« Mauro Ceruti est l’un des rares penseurs de notre temps à avoir compris et relevé le défi que nous lance la complexité de nos êtres et de notre monde », affirme Edgar Morin dans la préface d’Il Tempo della complessità [Le Temps de la complexité]. Ce livre du philosophe Mauro Ceruti s’inscrit dans la continuité de l’ouvrage que les deux penseurs ont écrit ensemble, Notre Europe . Mauro Ceruti, résume Edgar Morin « montre que le problème essentiel ...
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Five years ago, we saw the formation, under the chairmanship of Amartya Sen, of the International Panel on Social Progress (IPSP), a collective of 300 social science researchers from around the world. The aim was to develop multi-disciplinary, non-partisan solutions in response to the major issues our societies currently face. Marc Fleurbaey and Marie-Laure Salles-Djelic, who are members of this collective and have actively participated in the publication of its first deliberations and recommendations, take the opportunity offered by this ‘forum’ article to present the perspectives for 21st century social progress identified by the IPSP.
They describe what seem to them to be the most promising institutional reforms to meet current challenges, targeting five major areas of work: 1) moving beyond the ideologies of the 20th century; 2) reforming the market economy to subordinate it to human needs; 3) transforming businesses to make them vehicles of progress, rather than of value-extraction and exploitation; 4) reforming the state to take it beyond its protective function and place it in the service of individual emancipation; and 5) reforming political life to enhance democracy. To make good on these tasks, they identify a number of actors capable of driving social progress.
La remarquable expansion de mouvements populistes en Europe est révélatrice du malaise de nos démocraties représentatives libérales. À la fois symptômes et vecteurs de leur métamorphose, ils participent de l’instauration subreptice d’un nouveau système qu’Ilvo Diamanti et Marc Lazar nomment la « peuplecratie ». Pour analyser le populisme d’aujourd’hui et comprendre en quoi il engendre une mutation de nos démocraties, les auteurs — tous deux historiens, politologues et sociologues — se penchent sur les cas italien et français, dont ...
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Le propos de Michel Onfray pourrait être condensé en une formule lapidaire, tel un slogan de campagne : « 1984, c’est maintenant ». Et ainsi nous satisfaire d’une sentence sans appel. Mais ce serait mal le connaître ! Ainsi, comment ne pas être enlevé — et élevé — par la remarquable exégèse du chef-d’œuvre incontesté, incontournable — et espérons-le indestructible —, de George Orwell publié en 1949  ? De la même façon comment, à la lecture du chapitre dédié à ce que dit La Ferme ...
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Situation paradoxale que celle de l’Amérique latine dans sa sphère religieuse. Bastion du catholicisme, le sous-continent abrite à ce jour 425 millions d’individus se réclamant de l’Église romaine — soit 40 % de la population mondiale issue de cette confession — et a vu l’un des siens accéder au trône de Pierre en 2013, en la personne du pape François. Institution majeure, l’Église catholique latino-américaine est aussi l’une des plus exposées à la concurrence d’Églises protestantes ...
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At the European elections of May 2019, the parties of the extreme Right tripled their seats in the European Parliament by comparison with 2014. This result confirms that more or less all over Europe ultra-nationalist and populist parties are making progress and using the democratic process to move in on the institutions that govern us. Nevertheless, we should not have any illusions about the profiles of these parties, as André-Yves Portnoff shows here, drawing on the Italian example: their only democratic arguments are window-dressing and they are expert in the manipulation of crowds and truth. This is how it is with the Italian neo-fascists who, through an idiosyncratic rewriting of history and of the Mussolinian past, peddle falsehoods and employ disinformation to attract votes, while maintaining systems of collusion and corruption very far distant from the virtuous conduct they claim to advocate. This Forum aims to dissect these stratagems and to warn of methods that might rapidly spread to other extremist groups.
Benoît Borrits est cofondateur et animateur de l’association Autogestion, et auteur de plusieurs travaux sur le travail et les coopératives. Dans son dernier ouvrage, Au-delà de la propriété, il propose des pistes d’appropriation citoyenne des outils de production à partir des expériences passées de socialisation et de dynamiques à l’œuvre. Sa proposition vise à dépasser les limites rencontrées historiquement par le mouvement coopératif et la propriété collective pour aller vers les « communs ». Pierre Dardot, philosophe et chercheur ...
