Société, modes de vie
Cette page regroupe l'ensemble des publications de Futuribles sur cette thématique (Vigie, revue, bibliographie, études, etc.)
Le gouvernement français a affirmé sa volonté de procéder en 2013 à une nouvelle réforme des retraites. Une commission d’experts, placée sous la présidence de Yannick Moreau, a rendu son rapport le 14 juin. Une conférence sociale, doit se tenir les 20 et 21 juin avec les partenaires sociaux, avec entre autres objets principaux, celui de procéder à une concertation préalable au projet de loi qui devrait être soumis au Parlement en septembre. La raison d’être de cette ...
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Depuis les premières lois d’assistance de la fin du XIXe siècle, jusqu’à l’ensemble des mécanismes socio-fiscaux contemporains, en passant par la mise en place d’une branche « Famille » de la Sécurité sociale après guerre, le périmètre de la politique familiale n’a fait que s’étendre. Le plus important virage de la politique familiale n’est pas le plus commenté. On parle très souvent du passage d’une politique familiale vers une politique sociale, avec les mises ...
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Alors que la maison individuelle non mitoyenne a longtemps représenté un idéal, le concept de l’habitat partagé, né en Europe du Nord dans les années 1960, suscite depuis quelques années un regain d’intérêt . Ce mode d’habiter répond en effet à l’émergence de certaines préoccupations sociales et environnementales. Un habitat partagé peut naître de la volonté de plusieurs ménages, parfois aidés par une association ou une collectivité, qui se regroupent en société coopérative pour acquérir un ...
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La question du lien social et de l’éventualité de son déclin est un enjeu important pour l’observation sociologique aussi bien que pour le gouvernement des sociétés. Les tendances observées dans ce domaine apparaissent souvent contradictoires : un détour par les travaux de recherche consacrés à cette question est nécessaire. Il en ressort un paysage social marqué par l’existence d’un réel problème d’isolement social, comme plusieurs indicateurs le montrent. La tendance n’est cependant pas à une ...
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Drawing on the findings of the three waves of Values studies carried out in Europe in 1990, 1999 and 2008, Abel François proposes an analysis of (essentially Western) Europeans’ economic values on the basis of their perception of the market economy. That perception is measured by three questions relating to competition, ownership of the means of production and incomes, which bring out a relatively positive view, overall, of the market economy (except with regard to income inequalities), but also great divergences between countries and between the various waves of studies.
Abel François then proposes to examine these findings using a combined indicator of the perception of the market economy which aggregates the three basic questions. This enables him to distinguish three groups of countries based on the way the indicator has moved between 1990 and 2008, but it leads him also to downplay the strictly cultural factors underlying these developments. It is, he argues, factors more directly linked to the current economic situation and the economic success of countries (factors he describes as “sociotropic”) and the personal situation of the respondents (“egotropic” factors) that influence the perception of the market economy, with respondents regarding it more favourably when they believe that it brings them personal advantages or is favourable to the community to which they belong.
With its economic success and its successful keeping of the peace on the Old Continent behind it, what was once the European Community and is now the European Union has gradually expanded to include 27 countries and has seen its political competence extend into many fields. Given this context, what feelings do Europeans have towards the entity? As Céline Belot and Isabelle Guinaudeau show here, the surveys of Europeans’ values offer a partial answer regarding, on the one hand, their sense of belonging to Europe and, on the other, the way they view the European political system.
Generally, for example, the sense of belonging to Europe is not widely expressed, Europe being far from the main level to which people claim allegiance, but there are different country profiles and no doubt also multiple levels of belonging that are not always revealed in surveys, as the authors stress. Moreover, almost half the citizens of the “Europe of 27” trusted in Europe and were quite positively inclined towards the Union’s political system in 2008, even though this favourable attitude seemed set on a downward course by comparison with 1990. Finally, since 2008 surveys have made it easier to identify Europeans’ fears in political, social or economic terms (social security, employment, power, identity, culture etc.). These vary greatly from country to country and complex explanatory factors are involved –factors often linked to national contexts, though present in most of the countries surveyed.
This article, which draws on the Values studies regularly conducted in Europe, aims to compare Europeans’ political values through their positioning on a Left-Right scale, and their development between 1990 and 2008, and also to analyse the underlying values that go furthest to explaining this positioning. Raul Magni Berton begins by presenting the Left/Right split in the various countries surveyed, as it emerges from the self-positioning of individuals (or their refusal to position themselves), highlighting, among other things, the relative stability of this split in the various countries, the importance it retains in Western Europe and a mild “leftward” trend in Europe.
