Cette page regroupe l'ensemble des publications de Futuribles sur cette thématique (Vigie, revue, bibliographie, études, etc.)
Fin de la guerre froide, mondialisation des échanges, processus d'intégration régionale, essor de la dimension éthique, autant d'évolutions qui imposent de renouveler les approches concernant la politique étrangère. En ce début de XXIe siècle, qu'est-ce qu'une politique étrangère et comment la définir ? Y a-t-il même consensus sur l'objet de la politique étrangère ? Si « la politique étrangère reste bien l'instrument par lequel l'État tente de façonner son environnement politique international, [...] elle n'est plus ...
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Bien que l'état de santé général des Européens soit l'un des meilleurs du monde, ce rapport montre qu'il existe de grandes inégalités entre les pays et même à l'intérieur de ceux-ci. Le fossé croissant en matière d'espérance de vie entre les pays de l'Est et l'Europe occidentale, dû principalement à une forte mortalité prématurée des jeunes hommes des anciens États communistes, est particulièrement préoccupant. De même, on assiste à une recrudescence des maladies ...
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Roger Masters has already written for Futuribles (n° 228, February 1998), but his topic then was the future of the nation-state. This time, in an article begun before the tragic events of 11 September 2001, he discusses a more limited field: to paraphrase Montesquieu, not so much the "nature of things" as the "accidents of fate".
Masters highlights two aspects of this dreadful "accident". First, the altruistic element. Arguing as an evolutionary biologist, as he did in 1998, he sees the Islamist kamikazes as an example of self-sacrifice pushing individuals to die in order to increase the chances of survival and reproduction of others with similar genes to their own. The role of the environment is not, however, overlooked, since such altruism is more likely to occur in societies with a high birth rate and short life expectancy (the so-called developed countries, with their low birth rates and long life expectancy tend, by contrast, to exhibit individualistic/hedonistic patterns of behaviour).
As for the destructive element, it can be traced back ultimately to globalization. An increasingly unpredictable world and an ever widening gap between what the ordinary person knows and the state of science and technology together create a need for scapegoats whose destruction will put everything right. This is the role that some types of Islam, which promise Paradise to those who die for the jihad, is undoubtedly playing. Yet in his analysis and his recommendations, Roger Masters never allows us to forget that all beliefs, both religious and nationalist, may become messages of hate, though this is not inevitable. As a result he emphasizes the need to avoid lumping together mainstream Islam and the terrorist networks.
Let us not confuse Islam and the vast majority of the Muslim population, who want simply to live in peace, with Islamic fundamentalism, a fortiori with Islamic terrorism, says Gérard Donnadieu. He nevertheless proposes to analyse the factors within the religious ideas of Islam that might encourage violence, while also stressing that no religion is safe from extremism.
He goes on to explain that people can have widely differing attitudes to Islam, and then to outline the peculiar views of some fundamentalists, such as the Egyptian Hasan al-Banna, founder of the Muslim Brotherhood, and above all the Pakistani Maulana Abul Maudoudi, the founder of Jamat-i-islami, a radical Islamic movement, whose book Understanding Islam provides valuable insights.
Gérard Donnadieu sketches briefly three topics discussed by Maudoudi that he finds especially revealing:
- the absolute preeminence of Islam, which preaches unfaltering obedience to everything prescribed in the Koran and the charia;
- the supreme position of the "good Muslim" who is promised a place in Allah's paradise as a reward for irreproachable behaviour;
- the justification for resorting to violence: every Muslim must be ready to defend Islam and if necessary to join in the jihad (holy war). This radical version of Islam believes in sacrifice, and justifies the use of violence and war.
In the last part of his article, Gérard Donnadieu highlights the strengths and weaknesses of Islamic fundamentalism. He argues that, faced with the modern world and the problem of controlling violence, it is deeply archaic and that "we are probably only seeing the start of its violent and spectacular manifestations".
He concludes that "We cannot rule out the possibility that a non-sacrificial, pluralist and secularized version of Islam will emerge in the future", but this would require a more modern reinterpretation of the basic texts; this would be a major challenge first of all for the Muslim world.
A radical transformation of the aims, methods and organization of large-scale violence is now occurring: it is no longer limited to clashes between states, and the classic divisions are becoming blurred between civilians and the military, between private and public, between national and international, and ultimately even between war and peace...
In essence, this is the new landscape described by Geneviève Schméder, who shows how far we are witnessing a general move towards deregulation, led by the United States; this is not confined to the economic sphere and it leads to poverty and injustice, which in turn generate further violence.
Schméder highlights the negative effects of the economic and military policies of the United States, which has tried its utmost to impose its dominance on the rest of the world , hence the dislike of the US and the violence of the attacks against it.
