div>\n

\n
\n Voir aussi<\/span>\n
\n
\n \n \"\"<\/a>\n <\/span>\n \n L\u2019Acc\u00e9l\u00e9ration de l\u2019histoire<\/a>\n \n \n \n <\/use>\n<\/svg>\n <\/a>\n <\/span>\n
\n
10 April 2024<\/div>\n PAGLIA Morgan<\/a>\n
\n 4 min.\n <\/div>\n <\/div>\n\n
\n \n \n <\/use>\n<\/svg>\n\n Read, Seen, Heard\n <\/a>\n Geopolitics<\/a>\n <\/div>\n <\/div>\n<\/div>\n <\/div>\n <\/div>\n <\/div>\n<\/div>\n
\n\n\n\n

Reserves at an all-time low<\/h2>\n\n\n\n

While Washington still dominates global military spending, at US$916 billion out of an estimated global total of US$2,443 billion, its pledge of \u201cunwavering\u201d support for Israel and assistance to Ukraine \u201cfor as long as it takes\u201d[3]<\/a><\/sup> clearly drains the resources needed to maintain its superpower status. If the United States were to engage in a conflict in the Pacific, they \u201cwould likely run out of some munitions \u2014 such as long-range, precision-guided munitions \u2014 in less than one week in a Taiwan Strait conflict. […] The U.S. defense industrial base is not adequately prepared for the competitive security environment that now exists\u201d, reckons the Center for Strategic and International Studies<\/a>, following a simulated engagement against China.[4]<\/a><\/sup><\/p>\n\n\n<\/div>\n

\n
\n
\n

Moreover, the tensions over arms stocks reveal some unflattering lessons about the trade-offs made by Washington in its defence policy in recent years. US stocks of precision munitions are dangerously low, noted the CSIS in early 2023<\/a>, with the Pentagon having \u201conly placed on contract a fraction of the weapons it has sent to Ukraine\u201d.<\/p>\n

Among these weapons, the Javelin <\/em>anti-tank missiles, designed to neutralise enemy armoured vehicles and tanks thanks to their precision, occupy an important place. By transferring these missiles to Ukraine until the end of August 2022, the United States has supplied the equivalent of seven years\u2019 production at fiscal 2022 rates, before the reprogramming necessary to offset this reduction in stocks. The problem is that it takes almost two years to produce certain models of ammunition, creating a significant time lag between the expression of a possible need and use.<\/p>\n

Against this backdrop, the United States\u2019 ability to revive its military-industrial complex is coming up against major obstacles, in particular a labour shortage in key sectors such as shipbuilding<\/a>, where there is an estimated shortage of more than 50,000 workers to meet the growing demand for shipbuilding. Faced with these difficulties, ally-shoring (relocating to allied countries) is being considered as a support solution. In 2025, the US Navy plans to experiment with this approach by using allied shipyards for the maintenance of certain ships, particularly in Japan and South Korea. While this solution could help reduce the backlog and improve fleet availability, it has limitations in the event of armed conflict, where access to foreign infrastructure could become uncertain. Furthermore, in the longer term, the US will probably need to invest in an industrial strategy to support the defence sector, with long-term contracts capable of securing industrial capabilities and mitigating the effect of budget fluctuations.<\/p>\n\n <\/div>\n

\n
\n Voir aussi<\/span>\n
\n
\n \n \"\"<\/a>\n <\/span>\n \n Pax atomica\u00a0?<\/a>\n \n \n \n <\/use>\n<\/svg>\n <\/a>\n <\/span>\n
\n
17 July 2024<\/div>\n PAPON Pierre<\/a>\n
\n 7 min.\n <\/div>\n <\/div>\n\n
\n \n \n <\/use>\n<\/svg>\n\n Read, Seen, Heard\n <\/a>\n Geopolitics<\/a>\n Science and Technology<\/a>\n <\/div>\n <\/div>\n<\/div>\n <\/div>\n <\/div>\n <\/div>\n<\/div>\n
\n\n\n
\n
\n
\n

\n \n <\/p>\n

\n Selected US Munitions Production Timelines (in months)\n <\/p>\n <\/div>\n

\n \"\"\n <\/div>\n <\/div>\n<\/div>\n
\n

Source: <\/em>CSIS<\/a> based on Department of Defense data.<\/p>\n\n <\/div>\n\n\n\n

Despite the acceleration in ammunition production \u2014 increased by 12% in 2024 \u2014 the effort remains well below the levels imagined by some think-tanks. Not least because, in addition to the replacement of ammunition transferred to allied countries, concerns are also emerging about US defence supply chains.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

