Cette page regroupe l'ensemble des publications de Futuribles sur cette thématique (Vigie, revue, bibliographie, études, etc.)
A l'horizon 2020, la baisse de la population en âge de travailler ne pourra être compensée ni par la poursuite de la hausse de la fécondité ni par le relèvement du taux d'emploi des salariés les plus âgés. Face à cette perspective, le Conseil économique et social propose d'envisager autrement le futur de l'immigration en France et en Europe et d'articuler une politique d'asile conforme aux conventions internationales et à notre Constitution, une politique ...
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Victor Hugo as futurologist? This may seem surprising, but an opportunity tempted him to try his hand. Before the great "Exposition universelle" in 1867, a publisher decided to put together a guide to Paris with contributions from a dozen of the most famous writers of the day. Although Hugo had been in exile in Guernsey for many years, he agreed enthusiastically to write a preface. He was a keen walker and loved the city, which he knew street by street, but he was also able to look critically at it and to produce a well-aimed and relevant assessment.
1866 was the year of the Austrian defeat by the Prussians at Sadowa, a brutal demonstration of Prussian military might. Coincidentally Prussia had decided to make a giant gun built by Krupp the star attraction of its pavilion at the Exhibition. Hugo reacted to this provocation and made his preface a plea for the ideas that he had long held dear: pacifism against the bellicose stance of empires, democracy against autocratic regimes, "a school that opens means a prison that closes".
Looking back, he argues that in 1789 Paris had been given a historic mission that had motivated people, even the masses, to invent a peace-loving and universal society. A utopia, of course, but in the best sense of the term and one that looked forward to the efforts of the League of Nations and later the United Nations Organization, and peace restored to the European continent through the moves towards unification.
In the first section of his text, reprinted here, Hugo outlines the broad features of this peaceful society that he so earnestly desired and describes the best ways this could be achieved. He foresaw that the rise of mass means of communication would be a factor promoting greater unity among peoples thanks to such things as tunnels through mountains, canals across isthmuses and even commercial aviation, to which he gave the delightful term "air-ships". His comments on a common currency and the fact that employment creates work for others are not dissimilar from the ideas of Alfred Sauvy.
The publishers Bartillat have had the happy idea of reissuing this rather flamboyant little book, with a preface by Dominique Fernandez, which will delight lovers of learned literature. It adds a new and pleasing dimension to our view of a great French writer.
Dans les principaux pays européens, les générations du baby-boom, qui ont élargi durant plus de trente ans les effectifs de la population en âge de travailler, atteignent désormais l'âge de la retraite. Joints à ce phénomène transitoire, la baisse de la fécondité et l'allongement de la durée de vie vont, au cours du prochain demi-siècle, cantonner la croissance démographique à la population des retraités. Dans la majorité des sept pays étudiés, la baisse de la population d'âge ...
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Ce nouveau rapport, qui couvre quelque 52 pays au total dont, pour la première fois, l'ensemble de la fédération de Russie et les 11 autres pays d'Europe orientale, du Caucase et de l'Asie centrale, met en lumière les différences considérables concernant la situation de l'environnement dans les principales régions de l'Europe. La transition économique et sociale enclenchée au début des années 1990 - l'Europe occidentale se transformant en une société axée sur les services et ...
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Une ère nouvelle s'est substituée à la guerre froide: celle de la guerre asymétrique. Paradoxalement, c'est l'efficacité des puissances occidentales en matière de guerre conventionnelle qui a poussé leurs adversaires à privilégier des stratégies d'asymétrie (la guérilla, l'insurrection, la guerre prolongée), face auxquelles ces mêmes armées occidentales ne sont ni les plus adaptées ni les plus efficaces. Les États occidentaux doivent donc réviser leur approche des questions de sécurité, revoir la place de l'armée ...
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This article looks at the aftermath of the attacks of 11 September 2001 and the anti-terrorist measures put in place by the Bush Administration in the United States. Above all, it is a warning about the dangers to academic freedom that these measures could cause: withholding of information, limited access for foreign students to American laboratories, embargo on the publication of the results of research that the Pentagon considers (rightly or wrongly) to be sensitive, etc. In the long run, the factors that have made the American research system so outstanding - its openness and its ability to absorb talented foreigners - could quite easily be undermined.