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Le populisme est un mouvement récent à l’échelle de notre humanité : il émerge dans la deuxième partie du XIXe siècle, en Russie, aux États-Unis, en France…, puis connaît des regains réguliers depuis lors. Mais comme le rappelle Bertrand Badie en ouverture de l’édition 2019 de L’état du monde, un siècle et demi n’est pas un temps si court si on le rapporte à l’histoire de la démocratie. De fait, la récurrence de vagues populistes dans ...
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The rise of populist movements — particularly in Western countries that are supposed to embody the democratic ideal — and, indeed, the accession to power of some of their leaders, are rightly prompting serious concern and much soul-searching. How are we to explain this phenomenon? What features are shared by these movements and, conversely, what constitutes their special nature in the various countries? This is the first theme that has been chosen to give substance to the cooperation agreement established, on the initiative of Najat Vallaud-Belkacem between Ipsos, of which she is general director with responsibility for “International Research and Social Innovation”, and Futuribles.
This article by Henri Wallard, which draws on surveys and studies carried out by the Ipsos institute, begins by reminding us what the term populism covers. He then shows that, though populisms have common features and base their action on certain preferred themes, they are nonetheless very diverse and have to be analysed with an eye to the history, culture and socio-economic and political context of each country. This is borne out, Wallard argues, by the cases analysed here — the USA, Italy and the UK.
“There is no rise of populism,” writes Wallard, “but rather an emergence of different individual populist movements.” This is not, however, a reason to underestimate the danger they represent.
Voici un numéro qui vous invite à prendre de la hauteur sur des sujets d’actualité, trop souvent traités à chaud sans vision prospective suffisante. Nous n’y traitons ni du record de capitalisation boursière d’Apple ni de la guerre commerciale mondiale, mais principalement de trois grands sujets déterminants pour l’avenir : l’intelligence artificielle, les espoirs et les craintes qu’elle peut susciter ; l’implication des entreprises dans la fabrique du bien commun ; et la montée des populismes ...
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The last two years have perhaps marked a turning point in the — relatively peaceful — international relations that had prevailed in the developed world since the end of the Cold War. A wind of change has been perceptible for some time now, with the growing resonance of populist movements, particularly in Europe, a newly expansionist China and Russia, and the spread of Islamic terror onto European soil etc.
And, as Jean-François Drevet shows here, three recent events confirm that there is cause for concern: first, Brexit, the consequence of a form of populism that runs the risk of leaving the UK isolated on the international stage; second, the accession to power of Donald Trump, whose erratic behaviour in the diplomatic field — also tinged with populist overtones — is tending to cause or aggravate crises rather than resolve them; and, last, the clampdown in Turkey by President Erdo?an who, like Donald Trump, manages his foreign policy on an emotive basis, without always foreseeing the consequences. These three events are changing the way international relations are conducted and raise questions over the future security of Europe, since, with the foreign policy of three of the EU’s major neighbours or partners being dictated by populist considerations, Europe has to be able to cope with new crises and to do so alone, outside the US umbrella. That will no doubt be one of the major challenges for the European Union in the medium term.
Les débats sur la radicalisation devraient tenir compte des avertissements qu’Edgar Morin dispense dans ses articles et son livre Penser global. Il met en garde contre les limites de la répression policière et des « dispositifs législatifs contraignant les libertés » qui, dans de « mauvaises » mains, autoriseraient « le pire arbitraire  ». Il faut des mesures de fond, et « éduquer à la paix pour résister à l’esprit de guerre ». Pour cela, enseignons que « la connaissance est sujette à l’incertitude et ...
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Voici un ouvrage qui plonge au cœur des réflexions sur le futur : leur histoire, leur présent, leurs caractéristiques, leurs biais, etc. Assez richement documenté, La Politique des oracles offre un tour d’horizon des principaux centres de réflexion sur le futur, mais selon un prisme un peu déformé en ce sens qu’il axe essentiellement son analyse sur les « futuristes » — l’auteur n’utilise pas ou très peu le mot « prospectivistes » pour qualifier les experts en cette matière — spécialisés dans ...