In the United States, as in Europe, the \u2018peace dividend\u2019 period was accompanied by a high concentration of defence industrial activity, resulting in greater dependence on a limited number of suppliers. Budget cuts have particularly reduced the number of so-called secondary suppliers, i.e.<\/em> those providing specific, often strategic, components, making the supply chain more vulnerable. Some experts are now pointing to<\/a> the dangers associated with the extreme concentration of this value chain, estimating that a US$300 billion additional effort is needed to ensure a healthier diversification of supply chains.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

A further diversification effort remains unlikely in either the short or long term, given the high level of the US deficit \u2014 estimated at 6.3% of GDP in 2023 \u2014 even though the US\u2019s ability to finance its debt through its unrivalled access to international financial markets, via the dollar, still gives it a degree of fiscal flexibility. The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) long-term projections of the budget outlook for 2024 to 2054 estimate that compulsory civil programmes (Social Security, healthcare) and interest on the debt, which is set to rise to 166% of GDP by 2054, should be the main drivers of the increase in federal spending as a percentage of GDP, leaving little room for other types of investment.<\/p>\n\n\n

\n
\n
\n

\n \n <\/p>\n

\n Budget Deficits Under CBO\u2019s Long-Term Budget Outlook (% of GDP)\n <\/p>\n <\/div>\n

\n \"\"\n <\/div>\n <\/div>\n<\/div>\n
\n

Source: <\/em>\u201cAnalysis of CBO\u2019s March 2024 Long-term Budget Outlook<\/a>\u201d, CBO, 20 March 2024, p. 3.<\/p>\n\n <\/div>\n\n\n\n

Strategic overstretch, a fashionable fear<\/h2>\n\n\n\n

The notion of \u2018strategic overstretch\u2019 is therefore reappearing in the light of a clear gap between ambitions and resources, all at a time when the global arms race is accelerating. Some experts believe that in addition to the current four external fronts, hot or cold (Ukraine, Palestine, Taiwan, the Korean peninsula), a domestic front could quickly be activated by a natural disaster or internal violence, making the current strategic equation untenable. The idea of strategic overstretch also takes on particular significance in the light of biases recently highlighted in certain US foresight exercises. Conflict simulations reveal<\/a>, for example, that in the context of a conflict with China and North Korea, it would be almost impossible for either to occur without some form of simultaneity. According to American experts<\/a>, \u201cthe logistical, command and control, basing, and alliance policy considerations of the United States and its allies in the Indo-Pacific all appear designed around and suited for one fight or the other. They aren\u2019t designed for simultaneous conflicts with the PRC and North Korea.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n

\n
\n
\n

\n \n <\/p>\n

\n Military expenditure (in thousands of billions of US$ at 2021 prices)\n <\/p>\n <\/div>\n

\n \"\"\n <\/div>\n <\/div>\n<\/div>\n
\n

Source: <\/em>SIPRI (Stockholm Peace Research Institute), in The Economist<\/em><\/a>.<\/em><\/p>\n\n <\/div>\n\n\n<\/div>\n

\n
\n
\n

While the United States struggles to respond to the multiple crises it is called upon to deal with, China is continuing its military expansion, threatening Washington\u2019s superiority in key areas, notably the navy. The world\u2019s leading exporter since 2009 and the world\u2019s leading industrial power since 2010, China now has material capabilities comparable to those of the United States, and even superior in some areas. According to an article published in September by The National Interest<\/em><\/a>, China\u2019s shipbuilding capacity is 232 times greater than that of the United States. With 355 warships by 2021, China already has the largest navy in the world. According to Pentagon estimates, the Chinese fleet should reach 400 ships by 2025. But this huge quantitative lead is set to last. After decades of costly procurement failures,[5]<\/a><\/sup> the US Navy is having to reduce its procurement requests, delay its modernisation programmes and withdraw its ships from service earlier than planned, due to fiscal constraints. The Navy\u2019s budget for 2025 provides for the decommissioning of 19 ships, while only six new ships will be built.[6]<\/a><\/sup><\/p>\n

In addition to issues specific to the size of the US Navy, the consequences of an industrial base cut to the bone are being felt in terms of readiness. Fewer than 40% of US Navy ships complete their repairs on time, due to saturated shipyards, a shortage of skilled labour and hard-to-get spare parts for ageing ships. What military analysts have long described as the \u201cTerrible \u201820s\u201d<\/a> for the US Navy, marked by the withdrawal of a raft of surface ships and submarines, and a budgetary \u2018scissors\u2019 effect that is hampering any increase in power, now seems to be coming to fruition on a massive scale.<\/p>\n