The new threats following the events of 11 September certainly give legitimacy to the secrecy imposed on "classified" research with regard to defence needs, but should such research now be conducted in university laboratories rather than in defence establishments and industrial laboratories linked to the Pentagon? Are the measures envisaged in the Patriot Act, recently adopted by Congress to deal with the challenges of terrorism, compatible with the principles and values of academic research?
Eugene B. Skolnikoff emphasizes that the situation now is far more delicate than during the Cold War (when the McCarthy witch-hunts deeply affected the conduct of research in the US): a clash is inevitable between, on the one side, freedom to undertake research, access to information, sharing of results and openness to the outside world, and on the other, the government's efforts to erect barriers around knowledge and to institute discriminatory measures against students on the basis of their nationality.
Les scénarios européens élaborés à l'horizon 2020 par le Groupe de prospective DATAR " Europe et aménagement du territoire " sont présentés dans cet article. Des scénarios partiels s'appliquent aux quatre grands sous-systèmes susceptibles d'influer sur l'aménagement de l'espace européen : les frontières de l'Union européenne, sa gouvernance, ses compétences et l'organisation spatiale du continent. On expose ensuite la méthode de construction des scénarios généraux, avant de résumer les cinq scénarios finalement retenus : l'Europe pré ...
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Jean-Marie Chevalier et Olivier Pastré sont venus présenter à Futuribles leur ouvrage, né du constat que les attentats du 11 septembre 2001 avaient suscité beaucoup de discours sur leurs conséquences sur la conjoncture économique, mais peu de réflexions globales sur les changements structurels profonds qui risquaient d'en découler. C'est pourquoi ils ont décidé de solliciter les économistes pour lesquels ils avaient le plus d'estime, et qui tous ont répondu à l'appel.
One of today's most successful portmanteau terms, as the sociologists call them, is undoubtedly the principle of "subsidiarity" - a word that is now used for all manner of things, but above all in every discussion, whether European or national, of the future of our institutions and the redistribution of competencies among different levels of public administration.
If, in invoking this principle, the idea is generally to insist on the need to deal with issues as close as possible to where they have an impact (proximity principle), it is nevertheless the case that this well-known principle is, according to Yves Gaudemet, ambiguous and debatable, without real legal or practical meaning.
After showing how widely this principle is now used, especially in debates about European unification and the creation of appropriate public institutions, Yves Gaudemet argues first why the principle of subsidiarity is so ambiguous, and then why its future is so uncertain.
Tony Blair, the British Prime Minister, acknowledged that "subsidiarity is the word that saves the Treaty of Maastricht". It does so because everybody can interpret it as suits them best, says Yves Gaudemet, who in the course of this article argues that affirming this principle does not resolve anything and can in no way take the place of the indispensable sharing out of responsibilities within the European Union.
There are more and more books about anti-Americanism in France, and it is true that in the emotional relationship between France and the United States, resentment and frustration on the part of weak for the strong have tended to generate criticisms in which denigration has long been the result more of ignorance than of arrogance. Today this anti-Americanism needs to be put in perspective, partly because the French (especially young people) have taken to travelling in the United States and therefore have less biased views than the older generation; but mainly because it is much too hasty to dismiss all critical analysis of American foreign policy as anti-American. Critical views are all the more legitimate given that there are commentators among both Democrats and Republicans in the United States who refuse to accept blindly the declarations of President George W. Bush in his crusade against the "axis of evil", in particular against Iraq under Saddam Hussein.
Moreover, it is important to be aware of and understand the deep roots of the unilateralism that the current US Administration pursues so aggressively and, beyond its historical and cultural origins, the influence that the Jacksonian tradition has always exerted to varying degrees in the design and implementation of American foreign policy. Admittedly, if America seems imperialist, argues Jean-Jacques Salomon, this is primarily due to Europe's inadequacies.
Since we cannot publish all of Walter Russell Mead's text, owing to lack of space, he summarizes certain passages, and stresses how far the temptation to act unilaterally derives from values and practices that are deeply rooted in popular attitudes: the code of honour and the religious belief in America's ability to win in any situation. The image of the cowboy, lone champion of good against Osama ben Laden or Saddam Hussein, reflects the whole mythology that inspired the western and that certain American commentators willingly invoke in criticizing the reservations and hesitations, if not the tendency to Munich-style appeasement, of their European allies.