The author then analyses 11 value conflicts that are likely to explain the political positioning of individuals: attitude to equality, moral progressivism/conservatism, state/market, attitude to law-and-order, nationalism/universalism, solidarity/individualism, attitude to work, degree of materialism, authoritarianism/criticism, attitude to religion, and sexism/sexual equality. Drawing on the observed correlations between these values and the political positioning of individuals, Raul Magni Berton shows, among other things, that religious values are less and less predictive of political standpoints in Western Europe, whereas those relating to egalitarianism, the state and law-and-order play an increasing role. On the other hand, very few significant correlations can be seen in Eastern Europe, which shows the major importance of the –both political and historical– context, and somewhat undermines the idea that the notions of Left and Right are universal in character. This is also confirmed by the country-by-country analysis of differences proposed at the end of the article.
It is almost 30 years now since the European Values Studies (EVS) were launched. They were carried out in 14 European countries at first (in 1981), then gradually extended to the whole of the continent, as broadly conceived (47 countries in 2008). By means of precise questionnaires relating to all fields of private and social life –many of the surveys being repeated identically over the four waves of studies so far completed, with others regularly updated to cover social developments that were difficult to anticipate 30 years ago– we have a great wealth of material at our disposal, enabling us to gauge social change in the various European countries and compare by broad cultural areas the trends at work in terms of values and behaviour. From the second wave of studies onwards, Futuribles provided a sounding board for the valuable analyses that were to be drawn from them (special issue of July-August 1995) and continued with the venture after the third wave (July-August 2002 issue). The fourth wave of studies begun in 2008 presents an opportunity once again to open the columns of our journal to the researchers who have delved into the analysis of the latest findings and the long-term comparisons to be made from them, brilliantly coordinated by Pierre Bréchon who, in this introductory article, demonstrates the considerable contribution made by the Values studies to the understanding of developments within European societies.
Several countries, having been faced for over five years with a serious economic crisis that has grave social consequences, have seen the growth of populist political parties with, in many cases, xenophobic overtones. But do these political expressions echo the trends in Europeans’ values and behaviour with regard to tolerance and xenophobia? It seems not, at least up to 2008, the date of the last survey of European values, as analysed here by Guillaume Roux.
Roux begins by drawing up a geographical chart of tolerance in Europe: the values of tolerance are everywhere in the majority, but the levels are highest in Northern Europe and lowest in Southern Europe and in the former Soviet bloc countries, with Western Europe presenting a more mixed profile. Over the last two decades, these seem to be durable differences, even though, in general, the values of tolerance have progressed in many countries (doubtless in connection with increased individualization) and the homogeneity of Western Europe is a little diminished by comparison with 1990.
Roux goes on to analyse Europeans’ behaviour towards ethnic minorities (preference for the employment of nationals and xenophobia). Even though the situation varies greatly from one country to another, we find a geographical distribution similar to that for tolerance, with the countries of northern Europe showing the least xenophobic attitudes in 2008 and those in the south and the former Soviet bloc having the most xenophobic behaviour. Generally, over a long period (1990-2008), the trend is for xenophobia to decline, but the coherence between the values of tolerance and attitudes towards ethnic minorities remains stable, confirming the partially cultural dimension of positioning with regard to xenophobia.
Several articles in this special issue on Europeans’ values have foregrounded an important factor influencing their development: individualization, in the sense of the pursuit of autonomy and of the valuing of individual choices, which is to be distinguished from individualism, which refers, rather, to a withdrawal into oneself, as Pierre Bréchon reminds us here. How, then, has the individualization of European societies evolved in recent decades and what does this mean in terms of the more general development of values in Europe?
After reminding readers of the indicators from the Values survey that enable us to gauge this process of individualization, Bréchon stresses the geographical differences involved. While the countries of Northern Europe and France display a high level of individualization, those of Eastern and Southern Europe are below average in this regard, some of them standing out with a particularly low level (Poland, Romania, Turkey etc.). He shows the major role of the religious dimension in this geography of individualization, with the Protestant countries being the most individualized and those of Orthodox or Muslim religion having the lowest degree of individualization.
Lastly, Bréchon analyses the other socio-demographic variables (age, income, level of education etc.) linked to individualization and stresses the high correlation between individualization and sociability: the most individualized societies are also the most trusting and tolerant in most areas, the most altruistic and the most politically active. In fact, the observed advance in individualization of European societies is not at all synonymous with individualistic withdrawal, but actually goes together with a greater respect for others and the development of a “shared sociability”.
