Cette page regroupe l'ensemble des publications de Futuribles sur cette thématique (Vigie, revue, bibliographie, études, etc.)
Comment les systèmes de santé européens vont-ils survivre à l’horizon 2030 compte tenu de l’augmentation constante des dépenses de santé ? The Economist Intelligence Unit a réalisé une courte étude sur le sujet qui aboutit à cinq scénarios contrastés à l’horizon 2030.Selon la Banque mondiale, les dépenses publiques de santé en Europe pourraient passer de 8 % du PIB (produit intérieur brut) en 2000 à 14 % en 2030, et continuer à augmenter après cette date, leur croissance étant ...
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Ce rapport a été présenté le 8 mars 2011 à Genève, devant le Conseil des droits de l’homme de l’ONU, par Olivier de Schutter, rapporteur spécial de l’ONU sur le droit à l’alimentation. Dans un contexte de crise écologique, alimentaire et énergique, les États sont confrontés à la nécessité de réorienter leurs systèmes agricoles vers des modes de production hautement productifs, durables et qui contribuent à la réalisation progressive du droit fondamental à une alimentation suffisante ...
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Au terme de cinq années de négociations, l’Organisation internationale de normalisation (ISO) a publié le 1er novembre 2010 la première norme internationale sur la responsabilité sociétale à destination des entreprises et des administrations. Une telle norme pourrait permettre l’uniformisation des politiques de RSE et leur diffusion dans le monde entier. L’absence de certification associée risque toutefois de porter préjudice à cette ambition.
This article by Jean-Christophe Bureau, the second strand in Futuribles’s dossier on the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), outlines the issues raised by that policy and the main European actors involved (states, environmental organizations, farming unions etc.).
Bemoaning the fact that, in a context of rising world agricultural demand and intensified action on environmental matters, debate on the essential issues raised by the CAP has so far been too superficial, J.-C. Bureau begins by looking back over how we arrived at this situation. He indicates the path which, from 1992 onwards, led the European Council to reform the CAP, in an attempt to end what had become a structural mismatch between the supply and demand of agricultural produce, and describes the growing trend (with the reforms of 2003 and 2008) to vest responsibility for the management of agricultural subsidies in the member states. He goes on to present the positions of the main states concerned, together with a certain number of proposals advanced by non-governmental organizations or think-tanks in respect of the next stage, which is set to begin in 2013. These involve emphasizing “public goods” and encouraging the agricultural sector to act positively in environmental matters, rather than granting support centred exclusively on production or agricultural prices.
Lastly, Bureau identifies a number of possible ways forward for the CAP after 2013 in an unprecedented institutional context in which the European Parliament has a greater role, to the detriment of the Council and the European Commission. With some advocating a return to market regulation and others believing such a policy belongs to the past, while yet others wish to put an end to direct subsidy altogether (or to change its form); with differences of perspective between new and old members of the Union; and with countries where the agricultural sector is almost non-existent figuring alongside others where the economy is largely based on that sector, there is a danger of the debate degenerating into chaos. Can we really hope for an ambitious reform to emerge?
The European Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), which came out of the Treaty of Rome, has always occupied a key place in European construction. It did so particularly at Europe’s beginnings, in a context of food shortage that inspired a drive for agricultural production. In the end, however, the CAP became a victim of its own success and occasioned enormous levels of expenditure, particularly in the 1980s when a huge part of the community budget was devoted to it. Hence the reforms successively introduced in 1992, 1999 and, most importantly, 2003, aimed largely at revising the forms of assistance given to agricultural production, agricultural pricing policy and the general logic of the programme (lending greater weight to nutritional quality and the sustainable management of the environment). These were tangible reforms produced in tough negotiations and they are due to run until 2013.
In this context, and insofar as France is particularly concerned by the CAP, a French interdepartmental working group embarked in 2009/10 on a foresight exercise on the future of the CAP to 2020 – in other words, beyond the 2013 deadline when a new CAP reform falls due. This was under the leadership of Bernard Bourget. After a brief presentation of the approach and method employed, Bourget gives an account here of the main lessons learned from this exercise and, in particular, develops six possible scenarios for the CAP in 2020, depending on various assumptions made about the environment, food needs, support for agricultural incomes and international competition etc.