This text is all the more revealing because it was originally published more than a year before the attacks of 11 September 2001. As with Pearl Harbor, it is not so much the actual number of people killed that explains the Jacksonian reaction in the United States, but rather the intense revulsion at the violation of the sanctuary. We are shown clearly a very different vision of the world to the one that prevailed in Washington during the Cold War, a vision in which the US can now manage without the support of allies, abandons its former alliances, challenges any international solidarity and intends to deal with terrorist opponents all by itself, defending only America's own interests. In this crusade, W.R. Mead suggests, oil is a far more important factor than compassion for the victims of Saddam Hussein. The two sides of the Atlantic are definitely no longer singing from the same hymn sheet. But if this article had been written by a Frenchman, would it not have been criticized as yet another example of anti-Americanism?
Ce nouveau Cahier de Chaillot tente de définir la forme que pourrait prendre aujourd'hui l'Union européenne (UE) en matière de politique étrangère et de sécurité commune (PESC). En effet, face aux défis de l'après-guerre froide, les modèles traditionnels de l'UE – puissance civile, militaire ou normative - ne semblent plus appropriés. Selon l'auteur, l'Union devrait fonder ses actions extérieures sur un concept de sécurité coopérative, intégrant les dimensions civile, militaire et normative, dans une approche globale ...
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Population growth in European countries -as in any region- depends on both natural increase (the difference between births and deaths) and, to a large extent, on migration flows, i.e. the net outcome of residents leaving and people arriving, whether from within Europe or from outside. It is therefore extremely important to measure these flows accurately and, since the aim is to control them, to try to anticipate or at least understand the factors that may be driving or restraining them.
Unfortunately, according to Michel Poulain and Anne Herm, our knowledge of the flows within the European Union and of immigration from other countries is remarkably hazy -even though accurate knowledge is an obvious prerequisite for any ultimate agreement on a common migration policy- because the methods used for measuring flows are not altogether satisfactory and differ from country to country. For example, the authors point out, the estimates of the number of Italian immigrants in Belgium differ widely depending on which country's statistics you use.
Michel Poulain and Anne Herm present a sometimes surprising description of the methods used to measure international mobility, stressing the practical problems, the uncertainties surrounding the figures currently collected, indeed the real oddities that can occur.
In the second section, while bearing in mind the difficulties with the available statistics, the authors present an overview of the main trends within the European Union, focusing first on the size of the foreign populations in each of the member states and then on the special features of migration flows into Europe from outside.
While the growth of population flows within Europe augur well for greater European unity, the authors nevertheless conclude that there is an urgent need for more reliable data on international migration and, furthermore, this will be achieved only if there is a clear policy for the EU as a whole. Unfortunately, in this area even more than others, there is a regrettable tendency among the member states to shy away from the problem, doubtless for fear that the truth might be too disturbing.
Gabriel Fragnière shares his view of the cultural transformations currently under way in Europe: he argues that Europeans are about to arrive at true multiculturalism, synonymous with the emergence of 'a new kind of humanism that makes diversity the basis of what brings them together'.
Before coming to this conclusion, he offers his own definition of culture: 'the sum total of values, beliefs, attitudes [...] that are specific to a society [...] helping to generate a feeling of identity and belonging'. He shows how our societies have moved towards a plurality of cultures, which he defines as a trend away from centralization and an imposed monoculture, affirming instead a large number of individual cultures. By introducing a greater degree of decentralization, and therefore of democracy, and encouraging respect for others, pluriculturalism is therefore an indispensable step towards multiculturalism.
Yet multiculturalism does not simply mean juxtaposing different cultures. Rather, it is 'a social experience and a new way of organizing society, [...] a balance of differences that avoids both social disintegration and fusion that denies the very existence of differences'. It strengthens the unity of society as a whole by making a clear distinction between social organization and cultural identification.
Gabriel Fragnière illustrates his argument with examples drawn from the cultural functions of language (understood as 'cultural language'): communication, expression, socialization and identification. It is the way in which these elements interrelate that reveals the cultural state of an entity. Multiculturalism exists when the relationships are not one-way and when the unity of the whole of society is not challenged by the observed diversity. In this sense, he argues, Europe has indeed moved into an era of multiculturalism.