If no major strategic adjustments are made, the United States risks falling into what Frank Hoffman calls the \u201cpink flamingo\u201d<\/a>: a cognitive bias that consists of ignoring the obvious signs of imminent danger, out of overconfidence in its position of power. Unlike Nassim N. Taleb\u2019s<\/a> \u201cblack swan\u201d, which refers to an unpredictable event, the \u201cpink flamingo\u201d is a visible threat that is underestimated by decision-makers.<\/p>\n

Yet the economic power of the United States remains unrivalled. In 2024, it will account for almost half the GDP of the G7, with a growing gap with Europe and Japan. But this economic strength is no longer enough to guarantee a viable strategic posture in the face of today\u2019s challenges. As Paul Kennedy wrote in 2023<\/a> on the 35th<\/sup> anniversary of The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers<\/em>, \u201cthe American security blanket will be tighter, smaller, limited to those well-known places such as NATO-Europe, Japan, Australia, Israel, Korea, maybe Taiwan, and not much else\u201d.<\/p>\n\n <\/div>\n

\n
\n Voir aussi<\/span>\n
\n
\n \n \"\"<\/a>\n <\/span>\n \n What Course for U.S. Foreign Policy after the 2024 Presidential Elections?<\/a>\n \n \n \n <\/use>\n<\/svg>\n <\/a>\n <\/span>\n
\n
26 August 2024<\/div>\n COHEN-TANUGI Laurent<\/a>\n
\n 10 p.\n <\/div>\n <\/div>\n\n
\n \n \n <\/use>\n<\/svg>\n\n Journal Article\n <\/a>\n Geopolitics<\/a>\n <\/div>\n <\/div>\n<\/div>\n <\/div>\n <\/div>\n <\/div>\n<\/div>\n
\n\n\n
\n
\n

Donald Trump, the return of Jacksonism or transactional diplomacy?<\/h2>\n

During his first term in office, Donald Trump readily claimed to be Andrew Jackson, the seventh President of the United States (1829-1837), whose portrait he displayed in the Oval Office. This symbolic choice reveals much more than simple historical admiration: it opens up avenues for reflection on the way in which Donald Trump intended to redefine the role of the United States on the international stage.<\/p>\n

The parallel between Donald Trump and Andrew Jackson is based on a desire to limit international openness in order to consolidate American power on its own continent. During the presidential campaign, candidate Trump called into question certain historic alliances such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), promised to settle the conflict in Ukraine in 24 hours, adopted a resolutely protectionist style, putting American interests first (\u201cAmerica first\u201d), and did not hesitate to question the very relevance of American intervention in the event of a Chinese invasion of Taiwan.<\/p>\n

Beyond these positions, which are sometimes shocking for allies accustomed to American support, there is of course the memory of the \u201ctransactional diplomacy\u201d[1]<\/sup> of his first term in office. During the presidential campaign, the candidate himself acknowledged that his threats against NATO and his repeated attacks on the \u201cfree-riding\u201d behaviour of South Korea were \u201cways of negotiating\u201d a better sharing of the budgetary \u201cburden\u201d. Certainly, with Donald Trump, no statement should be seen as definitive; negotiation will always be possible. Question: at what price will the allies have to pay for US support?<\/p>\n

The fact remains that \u201cstrategic overstretch\u201d is a major trend, visible in the decisions taken by the various administrations, whatever their political hue, in recent years. This constraint is bound to affect the work of the next administration.<\/p>\n

Downward adjustments to the operational contracts of the US armed forces have already been made by previous administrations. In the early 2010s, President Obama stated that, as part of a new strategy described as 1+2, US forces would retain the ability to \u201cdo more than one thing at a time\u201d, but rather in the sense of conducting a conflict and carrying out several smaller-scale operations simultaneously, marking a turning point compared with the orientations observed under the Clinton and Bush administrations.<\/p>\n

As for the US military presence abroad, it has undergone several reconfigurations (2004, 2021), falling from more than 700 installations to 545 installations abroad in 2023, exceeding the reduction target set in 2004 by the Bush administration.[2]<\/sup> In the medium term, Washington could therefore embark on a major review of its international commitments (Global Posture Review<\/em>), something that Donald Trump did not initiate during his first term in office.<\/p>\n

Secondly, faced with budgetary imperatives and multiple international fronts, it is likely that the nature of American support will change to involve fewer presence forces and more technical or intelligence support. Faced with an overload of obvious commitments, co-production actions with their allies \u2014 such as ally-shoring, which may, for example, involve transferring manufacturing plans and technical manuals to Ukraine \u2014 are already being tried out. However, this strategy must be constantly adapted to increasingly dynamic geopolitical competition.<\/p>\n