For many months now, the European Union (EU) has been the butt of all criticism. The hopes of seeing the EU make its presence felt on the international scene – hopes born of the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty on 1 December 2009 – have been dashed. The EU has lost its way; it is incapable of asserting itself and making its voice heard. This is a context that leads Bastien Nivet to raise the question the relevance of the Union as a decision-making instance and to problematize its contribution in the conduct of foreign affairs.
In doing so, he bases himself on two notions, globalization and global governance, which, though “overused” and widely “controversial”, as he notes, remain very useful for grasping the current conjuncture. Widening his thinking on the European political system to international political action, Nivet shows, in fact, how the EU could have – and still might – become a decisive player at the global level.
“In an international system seeking coherence between what can be decided on a global scale, what can be decided at continent or state level, and the consideration of local realities, the EU has solid political and institutional experience on which to draw,” he stresses, before turning, in the light of this remark, to the reasons why it has been eclipsed. Is that eclipse temporary and accidental, he asks, or the symptom of a deeper malaise?
By the time this issue of Futuribles reaches its readers, the legislative elections of 28 November 2010 will have taken place in Egypt, probably with little consequence for the government that has been in power since 1981. For though the Egyptian people is not exempt from the occasional convulsion and has, for some years, been willing to go on to the streets when it is unhappy with its situation (as witness the “hunger riots” of 2008), this never goes so far as to threaten Hosni Mubarak’s regime. Incidentally, the Egyptian president is tending now to make concessions (having accepted, for example, multiparty presidential elections in 2005) and his son, Gamal, who has been sounded out as his successor, is seen as being on the reforming wing of the ruling party.
To throw light on these matters, which are often poorly understood, Dina el-Khawaga and Jean-Noël Ferrié unpick for us here the particular context of Egyptian domestic politics. They stress, among other things, the very different attitude an authoritarian regime like Hosni Mubarak’s can have to time, by comparison with democratic regimes. While not standing out against the political liberalization of the country, the current regime is advancing only slowly, whereas Mubarak’s son would be inclined to speed up the pace of reform. Both the old and new guards are at one in wishing to provide effective responses to Egyptian society’s demands, so as to perpetuate the regime, but the difference among the reformers is their concern to advocate a “social contract” providing new foundations for the operation of civil society. It remains to be seen which of the two wings of the regime will win out and at what date…
Sous l’impulsion de Jacques Delors, le think tank Notre Europe propose la création d’une communauté européenne de l’énergie qui réunirait les pays volontaires, sur le modèle revisité de la CECA (Communauté européenne du charbon et de l’acier). Le projet est ambitieux et impliquerait une forte volonté politique. Cette proposition pourrait permettre de relancer la coopération politique européenne sur un sujet d’intérêt commun. Sa réalisation, dans sa forme complète, est peu envisageable à court terme, même ...
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Alors que les chiffres de la pauvreté, en France, ne sont connus, fin 2010, que pour l’année 2008, il est judicieux d’observer la situation et les évolutions dans d’autres pays, dont l’appareil statistique est plus « réactif ». Les chiffres concernant les États-Unis pour l’année 2009 permettent d’apprécier ce que sont, d’une part, les conséquences de la crise économique et sociale et, d’autre part, les performances des réponses mises en œuvre par les pouvoirs ...
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Governments seem to be increasingly powerless, notes Jean-François Drevet in this article. In Europe, in particular, they “seem to be very much overtaken by events and to lack capacities for intervention in response to the economic crisis”. We are thus seeing a crisis of the nation state today, undermined as it is by substantial budgetary disequilibria, remarks Drevet and, in his view, the future seems scarcely more encouraging.
In this context, how do things stand with the European institutions? “They too have lost ground”, argues Jean-François Drevet, being constrained both by the governments themselves, which do not wish to provide them with the necessary resources and by their lack of democratic legitimacy.