The treaty of Maastricht confirmed this by establishing a 'European citizenship' that shatters the traditional strict separation of identity, nationality and citizenship. We must therefore expect an increasing backlash of claims by minorities and others demanding that their identity be recognized within their national context while at the same time appealing to a citizenship wider than that context, as well as rights over which nation-states no longer have control.
Former Secretary of State in the Nixon Administration, eminent professor at Harvard University, winner of the Nobel Peace Prize, Henry Alfred Kissinger is one of the greatest experts on American foreign policy. In his latest book, Does America Need a Foreign Policy? (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2001), Kissinger stresses the urgent need for the United States to establish a foreign policy appropriate to the new global situation.
Pierre Béhar, whose interest in these matters is unflagging, has chosen to review the book. Indeed, since the psychological blow of 11 September 2001, America is disoriented and needs more than ever a subtle and finely tuned foreign policy.
Béhar highlights several of Kissinger's recommendations, namely: (a) American foreign policy must deal with the whole world, and the globalizing and simplistic attitudes of "Left wing" idealism (whereby the world is moving inexorably towards greater democracy) and "Right wing" realism (whereby the free world will win and American power will expand even further) both make foreign policy impossible. (b) American foreign policy needs to be "reasoned" and must set out, for every region of the world, the moves that the United States must make in order to promote states based on peace and law. What is needed, rather than an imperial system, is an international system that maintains a fine balance among the various forces in the world while ensuring American dominance. (c) To counteract the various regional groupings and rapprochements developing around the world, it is necessary to create systems of political and economic international relations subject to American approval. (d) The economic and legal aspects of globalization must not be allowed to take the place of foreign policy. (e) Finally, the United States must drive and sustain ethical action around the world and foster a more humane moral world order.
All of this strengthens the view that American foreign policy will be the key to future developments, probably in the short as well as in the longer term, especially given that the policies of Russia and China are now merely reactive, while it seems that Europe has none at all.
Les tendances démographiques constituent, on le sait, des variables primordiales et pourtant souvent négligées. En la matière, un phénomène particulièrement important est flagrant pour ce qui concerne les évolutions contrastées de l'Europe de l'Ouest et des États-Unis. Un récent dossier de The Economist en souligne les perspectives et les enjeux . La vitalité démographique américaine actuelle, comparée à la relative torpeur européenne, pourrait avoir des conséquences extraordinaires sur la structure des populations, le dynamisme économique et les relations géopolitiques ...
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An examination of the way values in several major fields have changed should not give the impression that European values are diverging, argue Pierre Bréchon, Olivier Galland and Jean-François Tchernia. Two main trends emerge from the surveys of values discussed here:
-The rise of "postmaterialism": once material needs are met and there is a sense of security, people start to challenge traditional moral positions and instead emphasize aspirations such as self-expression or community participation. This trend was very marked in France during the three decades of post-war prosperity (the "Trente Glorieuses") and has continued despite slower economic growth. These aspirations appear to complement rather than contradict each other: people today aspire to satisfy both their material needs and their postmaterialist concerns.
-The desire by individuals to decide for themselves what is good and bad, rather than allowing their opinions and behaviour to be determined by some higher authority, often a religious one. This trend has been growing for a long time, but it is quite distinct from selfish individualism that rejects any social norms or sense of belonging to a community. Admittedly individualism still exists, the authors stress, although in varying degrees depending on whether a country is traditionally Catholic or Protestant, but it is linked to a more or less strong sense of community, which inevitably means acceptance of certain rules of social behaviour, even a recognition of a superior "public good".
Nevertheless, the authors find that there are major differences among European countries that turn out to be closely linked to whether they are traditionally Catholic or Protestant. This is also true of trends in Eastern Europe.
In conclusion they argue that there is a pattern of change peculiar to each country, if not region, although some countries are more homogeneous than others. Having examined the case of several typical countries, the authors conclude that some differences persist, with their roots in the past, although this does not prevent values from changing, albeit slowly, and reforming.
Although this article, which was written long before the recent French elections, sets out to examine long-term trends, it is also extremely illuminating about the present political situation.