[1] Diplomacy based on the negotiation techniques set out in his book Trump: The Art of the Deal <\/em>(New York: Random House, 1987), centred on aggression and pressure tactics.<\/span><\/p>\n

[2] According to the FY Base Structure Report 2024<\/em><\/a>, \u201cPRV Quartile Site Summary\u201d tab.<\/span><\/p>\n\n <\/div>\n<\/div>\n\n\n\n

\u2014\u2014\u2014\u2014\u2014\u2014\u2013
N.B.: <\/em>this article has been translated from French by DeepL, and revised by the author and Futuribles.<\/span><\/p>\n\n\n

    \n
  1. \n

    New York: Random House, 1987 (French translation: Naissance et d\u00e9clin des grandes puissances, <\/em>Paris: Payot, 1989). \u2191<\/a><\/p>\n<\/li>\n

  2. \n

    Crabtree<\/span> James, \u201cAmerica\u2019s Strategy of Ambiguity Is Ending Now<\/a>\u201d, Foreign Policy<\/em>, 22 January 2024. \u2191<\/a><\/p>\n<\/li>\n

  3. \n

    Ullman<\/span> Harlan, \u201cThe Five-front War that the US Is Unprepared to Fight<\/a>\u201d, The Hill<\/em>, 23 October 2023. \u2191<\/a><\/p>\n<\/li>\n

  4. \n

    See also Levantovscaia Kathryn, \u201cOverstretched and Undersupplied: Can the US Afford Its Global Security Blanket\u00a0?<\/a>\u201d, Atlantic Council, 5 January 2024. \u2191<\/a><\/p>\n<\/li>\n

  5. \n

    Sapien<\/span> Joaquin, \u201cThe Inside Story of How the Navy Spent Billions on the \u2018Little Crappy Ship\u2019<\/a>\u201d, Propublica<\/em>, 7 September 2023. \u2191<\/a><\/p>\n<\/li>\n

  6. \n

    Report to Congress on the Annual Long-Range Plan for Construction of Naval Vessels for Fiscal Year 2025<\/em><\/a>, p. 25. \u2191<\/a><\/p>\n<\/li>\n<\/ol><\/div>","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

    Ukraine, the Middle East, major works policy…, since 2022, the proliferation of domestic and foreign issues requiring the support \u2014 or arbitration \u2014 of the United States has fuelled fears among many observers of American defence policy of a \u201cstrategic overstretch\u201d. This concept, theorised by the historian Paul Kennedy in The Rise and Fall of … Continued<\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":25,"featured_media":99385,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_acf_changed":false,"_seopress_titles_title":"","_seopress_titles_desc":"","_seopress_robots_index":"","_seopress_robots_follow":"","_seopress_robots_imageindex":"","_seopress_robots_snippet":"","_seopress_robots_primary_cat":"none","_seopress_robots_breadcrumbs":"","_seopress_robots_freeze_modified_date":"","_seopress_robots_custom_modified_date":"","_seopress_robots_canonical":"","_seopress_social_fb_title":"","_seopress_social_fb_desc":"","_seopress_social_fb_img":"","_seopress_social_fb_img_attachment_id":0,"_seopress_social_fb_img_width":0,"_seopress_social_fb_img_height":0,"_seopress_social_twitter_title":"","_seopress_social_twitter_desc":"","_seopress_social_twitter_img":"","_seopress_social_twitter_img_attachment_id":0,"_seopress_social_twitter_img_width":0,"_seopress_social_twitter_img_height":0,"_seopress_redirections_value":"","_seopress_redirections_enabled":"","_seopress_redirections_enabled_regex":"","_seopress_redirections_logged_status":"both","_seopress_redirections_param":"","_seopress_redirections_type":301,"_seopress_analysis_target_kw":"","footnotes":""},"categories":[140],"tags":[203],"keyword":[1275,952,884,889,896,1276,1628,909],"class_list":["post-100692","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-newswatch","tag-geopolitique-en","keyword-armement-en","keyword-forces-armees-en","keyword-politique-de-defense-en","keyword-politique-etrangere-en","keyword-relations-internationales-en","keyword-depenses-militaires-en","keyword-puissance-en","keyword-etats-unis-en"],"acf":[],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.futuribles.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/100692","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.futuribles.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.futuribles.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.futuribles.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/25"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.futuribles.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=100692"}],"version-history":[{"count":5,"href":"https:\/\/www.futuribles.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/100692\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":100706,"href":"https:\/\/www.futuribles.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/100692\/revisions\/100706"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.futuribles.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/99385"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.futuribles.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=100692"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.futuribles.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=100692"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.futuribles.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=100692"},{"taxonomy":"keyword","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.futuribles.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/keyword?post=100692"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}