Société, modes de vie
Cette page regroupe l'ensemble des publications de Futuribles sur cette thématique (Vigie, revue, bibliographie, études, etc.)
Développeurs informatiques de talent, mais aussi cartographes, designers et urbanistes, se sont réunis du 22 au 24 mars 2013 à Paris pour mettre en place des applications numériques utiles sur la base des données ouvertes disponibles sur le site de la région Île-de-France. Ce Hackathon  Île-de-France 2030 était de plus suivi en ligne via les réseaux sociaux (blogs, Twitter) . Au moment où la région avance sur son projet de Schéma directeur régional « Île-de-France 2030 » (SDRIF) et sur sa ...
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In L’Engrenage de la technique, L’Enfermement planétaire and Les Horizons terrestres, André Lebeau sounded the alarm: the human species has reached the limits, both physical and economic, of its ecological niche. For the first time in its history it faces a challenge in which its survival is at stake. There are too many human beings and, as it wastes resources and thoughtlessly pollutes the planet, humanity is hurtling irreversibly towards a final catastrophe. It has no means of escaping from the planet on which it developed, while its resources in terms of energy, raw materials, food production, drinking water and living space are subject to tensions that cannot increase indefinitely without collective behaviour suffering radical breakdowns or profound transformations.
Neither technology nor an economics founded on the myth of eternal growth can provide solutions, since they are precisely the source of the problem. If a neo-liberalism which sees the market as the supreme saviour is making that problem worse, sustainable development is no better placed to halt the fateful mechanism, since it is blind to the creation of disequilibria now implied in any form of development. The Earth may perhaps feed more people, but it cannot ensure everyone of a share of resources comparable to that of a European today, nor (even less) of an American. In other words, some people’s standard of living is now inseparable from the poverty of others.
Is it still possible to modify collective behaviour? This is the question André Lebeau confronted in the unfinished work whose foreword we present below. Without ever formulating a prognosis regarding the outcome, he doubted that it was, since evolution had programmed man to divide into groups, conquer territories and dominate his neighbours, not to control the relationship with a finite environment, to cooperate and to share. Whereas answers can only be collective, all our political and economic structures run counter to this –including in the democracies, where the short-term is the ultimate matrix of decision-making. The two main dangers threatening society with break-up and civilizational decay are blindness and inertia. Even supposing that we were aware of the problem, our social organization does not really allow us to confront it. Thus, for example, in order to preserve social peace, politicians are proposing to give fresh stimulus to the economic growth, even though they are perfectly aware that such a model is no longer viable.
A “roadmap” preparatory to a new reform of pensions was accepted by the French government at the end of the social conference of July 2012. After a first diagnostic phase, which ended in January 2013 with the publication of the 11th and 12th reports of the Advisory Board on Pensions, there should now follow a phase 2, conducted by a Committee of Experts tasked with identifying pathways, and a phase 3 which should be the phase of negotiations between the government and the social partners, with the intention of the government announcing a reform before the end of 2013.
Unfortunately, as Jean-Claude Angoulvant points out here, there is no guarantee that this will enable a solution to be found to the country’s difficulties when it comes to the funding of pensions. Above and beyond the recurrent doubts surrounding the pensions system, there is a much wider question here. The French system of social protection has been in deficit for 30 years now. At issue, then, is the appropriateness of the modes of organization of the overall system of social protection, which is in permanent open crisis, and its main components which are pensions and health. The system “is heading for disaster, financially and structurally,” as this article shows, with a potentially serious impact on intergenerational relations. Referring especially to pensions and health, Jean-Claude Angoulvant stresses three structural problems which have to be overcome: the fragmentation of the system, the poor governance by which it is beset and its ill-adaptedness to the new needs of individuals.
To safeguard the essential achievements of the French system of social protection and overcome these problems, while ensuring the system’s continued existence, a global and structural –systemic– reform is necessary. This article suggests various paths to achieving this (with the further aim of ending a certain number of injustices where women and workers in insecure employment, among others, are concerned): the unification of the basic pensions regime, defined contributions for the supplementary pensions schemes, an overhaul of family entitlements etc. But time is short and the politicians concerned are not necessarily working to the same timescales.
Tous les gouvernements, notamment en France, affichent leur volonté de juguler le chômage et de relancer la croissance économique. Force est toutefois de constater leur échec et de se demander s’ils ne s’épuisent pas vainement à colmater les brèches d’un modèle de développement dépassé, inéluctablement condamné à disparaître. Pour prétendre explorer les futurs possibles, identifier les enjeux à moyen et à long terme, définir une politique de nature à rendre possible le souhaitable, il faut commencer par ...