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Futuribles has on several occasions provided a sounding board for detailed analyses of certain discourses relating to science and technology and the uses that may, in some cases, be made of them. For example, in issue 380 of Dec. 2011, Antonin Pottier presented an analysis of the arguments of climate-change sceptics and the way these were articulated to enable their begetters to defend interests not directly related to the scientific reality of climate change. Similarly, Pierre-Benoit Joly showed how some large corporations went about making use of regulatory norms and discourses linked to sustainable development in order to legitimate a number of controversial lines of research (no. 383).
In the present article Alexandre Moatti looks at the way certain ultra-Leftist movements speak about science and technical progress. He shows, for example, how these small groupings, taking science as their new enemy (alongside, if not instead of, capitalism), are developing an ideology that is very hostile to science –now seen as a cause of the enslavement of consciousness– leading to a re-reading of History which is, to say the least, questionable. This highly negative view of science and progress is not new. There have always been, and no doubt always will be, movements casting doubt on scientific progress, enabling us –quite rightly– to discuss the basic strengths and limitations of that progress. However, the reception in the media –and among a generally well-disposed public– accorded to various kinds of actions carried out by this tendency prompts us to look more closely at the discourse it is promoting and, necessarily, to maintain a degree of vigilance.
This article, which draws on the Values studies regularly conducted in Europe, aims to compare Europeans’ political values through their positioning on a Left-Right scale, and their development between 1990 and 2008, and also to analyse the underlying values that go furthest to explaining this positioning. Raul Magni Berton begins by presenting the Left/Right split in the various countries surveyed, as it emerges from the self-positioning of individuals (or their refusal to position themselves), highlighting, among other things, the relative stability of this split in the various countries, the importance it retains in Western Europe and a mild “leftward” trend in Europe.
The author then analyses 11 value conflicts that are likely to explain the political positioning of individuals: attitude to equality, moral progressivism/conservatism, state/market, attitude to law-and-order, nationalism/universalism, solidarity/individualism, attitude to work, degree of materialism, authoritarianism/criticism, attitude to religion, and sexism/sexual equality. Drawing on the observed correlations between these values and the political positioning of individuals, Raul Magni Berton shows, among other things, that religious values are less and less predictive of political standpoints in Western Europe, whereas those relating to egalitarianism, the state and law-and-order play an increasing role. On the other hand, very few significant correlations can be seen in Eastern Europe, which shows the major importance of the –both political and historical– context, and somewhat undermines the idea that the notions of Left and Right are universal in character. This is also confirmed by the country-by-country analysis of differences proposed at the end of the article.
In this March-April 2013 issue, which Futuribles is devoting very largely to the social and political impact of religions, Jean-François Mayer looks at the concept of fundamentalism. The notion, though widely used in very varying contexts –not to say loosely used and misused– has nonetheless a very precise meaning in the world of religion, as this article demonstrates.
After recalling the emergence of fundamentalism in the USA within the Protestant community and that movement’s entry into politics, Jean-François Mayer goes on to analyse the extent to which the concept has spread to other religious groups and what it refers to in those cases. Among other things, he highlights the fundamentalists’ fear of seeing the values they advocate threatened, points up certain developments in modern society which they regard as deviant (abortion rights, tolerance of homosexuals, the detachment of certain political forces from religion etc.) and underscores the fundamentalists’ frequent evocation of an idealized past of their particular strand of religion etc. He particularly stresses the great diversity of groups that can be placed in this category, and of the contexts in which they operate and, as a result, of the political practices which they adopt.
Drawing on the comparative analyses on which his study is based, Jean-François Mayer proposes a new typology that is capable of dividing the different forms of fundamentalism into four separate categories: transformational, reforming, restorative and conservative protest movements. Lastly, he examines the effects of the fundamentalisms on the societies in which they are established: this includes the danger of the denigration of minority groups and a variable level of political impact, depending on contexts and on the religion concerned.
On 6 November 2012, Americans will go to the polls to elect their next president, who will take over as leader of the United States in January 2013. As usual, the contest will essentially be between the candidates of the two major parties, the incumbent Democratic president Barack Obama and the Republican Mitt Romney. However, recent years have also seen the emergence of a movement (named “party” although it is not a party), which has radicalized the Republican party to the extreme. It is a particularly populist force and Paul Ryan, Mitt Romney’s running mate, is very close to it. We are speaking of the “Tea Party”. Within that faction, religious fundamentalists rub shoulders with unemployed youth, and pensioners ruined by the economic crisis mingle with those who still hanker after an all-powerful America. All are advocates of a radical change of government, abolishing most of the public sector and replacing it with private enterprise.