Thus, caught “between globalization and the temptation of re-nationalization”, some are beginning to question the “relevance of the European decision-making level” — a reality that leads Drevet to stress Europe’s need to stir itself in order to defend its role.
The unemployment insurance agreement that came into force in France on 1 April 2009 will expire on 31 December 2010. It will, therefore, become subject to renegotiation in November. Given particularly poor current levels of employment and the potential impact of pensions reform on the national unemployment insurance scheme, that renegotiation is like to spark some lively controversies.
One of these will no doubt be over the highly advantageous insurance arrangements enjoyed by workers in the entertainment industry. These latter in fact represent O.8 % of employees in the overall scheme, 3,4 % of persons indemnified and 5,9 % of the scheme’s costs. After reminding us of these data, Bruno Coquet freely acknowledges the exceptional dynamism of the entertainment industries and the fact that, contributing as they do not just to entertainment, but to culture and education, they are worthy recipients of state aid.
However, Coquet is critical of two oddities in this situation: since state aid takes the form, in this case, of unemployment benefits, it has a great impact on the financial equilibrium of the unemployment insurance scheme and is detrimental to the workers in other sectors of economic activity. While very dynamic, the entertainment industries abuse the fact of their employees being very advantageously indemnified during periods of unemployment to create great numbers of insecure jobs without due consideration for the consequences.
Coquet thus shows that the highly favourable unemployment scheme for these workers represents an unsuitable form of financial assistance to the culture industries, is a source of unfairness and has significant unintended consequences. He concludes that this atypical insurance system is harmful and that it would be better to replace it with a proper subsidy for cultural production.
Cities find themselves increasingly in competition with one another, particularly on account of globalization. For this reason, they are constantly attempting to attract more residents, tourism, investment and activities, and to position themselves at the top of the various “league tables” that have emerged in recent years to indicate the attractiveness of the great metropolises. These classifications, of varying degrees of rigour, are published, disseminated and discussed and hence have an impact on the image of local areas. In 2009, for example, The Economist and Mercer ranked Tokyo as the world’s most expensive city, while Vancouver (The Economist) and Vienna (Mercer) were said to be the most pleasant to live in.
In this context, the notion of territorial attractiveness has become essential in the “evaluation of the performance and dynamism of cities”, one of the priorities of city planning policies. But what is meant by the term “attractiveness”? What are its dimensions and determinants?
After presenting the main attractiveness “league tables”, François Cusin and Julien Damon enquire into this new concept, which they compare with the notion of competitiveness. “To gauge the attractiveness of a city is to assess its sphere of influence, its capacity to generate movement and to exert lasting attraction”, observe our authors. Beyond its economic functions, a territory must therefore offer its inhabitants well-being and quality of life. It must provide what they call “residential attractiveness”.
To stay competitive, local governments are developing ambitious city planning policies, putting attractiveness at the heart of their strategy and drawing on the new discipline of urban marketing — so great a priority has the promotion of their brand image become.
Le risque santé se caractérise, traditionnellement, aux États-Unis par la prédominance des assurances privées via l’emploi. Il contient tout de même également un système de prise en charge subsidiaire par des programmes publics. Un problème au fond de tous les débats contemporains réside dans le fait que les dépenses publiques s’accroissent plus rapidement que les dépenses privées. De récentes prévisions laissent entrevoir un dépassement des secondes par les premières à l’horizon 2014. À cette date, les États-Unis ...
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Quels pays offrent les meilleures conditions de « fin de vie » aux malades ? D’après une étude réalisée par la fondation britannique Lien, ce sont les pays anglo-saxons, alors que la Chine et l’Inde figurent parmi les moins généreuses en la matière. Un classement peut-être contestable, mais qui a le mérite de pointer du doigt certaines insuffisances dans ce domaine.
Dans un article du Financial Times Deutschland en date du lundi 9 août 2010, Janusz Lewendowski, le commissaire européen en charge du Budget, annonce pour fin septembre des propositions sur la création d’un impôt européen, une idée déjà ancienne. Il cherche visiblement à créer un débat public sur cette question, dans l’optique des prochaines négociations sur le cadre financier 2014-2020, sur fond d’hostilités de certains États membres.