In conclusion she puts the question: will the recent catastrophe cause the Americans to rethink their policies, as would seem to be the sine qua non for a new ordering of international relations?
The events of September 11th 2001 are a watershed; they mark the start of a new era, perhaps the beginning of a third world war. So opens the article by Michael Marien, who is very well-informed about the futures studies undertaken in the United States over the last 30 years and who, just after the September terrorist attacks, invited a dozen futures studies colleagues to react to the events and to suggest what consequences they might have.
He draws on their responses, as well as on about 30 texts available on the website of the World Future Society (www.wfs.org), in pointing out that many futurologists had already issued warnings about major terrorist action, although naturally they did not foresee the precise form that this would take.
Rather than describing the scenarios envisaged, Michael Marien outlines here the comments elicited by three types of question: those relating to war, and to the costs and the issues it may raise.
On the war itself, Marien stresses first the risk of further attacks, possibly even more serious ones using nuclear, biological or chemical means. Next, given that the war on terrorism will last a long time, he wonders about the chances of a positive outcome and worries about the strength of the alliances forged by the United States with Western nations where popular support for the war may weaken, as is even more likely in Muslim countries, especially Pakistan and Saudi Arabia.
As to the costs of the operation, the first question is obviously whether there will be, as there was after the Gulf war, a new period of prosperity or whether, on the contrary, the conflict will worsen the recession. But besides this economic aspect, Michael Marien stresses that the strengthening of security measures will probably be at the expense of individual freedom, and he wonders about the long-term future for such freedom. He mentions the sacrifices that Americans may have to make, as will the Muslim world, especially the Afghans who are already suffering great hardships. Finally, Marien is afraid that the war will push many important issues, such as global warming and the adoption of policies that promote sustainable development, further down the agenda.
As for the issues, Marien stresses two key points: first, the major challenge of stopping the flows of ill-gotten funds amounting to billions of US dollars and the consequent need to restructure and cleanse the international banking system. Second, provided that the international effort tackles the many real causes of terrorism, the recent events might mark the start of a new era (if the Americans learn the virtues of multilateral action) in which the world might become more concerned with fairness and solidarity, with respect for human rights and democracy...
No, Mr Fukuyama, the end of communism was not "the end of history", the final victory of the free market ideology exemplified by the United States, argues Jean-Jacques Salomon. He reminds us that Pierre Hassner expressed the fear that, on the contrary, the post-Cold War period might be the beginning of a new Middle Ages.
The events of September 11th mark a major geopolitical turning-point and require a radical change of attitude and policies on the part of the United States, Salomon argues. In order to make clear what this involves, he looks briefly at the situation "before" (a recently elected President, an unwavering supporter of ultraliberalism, convinced of American supremacy and the universal applicability of its model of development) and "after", which is likely to see the federal government revert to being strongly interventionist and ready to combat the ill-effects of unbridled capitalism.
What is likely to happen after that, wonders Jean-Jacques Salomon? Maybe this mobilization against terrorism will hasten European integration or encourage the industrialized countries to be less arrogant, to seek for ways and means of achieving lasting peace and greater North-South cooperation as a result of shifts in alliances and allegiances...
The author does not, however, rule out the possibility that the Muslim world will "catch on fire". He stresses that "the war against terrorism", unless it resolutely attacks terrorism's deep roots in poverty and humiliation and hence in resentment of the rich countries, is quite unlike any other war: it may have no end.
Terrorism, involving different groups of people for different reasons, has always existed and will never disappear. But with the arrival of a world without frontiers there has come a kind of "dumping" at global level, and hence a lack of rules and a general laxity that favours all manner of factors of destruction.
How can we parry the grave dangers that arise from the increasing numbers of people who shamelessly take advantage of this situation, asks Kimon Valaskakis? The diplomatic system developed since the mid 17th century, which was based on the principle of sovereign states with well-defined territories, is ineffectual against the new global challenges (terrorism, international financial problems, global warming, etc.) and the actions of transnational businesses that disregard frontiers.
Kimon Valaskakis argues that we must not only "think globally" but create the means to act globally; this would require giving high priority to examining how to set up new bodies and procedures which would ensure more effective governance of the world and thereby avoid the uncontrolled excesses of globalization, which at present operates without rules or laws.
The article has three parts. In the first, Jacques Lesourne makes it clear that the terrorist attacks in September 2001 and their consequences unfortunately merely confirm what was foreseen by futures studies in earlier years. "September 11th was not unthinkable", he writes, and goes on to remind us that terrorism has existed for centuries, it is not linked uniquely to Islamic fundamentalism, and it is probably hopeless to try to eradicate it...
