The Robien Law and the Reduction in Part-Time Work
In his complementary comments on Guy Aznar's, Gilbert Cette doest not question the basis of the incentives which could be adopted to encourage a reduction in part-time work; nevertheless, he points to some flaws in the Robien law and to possible inconsistencies between the different incentives.
He first stresses that, even if the principle of an harmonization in social security contribution rates with hours of work is not bad in itself, there is no reason why this mechanism could not be more flexible, that exemptions from social security contributions could be prorated to the reduction in hours of work without the need for the reduction in hours of work to be more than 10%. In any case, he questions the fact that these exemptions are not permanent and do not relate more to the unemployment insurance contribution rate than to the URSAFF contribution rate.
Gilbert Cette points in particular to the inconsistencies which seem to exist between the measures encouraging individual part-time work and those encouraging collective negotiation on the reduction of hours of work. Last, he demonstrates that if the Robien law constitutes strong incentive to negotiating hours of work, the annual net cost for governments of one job thus created is slightly higher that the one given by Guy Aznar.