La France, avec un haut niveau de protection et de dépenses sociales (plus de 30 % de PIB – au premier rang européen) dispose d’un instrument incontestablement efficace pour amortir la crise. La question est celle de la réelle capacité à continuer à financer l’ensemble des prestations et services sociaux, tout comme les projets de développement et de réforme. Pour le moment la crise a pour impact de voir augmenter les demandes et les dépenses. L’offre proposée ne diminue ...
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Le secteur du logement, et notamment du logement social, est, depuis le début de l’année 2010, en profonde mutation, avec la réforme des collecteurs du 1 % logement (désormais dénommé Action logement), le regroupement de certains organismes HLM (habitation à loyer modéré) sur des bases régionales et nationales (en particulier les entreprises sociales de l’habitat, ou ESH) et la réforme des dispositifs d’accession à la propriété, dans le cadre du projet de loi de finances 2011. L’un ...
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Le 8 juillet 2010, le Parlement européen réuni en séance plénière à Strasbourg a approuvé les principes généraux du Service européen d’action extérieure (SEAE) à une très large majorité. L’adoption de l’accord sur le SEAE est révélatrice d’un certain nombre d’évolutions actuelles ou à venir, conséquences directes de l’adoption du traité de Lisbonne. Elle manifeste, au premier chef, le renforcement du rôle du Parlement européen.
Les enquêtes barométriques sur les opinions et les aspirations des Français sont plutôt rares et sous-exploitées. On présentera ici les principaux résultats, en série longue, de l’enquête réalisée tous les ans, depuis 2000, (sauf en 2003) par l’Institut BVA, pour la DREES (Direction de la recherche, des études, de l’évaluation et des statistiques) du ministère des Affaires sociales. L’objectif de cette étude est de disposer d’un instrument qui, depuis une décennie maintenant, permet de mesurer ...
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By way of introduction to his article, Didier Blanchet recalls two essential facts: that the number of persons aged 60 or over can currently be expected to increase, whilst the working-age population seems likely to stabilize (insofar as we are speaking still of those in the age range 20-59); and that expenditure on pensions as a proportion of GDP (13% at present) will increase correlatively in a way that is likely to continue, particularly if economic growth is weak (and assuming that retirement pensions remain at a stable level, the current replacement rate running at around 65%).
Blanchet goes on to recall the various simulations carried out for France by the Conseil d’orientation des retraites (COR; Council for Guidance on Pensions) since the early 2000s, and the impact of the reforms introduced in 1993 and 2003, showing what would have happened if these had not been adopted, first assuming a favourable economic situation, then in the much more worrying context resulting from the economic crisis and the poor economic prospects of the coming years. In so doing, he shows, in effect, the major consequences of that crisis and the very rapid deterioration of the pensions to GDP ratio. In this way he brings out the crucial role of three variables: total pension costs, rate of growth of GDP and the age at which the French begin to draw their pensions.
Having laid out the relation between these figures and shown by how much pensioners’ income would be reduced if nothing were done, Didier Blanchet — basing himself throughout on the most recent publications of the COR — stresses the need to adjust the pensionable age through two measures that will have effects on varying time-scales: on the one hand, raising the legal pensionable age and, on the other, increasing the number of years of contributions required to enjoy a full pension.
Arnauld d’Yvoire proviides an overview of the pension systems in force in Europe here, recapping the philosophy that presided over their development. He thus distinguishes aptly between three general models that have, admittedly, evolved over time:
— Pension systems of the Bismarckian type, based on the principle of social insurance. These are organized on occupational lines and managed by the social partners. Their funding is based, in the main, on employers’ and employees’ contributions, and pension rights are closely linked to the period over which contributions have been made and the level of pay. This model applies particularly in Germany, Italy, Greece and France.
— Pensions systems of the Beveridgian type which depend essentially on the state. From the outset, these have no connection to occupational activity and provide retired people with a basic pension to which supplementary schemes may be added based on the capitalization principle (pension funds).