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In 2009 the French Ministry of Culture and Communication celebrated its 50th anniversary (it was created by André Malraux in 1959) and on that occasion decided to look towards the future also by launching a large-scale foresight and strategic study for the organization, aimed at taking in developments in the many fields covered by cultural activities. How can France, often presented as a case of cultural exceptionalism, come to terms with the three major dynamics affecting culture in the broad sense: the digital shift, globalization and the rise of individualism? How can the Ministry of Culture and its associated policies adapt to these changes, while also taking account of the changes in cultural practices?
Philippe Chantepie, who coordinated this enormous foresight and strategic exercise, reports its main findings here. He begins by presenting the factors and components of the cultural system that provided the basis for identifying four possible future scenarios for culture and the media up to 2030 (“Continued Exceptionalism”, “The Cultural Market”, “The Creative Imperative” and “The Culture of Identities”), together with 20 issues ensuing from these. Then, taking this diagnosis into account, he explains the strategic orientations to be envisaged by the Ministry of Culture and Communication in its organization and in the policies it puts in place in the years to 2020. The aim must now be to take account of the profound change of context at the national, European and world levels, and of the changes in practices which are going to intensify as new generations come on the scene, and to adapt to these while taking account of the new actors intervening in the cultural field, preserving the legitimacy of a policy and innovating in the three major fields of activity which it covers: namely, artistic creation, heritage, and the cultural industries and media.
Ce rapport a été réalisé par le Zukunft sinstitut, un cabinet de conseil et think-tank allemand spécialisé dans la réalisation d’études prospectives. L’objectif du rapport est d’identifier les leviers des médias de demain pour se garantir de bons niveaux d’audience et de revenus. Quinze médias sont analysés de façon rétrospective et prospective, à l’horizon 2025. Même si le rapport est allemand, il inclut quelques données comparatives pour différents pays, dont la France. Dans un premier ...
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Dans l’édition 2013 de son Rapport sur le développement humain, le PNUD dresse un bilan des progrès mondiaux accomplis en termes de développement, et notamment d’éducation, de santé et de revenus, mesurés grâce à l’IDH (indicateur de développement humain). En 2012, aucun des pays pour lesquels les données sont disponibles n’a enregistré un IDH inférieur à son niveau de l’année 2000. Un mouvement de convergence mondiale semble s’observer, même si des inégalités parfois fortes ...
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Risques environnementaux comme ceux liés aux pesticides ou aux ondes des téléphones portables, risques sanitaires comme le cas du bisphénol A, ou risques au travail (exposition des travailleurs aux produits chimiques, aux nanomatériaux), les causes de mobilisations sur les risques sont très nombreuses et diverses, comme le sont les acteurs — ONG (organisations non gouvernementales), syndicats… — qui militent sur ces sujets. Aujourd’hui, des liens s’établissent entre les différents acteurs et les différents risques, que ce soit par l’usage ...
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Depuis le début des années 2000, les entreprises utilisent des « serious games » (jeux sérieux) dans le domaine des ressources humaines, que ce soit pour former leurs cadres à des situations délicates de management ou pour tester des candidats lors de processus de recrutement . En les faisant jouer sur écran, ils peuvent apprendre de nouvelles compétences ou l’on peut mesurer leur aptitude à certaines situations de travail. Par la suite, des jeux d’un genre nouveau ont été développés ...
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La voiture sans chauffeur a longtemps été considérée comme un doux rêve de science-fiction. Et pourtant, depuis 2010, Google fait rouler des voitures totalement automatisées. En août 2012, le groupe a annoncé que ces voitures avaient parcouru l’équivalent de 300 000 miles (près de 500 000 kilomètres) sur des routes de différentes natures (autoroute, centre-ville…), sans provoquer aucun accident. En mars 2013, la mairie de Lyon a autorisé la circulation d'un véhicule automatique, la Navia, pour effectuer des ...
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Alors que 77 % des Français se disent prêts à acheter des produits « bons pour l’environnement », seuls 19 % admettent qu’ils le font effectivement. Parmi les nombreuses raisons qui peuvent expliquer ce décalage, figure notamment la question de l’information disponible sur l’impact environnemental des produits. Cette demande d’information s’est traduite depuis plusieurs années par la création de labels (publics et privés), qui se sont néanmoins multipliés au point de devenir illisibles : il en existerait actuellement une ...