He also points out that since the United States has become the only Great Power in the world, it is the natural scapegoat. Furthermore, as he has often insisted, the Arab-Turkish-Iranian region is particularly dangerous, and this fact is not sufficiently clearly recognized by the democracies, which have tended to emphasize freedom at the expense of their security.
In the second part, Lesourne ponders the trends that might develop out of the September 11th attacks. He argues that Western countries will probably need to review their security policies and reevaluate their systems of defence. But he also foresees some shifts in the alliances, especially among the six main elements: the United States, European Union, Russia, Japan, China and India. Finally, he stresses that these events threaten to deepen the downturn in the world economy which had already begun, and to encourage governments to adopt coordinated regulatory policies.
Despite the hazards involved, Jacques Lesourne ends by sketching three scenarios with particular emphasis on what he takes to be the key variables: the nature of the American retaliation and its outcome, the movements of public opinion in Western countries, the degree to which the United States accepts great multilateralism, and the progress towards European unification.
Choosing from among 32 theoretically possible scenarios, he describes three that cover widely differing variations: the "minor event", "improvements in world governance" and "generalized disorder".
Following the terrorist attacks against the United States on 11 September 2001, Pierre Bonnaure reflects on "the surprising failure of the American secret services, which some say were caught totally unawares".
First he comments that the situation is not that simple and that many problems arise between anticipation and action, in particular knowing whether to take a warning seriously and what decision to take about timely action when considerable uncertainty and enormous risks are involved.
He nevertheless stresses that the secret services seem to have been unprepared for an attack that did not fit current expectations, terrorist attacks on several targets rather than an act of aggression by a "rogue state". He criticizes the shortsightedness of the intelligence authorities, emphasizing that this is not the first instance, and tries to understand the reasons for this failure.
In a few lines he reminds us of a series of problems facing what is now called strategic intelligence as well as those inherent in the interaction between thinking and action.
There is no single European model for education, let alone a universally accepted one. Even within the European Union there is enormous diversity, which Francine Vaniscotte sets out to describe here.
Two different views coexist, she explains: the first combines primary education with the first stage of secondary education (everyone attends a single school), whereas the second considers an initial division (selection?) at the beginning of secondary schooling to be necessary.
Taking her analysis a step further, the author identifies four types of education system within the EU:
- the single school model (everyone attends the same school for the whole period of compulsory education) operating in Scandinavia;
- the all-purpose school model, offering pupils a variety of possibilities at secondary level (Great Britain);
- the streamed school model, which is structured according to options chosen early on, but with some degree of mobility between them; this is the most common arrangement in Austria, Germany, Luxemburg, Switzerland, etc.;
- the common core model (France, Greece, Italy, Portugal, Spain), which is inspired by the single school model but does not fully apply it, and is shaped by very different traditions and values.
These differences relate to religious traditions and to deep cultural disparities; they also reflect ideological differences, Francine Vaniscotte emphasizes, though she concludes by pointing out some factors bringing the models closer together.
Alain Michel proposes six scenarios for the future of schools in the industrialized countries over the next 15 to 20 years. The scenarios have been developed as part of the programme on "Tomorrow's schools" of the Centre for Research and Innovation in Education (CERI) at OECD (the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development).
Under the first scenario the status quo continues, which would mean generally deteriorating schools, despite some marginal improvements.
The second scenario, called "Extending the market model", shows what might happen if state schools were at least partly privatized, ultimately leading to a greater split between the public and private sectors in education.
The third scenario, called "Schools at the heart of the community", represents the exact opposite, in which education is considered to be a public good, and schools would play a key role in promoting citizenship.
The fourth scenario, too, "Schools as key learning institutions", tries to respond to the need to upgrade the role and prestige of education whilst placing greater emphasis on the responsibilities of schools to develop knowledge and skills.
By contrast, the remaining two scenarios reflect forms of decline. In the fifth, "Networks of learners" within a society composed of networks (typical of today! ) the main features are the fragmentation of national education systems, the diminishing role of the state and, simultaneously, the rise of local school systems and major networks.
The final scenario has the striking title "The flight of teachers and collapse". It foresees schools deteriorating and general discontent, especially on the part of parents and teachers. This is probably unlikely to occur within the next 20 years, and would happen only if there were major upheavals in the short or medium term.
Obviously these scenarios are not all equally probable, and are even less likely to occur in every part of the OECD area. Furthermore, some of them are more hypothetical while others are more normative. Nonetheless, they are extremely useful in quashing fears of possibilities that clearly remain open. They also show the importance of the issues facing schools today.
The European Commission publishes an annual report on distance working in Europe. Anne de Beer, on the basis the 2000 Edition, observes that distance working is on the increase in Europe, in spite of the different forms it adopts and the significant differences in its popularity from one country to another.