While there are clear differences among countries (in particular between the Protestant nations of Northern Europe and the Catholic South) it highlights the general decline in interest in politics and in turnout at elections, especially among young people. By contrast, it stresses the rise of new forms of political activity based on protest.
Pierre Bréchon ponders how much trust Europeans place in their institutions, and shows - although, again, there are obvious differences between countries - that some institutions are well regarded, depending on their purpose, for example the systems providing education, social security and healthcare.
By contrast, stressing the gulf between political leaders and the electorate, Bréchon points out how far the democratic institutions such as parliaments are criticized for being unrepresentative.
He then goes on to look at political affiliations, in particular the Left-Right divide; he shows that although this is now much less marked, it still has a certain sense, as can be seen from the importance attached to a range of values emblematic of the two sides.
After focussing on xenophobia, the changes in attitudes to immigrants and the immigration policies adopted by the various countries, Pierre Bréchon looks more closely at democracy itself. He argues that although it is well established in Western Europe, this does not mean that it is above criticism, sometimes energetic.
Overall, the author stresses that the trends observed over the last 20 years remain steady, including the continuing diversity among countries which appears not to have diminished in spite of the growth of the European Union.
Trust in other people, which underpins all social life, both public and private, is evolving in different ways in different European countries. These trends, assessed via the European Values Surveys between 1981 and 1999, have been studied by Olivier Galland, who presents his findings here.
He starts by identifying several factors that affect the level of trust: tolerance, permissiveness, altruism, social selectiveness and confidence in institutions. It appears from the initial research that the countries of Eastern Europe are the most selective, while the countries of Northern Europe are the most permissive and trusting. Although the sense of belonging to a community is similar from country to country, trust, selectiveness and permissiveness vary greatly. Two countries stand out: Ireland for its high moral standards and high level of social integration; and France, which is permissive with an exceptionally low level of trust.
Another observation is confirmed by the surveys: the relationship between the level of trust in a given country and the degree to which its inhabitants are active in voluntary organizations, although the correlation between trust and sociableness is not automatic. In France, for example, there is a low level of trust and little participation in voluntary organizations, but a lot of socializing with friends.
Then, having measured and ranked the amount of tolerance, altruism and social integration, Olivier Galland offers the following typology of Europeans: at the top of the social ranking are the "modern integrated" Northern Europeans, who are Protestant and with a strong civic sense; the "hyperpermissive" group, also in Northern Europe but in Austria and Spain as well, aged between 30 and 49, politically on the Left, postmaterialist and with no religious beliefs; the strong individualists, who are found in the Roman Catholic and Mediterranean lands, disproportionately in France, with their traditional values; the "integrated traditionalists" of Central and Southern Europe, who are elderly, from a rural background, deeply involved in family life, with strong religious beliefs and politically on the Right; lastly, the "poorly integrated traditionalists", without strong political or religious views, such as many Italian entrepreneurs.
The author concludes that trust and permissiveness go together. Nevertheless he stresses that this openness is selective and may be combined, especially among young people, with a decline in social integration. The collapse of a religious underpinning for moral standards leaves people freer to choose their moral values, but also their allegiances and the company they keep.
This article analyses the economic values held by Europeans, based on a series of questions asked by the European Values Survey which make it possible to divide the respondents fairly easily into those in favour of market forces versus those concerned with social justice.
Jean-François Tchernia starts by noting that there is almost total consensus in favour of the market economy in Europe, while at the same time there is wide support for the idea that it is important to guarantee that everyone's basic needs are met (social justice aspect).
As well as the differences between, for example, the members of the European Union (more liberal) and the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, Tchernia stresses that there remains within each country a sharp divide -which is almost impossible to reconcile- between supporters of a free-market approach to the economy and the supporters of economic redistribution.
Overall, it appears that the decisive factor, both at national and individual level, is the economic situation at the time of the survey. In crude terms, the most economically dynamic countries are those where attitudes are most strongly in favour of the free market; and the individuals who are least fortunate in terms of income or career prospects are generally the most inclined to support redistribution. Other explanatory factors are age, gender, political affiliation and level of education.
Ce chapitre est extrait du Rapport Vigie 2016 de Futuribles International, qui propose un panorama structuré des connaissances et des incertitudes des experts que l'association a mobilisés pour explorer les évolutions des 15 à 35 prochaines années sur 11 thématiques.