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Si les évolutions récentes d’Internet donnent lieu à une profusion de chiffres et de superlatifs, il en est une en particulier qui concentre toutes les attentions : l’explosion des big data. Ce concept, apparu il y a quelques années, désigne de manière relativement floue toutes les données dont la taille dépasse la capacité de traitement des logiciels les plus courants. Leur volume est cependant difficile à préciser, et le champ même des big data ne cesse de s’étendre ...
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Jacques Theys, ancien responsable de la mission prospective du ministère français de l’Écologie, du Développement durable et de l’Énergie (MEDDE), et Éric Vidalenc, économiste en charge de la prospective au service Économie et prospective de l’Agence de l’environnement et de la maîtrise de l’énergie (ADEME), ont copiloté à partir de 2009 un programme de travail visant à « repenser les villes dans une société postcarbone », dont la revue Futuribles a rendu compte dans son dossier ...
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Depuis le début de la crise économique, les consommateurs européens sont de plus en plus nombreux à réduire leurs dépenses et à s’intéresser à de nouvelles pratiques de consommation. Ces tendances sont confirmées par le baromètre 2013 de l’Observatoire Cetelem de la consommation, issu d’une enquête très riche auprès de 6 500 individus dans 12 pays européens . Près de 9 Européens sur 10 souhaiteraient limiter leurs dépenses « à l’essentiel » dans les années à venir. Seuls ...
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In this March-April 2013 issue, which Futuribles is devoting very largely to the social and political impact of religions, Franck Frégosi studies the place of Islam in European societies. After a short account of the history of the presence of the Muslim religion in Europe (from Arabic settlement in Spain in the Middle Ages to the Ottoman Empire and the migrations which followed the end of colonialism), Frégosi presents the various faces of Islam in Europe, which involves ethnic divides ensuing from the different regions of origin of European Muslims, a generation gap between the Islam practised by the younger generations and that of their elders, and ideological rifts.
He then explores the three avenues of Islam’s current expression in Europe and the prospects for these: a minority Islam which favours a certain orthodoxy; a relatively radical, standardized Islam laying claim to universal applicability; and a trend towards secularization. Frégosi also stresses the limited character of the economic integration of Muslims in Europe and the difficulties they encounter in the area of employment –in France, for example, given the recurrent concern that manifestations of religion should be excluded from the public sphere and calls for the same to apply in the arena of private business. In his view, these various elements suggest that European Islam is in a mature phase, a phase of adaptation to the prevailing tradition of secularism in Western Europe.
For almost 40 years now, France has been faced with a succession of crises detrimental to its social welfare system. Added to these now are the consequences of an ageing population (on employment and public health, and with regard to dependency etc.) and the limitations imposed by the state’s indebtedness. Governments of right and left have come and gone without really providing any miracle solution. The time has perhaps come, then, to undertake a large-scale revision of the French social system and of the terms of the contract whereby citizens connect with one another and the state.
When we take a genuine foresight approach to the examination of this question, one of the key elements is the way both public and private-sector inter-generational transfers are organized. These provide evidence, implicitly or explicitly, of the general orientation of the “social contract”. This is why Futuribles is opening its columns this month to an extensive exercise in thinking about these inter-generational transfers in the form of two articles which present the underlying ideological issues and relevant perspectives. The first of these analyses the modalities by which sustainable public transfers could be made in France, while the second looks at private transfers and possible action to reduce the importance of inherited wealth in French society.
In this first article, then, André Masson examines public transfers between generations. He reviews the “ideological triangle” of socio-generational discourses (the “free agent” paradigm, that of “citizen equality” and the “multi-solidarity” model) and the underlying dilemmas for the state. He then goes on to analyse the forms of transfer that would ultimately ensure the solvency of the Welfare state for each of the three paradigms identified: (1) the withdrawal of the state and the promotion of saving and life-annuities if priority is given to the “free agent”; (2) reorientation of the state in favour of youth in the “citizen equality” model; (3) safeguarding the protection of the elderly through a renewed social pact in the “multi-solidarity” vision. However, André Masson also stresses how difficult it will be to undertake any reform in a country as torn as is France between these three prospective paths. Lastly, in an additional section, he goes into greater detail on the subject of possible courses of reform to the pensions system within a multi-solidarity framework (which is sometimes seen as the dominant paradigm in France).
For some 30 years now, the question of according voting rights in local elections to non-EU aliens has regularly figured on the French agenda. Though it was one of President François Hollande’s 60 election pledges, the measure has actually been put on hold, since Hollande did not have a sufficient majority to pass the constitutional amendment involved and did not wish, for the moment, to opt for a referendum on the issue.