Following this article, Pierre Bréchon, who coordinated this special dossier on Europeans’ values, lists the major lessons to be learned (in particular, the strengthening of the values of individualization, in parallel with the persistence of firm social bonds and a growing demand for collective regulation), stresses the continuing existence of differences between geographical and cultural zones, and offers some possible future perspectives.
The serious economic crisis that has afflicted Europe for more than five years and its consequences for employment have confirmed the importance of having a job today, if such confirmation were needed, jobs being both an essential source of income for most individuals and the means of –both personal and social– self-affirmation. The last wave of survey activity for the European Values Study, carried out in 2008, at a point when Europe had barely yet been hit by the crisis, even then confirmed this central role of work in European societies. Jean-François Tchernia analyses the findings in this field, showing how Europeans position themselves with regard to work as a social norm, on the one hand, and how they see their personal aspirations as working individuals, on the other.
When it comes to social norms, Europeans take a rather traditional view: work is generally regarded as a social duty and idleness is viewed negatively; work is to be seen as a source of self-esteem. Regarding individual aspirations, Europeans expect work to be a source of personal satisfaction (initiative, development of skills, social usefulness etc.), but also to bring material satisfaction (income, acceptable working hours, holidays etc.). Jean-François Tchernia notes the differences that are found from country to country, as well as the correlations between the various factors employed in the Values Study to measure these aspects. In every case there are strong national divergences affecting this general picture; in particular, Europeans in the countries with the longest-standing economic development tend to value most highly the part played by work in personal fulfilment, whereas in the less developed countries material aspirations count for more. At the end of the article, Jean-François Tchernia also analyses Europeans’ attitudes towards leisure.
Comme je m’en suis expliqué dans un récent éditorial , la crise économique et sociale, loin de revêtir un caractère purement conjoncturel, résulte sans doute d’une mutation structurelle entre un modèle de société qui n’en finit pas de mourir et un autre qui n’en finit pas de naître. Et si certains s’opposent à cette mutation radicale ; d’autres en revanche en sont déjà les acteurs. Ce phénomène ne résulte pas seulement d’une transformation profonde ...
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Social capital, a recent notion that appeared in the 1990s, refers to the nature and quality of the bonds linking individuals in a society and their ability to develop trust and maintain relationships. We learn much about these topics from the surveys of European values that form the core of this special issue of Futuribles. Vincent Tournier presents the various lessons in this article.
First, he stresses the diversity of social capital in Europe, as measured by the level of interpersonal trust and community participation (trade unions, political parties, religious movements, sporting associations etc.) and also by more concrete probing regarding the neighbours one would be happy (or unhappy) to have. He then offers various strands of explanation of the level of trust or mistrust: a correlation with the degree of statism, level of wealth (inequalities in income and wealth being more influential factors in generating mistrust than the degree of statism) and religion (countries with Protestant traditions showing a higher level of trust) etc. He concerns himself lastly with the links that exist between interpersonal and political trust (opinions about democracy and institutions, the preference for a “strong man” to govern the country etc.), which are admittedly real but are not to be over-exaggerated.
In all these areas Tournier presents the overall findings and the finer variations within each country. He also looks more closely at the situation of France and at the argument that social relations are deteriorating and mistrust increasing there. This would seem to be a catastrophist view, which the findings of the Values Study do not entirely support when analysed more subtly.
The agitation surrounding the parliamentary vote extending marriage to same-sex couples in France in spring 2013 has shown the importance a section of the population still accords to traditional family values. Is this phenomenon specific to France? And does it represent a minority standpoint or even a wavering view? Thanks to the European Values Studies, we have substantial elements of an answer so far as most countries of the European continent are concerned and in some cases we can identify trends over almost 30 years. Sandrine Astor and Nathalie Dompnier offer a detailed analysis of these here, showing how Europeans’ perceptions with regard to couples and marriage are changing.
The authors concern themselves first with the conception Europeans have of marriage as an institution, as well as with how accepting they are of unmarried partnerships, highlighting geographical divides, age and generational effects, and, in passing, stressing correlations with other variables (religion, religious practice). The authors then examine the elements that are regarded as important in the success of marriage, stressing the great stability of the hierarchy of factors –those relating to marital harmony and personal fulfilment coming out on top and increasing in importance by comparison with those relating to material conditions or similarity of socio-cultural background. Here again the divergences observed between different countries are pointed out, and these attest once again to the influence of the dominant social model. Lastly, the article analyses the evolution of the conceptions of male and female roles within the couple, stressing the advance of egalitarian conceptions in Western and Northern Europe, whereas more conservative views of the family persist in Eastern Europe.