— The pensions systems promoted by the World Bank in the countries of Eastern Europe after the break-up of the Soviet Union, which have three pillars to them. Two of these pillars are obligatory: a basic pension of a Bismarckian kind on a pay-as-you-go basis and a second, funded pillar.
Arnauld d’Yvoire emphasizes, however, that all these systems have necessarily undergone some development and no longer correspond to the pure model that presided over their introduction. He stresses the fact that, in all countries — though admittedly at different dates and with differing degrees of anticipation — reforms have been undertaken aimed at restraining the increased expenditure associated with retirement pensions. This has been done through two measures: increasing the number of years of occupational activity, and promoting savings to offset the relative fall in basic pensions. He shows, in this way, that some countries have, much earlier than others, made the necessary arrangements to cope with the inevitable ageing of the population and the increase in pension costs. He also shows that, though none has found a ‘dream solution’ to the problem, each has tried with varying degrees of anticipation to adapt to a new, but easily foreseeable, situation.
There is no one single pensions system in France. Alongside the schemes that apply to general employees, there are various others, beginning with those covering workers in the agricultural sector, the public sector and — lest we forget — the so-called “special schemes” which are themselves very diverse and cover 4.5 million contributors and some 3,4 million pensioners today.
Despite the relatively small proportion of pensions that the special schemes represent, the role they play is an emblematic one, since they symbolize the last bastion of social resistance that the Juppé Plan failed to shake in 1995. The resultant trauma was such that the special schemes were deliberately excluded from the pensions reform law of 21 August 2003, and were only reparameterized later, after the salary measures that accompanied the reform were negotiated, somewhat secretively, within the public-sector companies.
Stéphane Hamayon, co-author of a reference work on the subject, provides an account here of the adaptations and reforms that have been made to three of these schemes: those of the SNCF (the French nationalized railway company), the RATP (the Paris regional transport authority) and the IEG (Electrical and Gas Industries). We now know that that special regimes will not be affected by the 2010 reform. Does the extent of other recent reforms justify the retention of the status quo in this area? The analysis developed by Hamayon goes some way towards answering this central question.
Alain Parant begins by stressing, contrary to readily accepted opinion, that, though France is exceptional in the European demographic context in having an appreciably higher fertility rate, the scale of this must not be overstated.
Analyzing how fertility has changed over time, he highlights a risk of increased infertility inherent in the shift towards a later average age of childbearing and shows how, as a result of variations in birth rates observed over a century and the major trend of increasing life-expectancy, the French age pyramid, like that of the other European countries, will inevitably be skewed in the coming decades and how the proportion of older people within the total population will increase.
Parant moves on to the effects of demographic ageing on the pensions system. He reports the latest predictions of the Conseil d’orientation des retraites (COR; Council for Guidance on Pensions), which reveal the magnitude of the challenge facing France, whatever the mix of measures chosen (increased levies, reduction of the purchasing power of old-age pensions or an extension of the period of occupational activity).
However, states Parant, the funding of pensions is only one problem among others. Increased healthcare expenditure, arising particularly from the higher number of dependent people of very advanced age, represents an equally important challenge, on which he offers various projections.
Warning against placing excessive trust in family solidarity, because the family is becoming a more uncertain source of support, he highlights the issues that ensue from rising healthcare costs and the socialization of the dependency risk.
Le débat « capitalisation vs répartition » est actuellement occulté en France, comme si les pouvoirs publics estimaient la mixité de ces deux systèmes – qui, pourtant, est appliquée dans plusieurs pays du monde – inconcevable en France. À ce propos, François Charpentier a évoqué l’anecdote curieuse de Guillaume Sarkozy, frère du Président Nicolas qui, à la tête du groupe paritaire de retraite et de prévoyance Malakoff Médéric, projette de constituer une filiale commune avec la CNP (Caisse nationale de Prévoyance) pour créer ...
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Ce chapitre est extrait du Rapport Vigie 2016 de Futuribles International, qui propose un panorama structuré des connaissances et des incertitudes des experts que l'association a mobilisés pour explorer les évolutions des 15 à 35 prochaines années sur 11 thématiques.