In this European column, Jean-François Drevet examines what would be involved in granting the vote to non-EU aliens, drawing, in particular, on neighbouring countries such as Belgium and analysing the moves that have already been made in France in the last ten years or so to grant voting rights to foreign EU nationals. He goes on to suggest a third way that might, in the end, ease the path to French acceptance of voting rights for non-EU aliens.
In this March-April 2013 issue, which Futuribles is devoting very largely to the social and political impact of religions, Philippe Portier looks at the development of relations between Churches and states in Western Europe. He begins by noting the importance of the religious heritage and outlines the two dominant models: the “confessional state” model, in which one religion is officially singled out (this applies mainly in the Protestant and Orthodox countries) and the model of Church/state separation, in either its flexible (in Central Europe) or rigid form (mainly in France).
However, Portier goes on to highlight an increasingly marked long-term trend for a “combining of trajectories”: in other words, a simultaneous movement of “deconfessionalization” in the countries of Catholic tradition (Italy, Spain) –and also in the Lutheran (Norway) and Orthodox (Greece) nations– and of a re-entry of religion into the public sphere (particularly in France). As Portier sees it, these developments might well represent the emergence of a common model of secularism which, without totally erasing national differences in the regulation of faiths, could be said to be shifting all these countries toward a relatively unified system of “co-operative separation”.
Ce numéro de mars-avril de Futuribles est beaucoup plus volumineux que d’ordinaire. Espérons que son épaisseur ne nuira pas à l’attention qu’il mérite de la part de nos lecteurs. Ce choix est dicté par l’importance particulière des deux sujets qui y sont traités : celui de la solidarité entre les générations, et celui de l’impact social et politique des religions. Le premier thème s’impose en raison de la crise majeure du système français de protection ...
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In this March-April 2013 issue, which Futuribles is devoting very largely to the social and political impact of religions, Jean-François Mayer looks at the concept of fundamentalism. The notion, though widely used in very varying contexts –not to say loosely used and misused– has nonetheless a very precise meaning in the world of religion, as this article demonstrates.
After recalling the emergence of fundamentalism in the USA within the Protestant community and that movement’s entry into politics, Jean-François Mayer goes on to analyse the extent to which the concept has spread to other religious groups and what it refers to in those cases. Among other things, he highlights the fundamentalists’ fear of seeing the values they advocate threatened, points up certain developments in modern society which they regard as deviant (abortion rights, tolerance of homosexuals, the detachment of certain political forces from religion etc.) and underscores the fundamentalists’ frequent evocation of an idealized past of their particular strand of religion etc. He particularly stresses the great diversity of groups that can be placed in this category, and of the contexts in which they operate and, as a result, of the political practices which they adopt.
Drawing on the comparative analyses on which his study is based, Jean-François Mayer proposes a new typology that is capable of dividing the different forms of fundamentalism into four separate categories: transformational, reforming, restorative and conservative protest movements. Lastly, he examines the effects of the fundamentalisms on the societies in which they are established: this includes the danger of the denigration of minority groups and a variable level of political impact, depending on contexts and on the religion concerned.
In this March-April 2013 issue, which Futuribles is devoting very largely to the social and political impact of religions, François Mabille provides a conspectus of the recent development of religions worldwide and presents a number of possible future scenarios for several of them. He begins by reminding us which are the numerically dominant religions (Christianity, Islam, Hinduism etc.), how they are distributed geographically and how that distribution has changed over a period of almost a century. He stresses, in passing, the difficulties inherent in statistical assessments of this kind, in which the data may be incomplete or biased, or mask more subtle developments.
Mabille goes on to analyse four major trends that have manifested themselves in the worldwide spread of religious influence: the return of religion to the political agenda, the broadening of the spectrum of religious movements, the increasing political role of religious diasporas, and the vitality of both Islam and Christianity. These are four developments which complicate the potential process of secularization. Lastly, Mabille turns a spotlight on the futures of Catholicism (“from crisis to decline?”), of Islam (“secularism, fundamentalism or liberalism?”) and of Buddhism with a Western slant.
In this March-April 2013 issue, which Futuribles is devoting very largely to the social and political impact of religions, particularly on the continent of Europe, Pierre Bréchon, who coordinated the dossier, offers an analysis of the socio-political effects of the religious dimension in Europe. Drawing on the results of the last European Values Study (2008), he shows, for example, the influence of the religious factor on value-systems: the cultural differences between countries depending on the dominant religion; the influence of individual religious identities (religious affiliation, practice) in the attachment to certain values; the respective importance of the geographical and religious dimensions in value-systems etc.