Overall, the trends noted and the development of critical judgements of marriage as an institution do not seem to have affected the continuing attachment to certain values specific to it (fidelity, understanding, children) and, indeed, to the social norm it represents. It is simply that a more flexible vision of the couple, more in keeping with individual freedom and sexual equality, is tending to develop in Europe.
The European Values Study is one of the rare surveys to devote so much space to the religious dimension and to allow us to observe developments in nine countries of Western Europe (Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Great Britain, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands and Spain) over three decades, from 1981 to 2008. In this article Pierre Bréchon draws the main lessons from that study so far as religious practices and beliefs in Western Europe are concerned. He shows, for example, how the various dimensions of religiosity have changed over time in these countries: how institutional attachment to a religious universe has fallen appreciably in Western Europe (with two countries –Italy and Ireland– resisting secularization); how individual religious practice (prayer and meditation) is also in decline; how the image of the Churches is generally worsening, though the demand for specific ceremonies has been maintained (marriages, burials etc.). There generally is a lesser intensity of religious feelings, less belief in a god, while belief in life after death, heaven, hell and sin has changed, as well as belief in reincarnation and good luck charms. Pierre Bréchon goes on to stress the high level of consistency in religious attitudes (between faiths, cultural practices etc.) and studies the evolution of the level of religiosity (declining in Western Europe, but with variations between different countries) and the possible correlations with the sex, age, educational level etc. of the persons surveyed. Lastly, after an analysis of the observed dissonances in religiosity and the remodellings of religious belief, Pierre Bréchon shows the extent to which the impact of religious socialization remains determinant. He also offers an analysis of levels of religiosity by age-group, from which it emerges that, where religion is concerned, the generational effect is the most crucial, the general trend being towards a gradual decline in religiosity over the generations.
La pauvreté, en France, se transforme plus qu’elle n’augmente. Si, ces récentes années, la crise a eu un impact à la hausse sur le taux de pauvreté, ce sont des mutations plus profondes qui affectent la pauvreté. Il en va ainsi de deux tendances majeures : l’urbanisation et la concentration du phénomène.
Les associations de défense des droits des homosexuels et des familles homoparentales ont longtemps soutenu que le nombre d’enfants concernés par l’homoparentalité était très élevé. Elles continuent, d’ailleurs, à afficher des chiffres très importants, ce qui est, somme toute, de bonne guerre. Toute cause a besoin d’effectifs conséquents pour mobiliser à la fois l’opinion et le législateur. Ainsi les associations de promotion des droits des homosexuels — l’APGL au premier rang —, évaluent, depuis le début ...
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Les préoccupations environnementales (mais aussi sanitaires et éthiques) se traduisent par une sensibilité croissante des consommateurs français vis-à-vis de l’origine des aliments. Ainsi, en 2012, près de la moitié des Français affirment qu’ils font « toujours » ou « souvent » attention à la distance parcourue pour le transport des produits alimentaires qu’ils achètent . Les productions locales sont de plus en plus valorisées (au moins dans les discours), ainsi que les circuits courts alimentaires, caractérisés par le fait qu’ils ...
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Depuis le début de la crise économique, les évolutions des comportements des consommateurs font l’objet d’une attention croissante. En particulier, l’essor de la consommation collaborative fait couler beaucoup d’encre. Ce concept désigne le fait « de prêter, louer, donner, échanger des objets via les technologies et les communautés de pairs  ». Le succès de la consommation collaborative s’expliquerait par trois nouvelles préoccupations des consommateurs : la volonté de dépenser moins ou mieux, la protection de l’environnement ...
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Le 21 mai, le PNUE (Programme des Nations unies pour l’environnement) a annoncé le lancement du Portail mondial pour la consommation et la production durables. L’objectif de ce portail est de rassembler en un lieu unique les informations existantes sur la consommation et la production durables, afin d’encourager la communication et la coopération entre les nombreux acteurs impliqués. Le site s’adresse donc aussi bien aux gouvernements, aux entreprises et aux chercheurs qu’à la société civile ...
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Quel est l’impact des services d’auto-partage sur la mobilité urbaine, notamment automobile ? Une étude menée par le bureau de recherche 6T, en partenariat avec France-Autopartage et l’ADEME (Agence de l’environnement et de la maîtrise de l’énergie), permet d’alimenter la réflexion sur cette question . L’enquête a été menée en 2012 auprès de 2090 utilisateurs de services d’auto-partage répartis dans 21 villes françaises. Ces automobilistes considèrent que ces services sont « économiques » (pour 46 ...