For instance, this report reveals that although the number of distance workers in Europe rose above 10 million last year, this form of work is much more frequent in Scandinavian countries than in the Mediterranean, with France at the bottom of the list... except in terms of creating obstacles to its development.
Westphalia II: Towards a New World Order
The Treaty of Westphalia (1648) was at the origin of the Nation State defined as a sovereign entity with a specific territory and lead, at a global level, to intergovernmental institutions, which have now been rendered obsolete by a process of unfettered globalisation. It is hence high time to create, according to Kimon Valaskakis, if not a global governance system, at least an 'effective global guidance system'. This is the scope of what he has dubbed "Westphalia II".
The author first describes the institutions that came out of "Westphalia I" characterised, according to him, by sovereign Nation States within a specific geographical territory and represented by a Government, vested with the exclusive power to wage war and sign international treaties.
According to the author, because of the way globalisation has developed since 1945, this system is now under threat due to the simultaneous undermining of the sovereignty of States from the bottom (decentralisation), from the top (federalism) and transversally (market forces), due to the reduction in the impact of distance and due to the appearance of new actors on the world scene, new sources of law and new sources of conflicts. This globalisation without rules or referee is dangerous and a source of inequality and barbaric conflicts.
Therefore, according to Kimon Valaskakis, we need to invent a new form of governance for the 21st century, which could follow two very different scenarios. It could either be characterised by a privatisation of governance, a system governed by the market (a dollar = a vote), corporations or even organised crime, something that could lead to the worst excesses. Or it could follow a second scenario, dubbed "Westphalia II", leading to new public institutions which, according to the author who is the President of the Athens Club, can only be constructed on the basis of a new form of co-operation between political thinkers and actors aimed at building an 'effective global guidance system'. What could this be?
Faisant l'impasse sur des siècles de réflexion émanant de philosophes politiques sur la genèse de l'État, les formes de gouvernement et, en définitive, le devenir d'institutions publiques supposées incarner et être garantes du bien commun, voici venu le terme de " gouvernance ", mot valise s'il en est, qui donne lieu depuis quelques années à une abondante littérature. À l'origine de ce courant figure sans conteste la prise de conscience que l'État, seule instance légitime et ...
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La prospective de l'aménagement de l'espace français doit intégrer une réflexion sur l'évolution de l'Union européenne, en particulier depuis la rédaction d'un document de référence : le SDEC. Ce Schéma préconise un développement spatial polycentrique, objectif partagé par la DATAR. Après s'être interrogé sur le statut du SDEC et sur la pertinence du concept de polycentrisme, on évalue les chances d'une Europe plus équilibrée. Un scénario purement tendanciel confirme la prééminence de l'Euromégalopole ...
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David P. Calleo est professeur à la John Hopkins University. Il a écrit plusieurs livres économiques et géopolitiques notamment Beyond American Hegemony: the Future of Western Alliance et une histoire sur le problème allemand dans le système mondial depuis 1870. Le thème central de son dernier ouvrage sur le futur de l'Europe est une interrogation. La guerre froide avait donné à l'Europe une sorte de stabilité, que va-t-il advenir maintenant qu'elle a pris fin ? De nombreux problèmes ...
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Le stock de la dette des pays en développement atteignait 2 400 milliards de dollars US fin 2000. Le poids de leur endettement est en hausse constante depuis 30 ans, sans que les mesures correctrices, de plus en plus généreuses, ne parviennent à en alléger le fardeau. Il s'agit là d'un phénomène particulièrement lié à la mondialisation qui, d'une part, renforce la marginalisation des pays les plus pauvres (notamment sur le marché des capitaux auquel ils n ...
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Beaucoup d'analystes occidentaux considèrent la Chine de l'après-Tiananmen comme un pays intolérant, dont les habitants ne cherchent qu'à s'enrichir depuis l'entrée dans l'économie de marché. Selon Joseph Fewsmith, spécialiste du monde intellectuel chinois, la situation n'est pas si simple : l'élite politique chinoise est loin d'être homogène et se divise très souvent sur les questions de politique et de pouvoir. Différents courants coexistent, exprimant des visions très différentes de l'avenir de ...
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Le 8 septembre 1951, le Japon signait à San Francisco un traité de paix avec les Américains. Dans l'article 9 de leur nouvelle Constitution, les Japonais s'engageaient à « renoncer à la guerre comme droit souverain de la nation ainsi qu'à l'utilisation de la force pour régler des différends sur le plan international ». Alors que cette clause a toujours limité le Japon à participer activement à la défense de ses alliés contre un ennemi commun, l'évolution ...
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Ce chapitre est extrait du Rapport Vigie 2016 de Futuribles International, qui propose un panorama structuré des connaissances et des incertitudes des experts que l'association a mobilisés pour explorer les évolutions des 15 à 35 prochaines années sur 11 thématiques.