It emerges, more or less, that the dominant values found in the various “georeligious” spaces identified square with those of the individuals claiming allegiance to the corresponding religion or denomination. Protestants, for example, manifest more modern values (less attachment to the traditional family model, greater liberalism on moral issues, greater politicization etc.), as do those who have no religious affiliations. Muslims and Orthodox Christians have a more traditional system of values (family, morals, authority, national pride etc.), while Catholics occupy an intermediate position. Pierre Bréchon goes on to study the specific impact of the religious variables in value-systems by way of a “ceteris paribus” statistical analysis, cross-comparing other variables (sex, age, income etc.).
He concludes that it is religious geography which introduces the most notable differences into value-systems, not the individual dimensions of religiosity (such as declared affiliations) and that, while denominational allegiance is not to any great extent a discriminating factor, degree of religiosity does, on the other hand, have distinctly more of an influence on values (in the direction of greater traditionalism) –and this is the case whatever the denomination concerned.
In this March-April 2013 issue, which Futuribles is devoting very largely to the social and political impact of religions, Jean-Paul Burdy and Jean Marcou analyse the role played by Islam and Islamists in the “Arab Springs” of the last two years and the role they are playing today in the ongoing political transitions. They first remind us that the Arab revolutions were unleashed by protest movements that were primarily social and political, and that Islamists (generally well established within the lower strata of the countries concerned) joined in with these after the event. Burdy and Marcou then show how the Islamists, following the example of the Muslim Brotherhood, took advantage of these uprisings to gain power (in Tunisia and Egypt in particular). However, they also show the extent to which the Islamists’ ideological line merely played into a social and political body that had actually long been dominated by Shari’a law. They outline, too, the various divergences in this regard between the various Arab countries concerned in the “Arab Springs” and the reference models on which they drew etc. In particular, they study the denominational issues (Shiite/Sunni rivalries) that have emerged in states like Bahrain or Syria and the way these have been made use of by certain players, while nonetheless disputing the “simplistic interpretation” that sees a “Shiite arc” emerging over against a “Sunni bloc” within the Arab world, when the positions and actions of states are in many cases motivated very classically by Realpolitik.
Lastly, Burdy and Marcou warn against what are sometimes rather over-hasty readings of current developments, recalling how important the part played by political, economic and social processes has been and pointing out how difficult it will be, in this context, for the Islamist parties which have gained power (democratically) to reconcile their ideological imperatives with the aspirations of their fellow citizens.
In this second strand of the investigation in this issue of Futuribles into public and private transfers between generations in France, Luc Arrondel and André Masson look at avenues for reducing the importance of inherited wealth in French society. After a brief discussion of the reality of the inter-generational imbalance that can be seen to have come about between today’s seniors and their children, they analyse the features attesting to the increasing importance of such inherited assets: the increasing proportion of national wealth that consists of inter-generational bequests and the growing concentration of assets in the hands of the oldest citizens. They also emphasize that, for at least the last 30 years, French society has assigned increasing importance to assets, inherited wealth and unearned income, and has seen inequalities of wealth develop between the different age-groups and also, at any given age, between inheritors and non-inheritors, property owners and tenants etc.
Hence the need for reforms, though the nature of these and their duration (whether they are to be temporary or long-term) very much depends on one’s preferred social paradigm (cf. previous article). In a free-market perspective, where the liberty of economic agents is favoured, the aim would be to stimulate the consumption of (affluent) seniors’ accumulated wealth. In an approach that pursued equality between citizens, there would be more intervention on taxation and increased taxes on the holding of assets or on asset yields. Lastly, in a “multi-solidarity” vision, the solution might consist in taxing sizeable family legacies more heavily. Arrondel and Masson detail the lines of action that might be taken in these three policy directions, together with the practicalities and time-scales of their implementation. Lastly, they conclude that the orientations to be pursued imply a clear choice of one of the three major Republican values (liberty, equality or solidarity), while attempting not to offend too greatly against the other two.
Alors que les performances énergétiques n’ont cessé de progresser en France depuis les années 1970, la consommation électrique des particuliers a doublé. Plusieurs facteurs expliquent ce phénomène : l’augmentation des exigences de confort, le poids des pratiques, la croissance démographique, l’augmentation des objets consommateurs d’énergie, etc. Dans une note publiée en février 2013, le CAS (Centre d'analyse stratégique) pointe un autre facteur : l’effet rebond des politiques d’efficacité énergétique dans le logement . L’effet ...
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Ce chapitre est extrait du Rapport Vigie 2016 de Futuribles International, qui propose un panorama structuré des connaissances et des incertitudes des experts que l'association a mobilisés pour explorer les évolutions des 15 à 35 prochaines années sur 11 thématiques.