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En France, en 2011, les ventes en ligne aux particuliers ont représenté 3,4 % de la consommation des ménages et 8 % du chiffre d’affaires du commerce de détail. Le pays compte, en 2012, 31 millions de e-consommateurs. Cette pénétration du e-commerce reste inégale selon les secteurs (elle représente 20 % des ventes pour le tourisme, 9 % pour le mobilier), mais elle s’accompagne d’une évolution des pratiques des consommateurs, qui sont de plus en plus nombreux à jouer de ...
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Développeurs informatiques de talent, mais aussi cartographes, designers et urbanistes, se sont réunis du 22 au 24 mars 2013 à Paris pour mettre en place des applications numériques utiles sur la base des données ouvertes disponibles sur le site de la région Île-de-France. Ce Hackathon  Île-de-France 2030 était de plus suivi en ligne via les réseaux sociaux (blogs, Twitter) . Au moment où la région avance sur son projet de Schéma directeur régional « Île-de-France 2030 » (SDRIF) et sur sa ...
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In 2009 the French Ministry of Culture and Communication celebrated its 50th anniversary (it was created by André Malraux in 1959) and on that occasion decided to look towards the future also by launching a large-scale foresight and strategic study for the organization, aimed at taking in developments in the many fields covered by cultural activities. How can France, often presented as a case of cultural exceptionalism, come to terms with the three major dynamics affecting culture in the broad sense: the digital shift, globalization and the rise of individualism? How can the Ministry of Culture and its associated policies adapt to these changes, while also taking account of the changes in cultural practices?
Philippe Chantepie, who coordinated this enormous foresight and strategic exercise, reports its main findings here. He begins by presenting the factors and components of the cultural system that provided the basis for identifying four possible future scenarios for culture and the media up to 2030 (“Continued Exceptionalism”, “The Cultural Market”, “The Creative Imperative” and “The Culture of Identities”), together with 20 issues ensuing from these. Then, taking this diagnosis into account, he explains the strategic orientations to be envisaged by the Ministry of Culture and Communication in its organization and in the policies it puts in place in the years to 2020. The aim must now be to take account of the profound change of context at the national, European and world levels, and of the changes in practices which are going to intensify as new generations come on the scene, and to adapt to these while taking account of the new actors intervening in the cultural field, preserving the legitimacy of a policy and innovating in the three major fields of activity which it covers: namely, artistic creation, heritage, and the cultural industries and media.
In L’Engrenage de la technique, L’Enfermement planétaire and Les Horizons terrestres, André Lebeau sounded the alarm: the human species has reached the limits, both physical and economic, of its ecological niche. For the first time in its history it faces a challenge in which its survival is at stake. There are too many human beings and, as it wastes resources and thoughtlessly pollutes the planet, humanity is hurtling irreversibly towards a final catastrophe. It has no means of escaping from the planet on which it developed, while its resources in terms of energy, raw materials, food production, drinking water and living space are subject to tensions that cannot increase indefinitely without collective behaviour suffering radical breakdowns or profound transformations.
Neither technology nor an economics founded on the myth of eternal growth can provide solutions, since they are precisely the source of the problem. If a neo-liberalism which sees the market as the supreme saviour is making that problem worse, sustainable development is no better placed to halt the fateful mechanism, since it is blind to the creation of disequilibria now implied in any form of development. The Earth may perhaps feed more people, but it cannot ensure everyone of a share of resources comparable to that of a European today, nor (even less) of an American. In other words, some people’s standard of living is now inseparable from the poverty of others.
Is it still possible to modify collective behaviour? This is the question André Lebeau confronted in the unfinished work whose foreword we present below. Without ever formulating a prognosis regarding the outcome, he doubted that it was, since evolution had programmed man to divide into groups, conquer territories and dominate his neighbours, not to control the relationship with a finite environment, to cooperate and to share. Whereas answers can only be collective, all our political and economic structures run counter to this –including in the democracies, where the short-term is the ultimate matrix of decision-making. The two main dangers threatening society with break-up and civilizational decay are blindness and inertia. Even supposing that we were aware of the problem, our social organization does not really allow us to confront it. Thus, for example, in order to preserve social peace, politicians are proposing to give fresh stimulus to the economic growth, even though they are perfectly aware that such a model is no longer viable.
Ce chapitre est extrait du Rapport Vigie 2016 de Futuribles International, qui propose un panorama structuré des connaissances et des incertitudes des experts que l'association a mobilisés pour explorer les évolutions des 15 à 35 prochaines années sur 11 thématiques.