Nicole Morgan has made a close study of this movement and its underlying ideology in her book Haine froide [Cold Hatred] which is hot off the press from éditions du Seuil of Paris. In that work, she provides the key to this “ideological machine” that has been built up over a half century, with its intellectuals, best-selling authors and Nobel prize-winners, its heretical alliances and powerful figures, who ultimately inhabit a different world from the other 99% of humanity. Although this ideology developed and established itself in the United States, its universal ambitions actually make it an essential subject of study so far as the future of all modern nation-states is concerned. As this extract from Nicole Morgan’s book shows, the ideology rests on simple postulates which it transforms, against a background of economic ultra-liberalism, into irrefutable truths. Like all hard ideologies, it is a vehicle for strong emotions welling up from deep within the collective unconscious, fear and hatred foremost among them. According to Morgan, hatred (a “cold” hatred, for the moment) underlies this ideology, figures lend it a benign veneer, and it is characterized by ignorance. Hence an attitude of vigilance is appropriate.
As a result of the dramatic social consequences they produce, periods of economic crisis are – as history shows – often springboards for the rise of various forms of extremism and of inward-looking movements. It is reassuring, then, to see governments in Europe currently striving to stand together and attempt to face up collectively to the economic setbacks affecting most European countries. Just a few decades ago, national conflicts and resentments were so rooted in people’s minds that, at that time, such cooperation would have been unimaginable. That it exists attests to the work done since World War II to calm those tensions and enable a common reading of recent European history to emerge.
Jean-François Drevet brings this out clearly in this column, so as to forewarn those in Europe – or at the gates of Europe – who might be tempted by a form of historical falsification. After reminding readers briefly of what such falsifications of history have led to in Europe and of the emergence of a more calmly conceived history, he turns to various clarifications he regards as necessary in this area. These relate particularly to two countries which are tempted by a rather skewed reading of their national histories: Hungary and Turkey. He concludes on the importance of every country “coming to terms” with its national history, so that it is not endlessly carrying a hostile baggage that is out of phase with a united Europe.
Jusqu'à présent, la vision de la fédération de Russie qui prévalait en Occident était celle d'un pays sorti de la crise des années 1990 (tant économique que politique) grâce à la présidence de Vladimir Poutine (2000 - 2008). Selon bien des observateurs occidentaux, la Russie, sous la direction de Vladimir Poutine, a renoué avec la croissance économique, consolidé sa puissance militaire et choisi la voie d'un régime autoritaire dont le leader (même après l'élection de son successeur ...
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Climate change is now a familiar subject for most of the individuals living in the industrialized countries, and no doubt a subject of growing interest in the emergent countries such as China. It arises with increasing frequency in the discussion of current affairs, when there is a significant climatic event (tornado, flood, drought etc.), international negotiations on how to deal with global warming, or scientific discussions etc.
How has this theme lodged itself in public debate? Who are the actors in that debate and how much of a part do they play? André Lebeau has examined these questions, attempting to determine how this initially highly scientific subject has over time found a foothold in economic, political and media debate.
After a brief presentation of the various actors concerned, he makes a detailed analysis of the emergence of the debate within the scientific community, particularly through the IPCC (the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change). He then shows how climate change has entered economic debate, further gaining in complexity because it is so difficult to envisage its impacts or the economic solutions to it over time-periods of the order of a century. He then stresses the contribution of the media which, while giving the phenomenon visibility and hence making it a subject of interest for public opinion and the political world, do not always distinguish between what is essential and what is merely secondary. Lastly, he clarifies the current role of public opinion and of political decision-makers with regard to climate change, stressing that the process of entry into the debate and of dealing politically with climate questions is a very slow one - perhaps too slow, given the scale of the responses required.
Une société en panne, des mensonges déclamés, des injustices subies. Nous sommes confrontés aujourd'hui au phénomène pervers de la « pensée unique ». Autrement dit, il s'agit de penser intelligemment toujours dans le sens où ça souffle : « dictature du doigt mouillé » tel est le procès que Jean-François Kahn fait des médias. Il développe et explicite dans cet ouvrage un aspect très significatif des méfaits du phénomène : la vision de plus en plus univoque que l'on nous propose - ou que ...
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