Philippe Herzog nous a habitués à de brillantes synthèses sur l’économie et la construction européenne. En tant que cinéphile averti, il nous présente ici son point de vue sur la culture européenne, sa grandeur, ses misères et ses perspectives de renaissance. La question de l’identité culturelle de l’Europe est une de ses anciennes préoccupations, tout au long d’une carrière atypique, du parti communiste aux institutions européennes, dont il retrace les principales étapes dans son introduction. Il ...
(347 more words)
L’espérance de vie à la naissance des Européens ne cesse d’augmenter. Si l’on peut se réjouir de cet allongement de la durée de vie, des données récemment publiées par l’OMS (Organisation mondiale de la santé) et la Commission européenne invitent néanmoins à s’intéresser aussi à l’évolution, beaucoup plus mitigée, de l’espérance de vie en bonne santé. L’OMS a récemment publié un Rapport sur la santé en Europe, dans lequel elle constate que ...
(1115 more words)
With 28 member states, the European Union today has more than 500 million inhabitants. Though not a federal political entity interdependent in all respects, it is an advanced social and economic community that has become increasingly integrated over time, thanks to the efforts of the founder countries who have long been described as Europe’s “advance guard”. Though the European enthusiasm of those countries (beginning with France and Germany) is somewhat on the wane, they are nonetheless driving forces when compared, in particular, to a dozen or so European countries that are members of the Union or hesitating over membership, who were previously, for the most part, members of EFTA (the European Free Trade Area).
These latter (in particular, the Nordic countries, Switzerland, Iceland, Ireland and the UK) seem to be “laggards” with regard to integration, as Jean-François Drevet shows in this column. Driven by the advantages that the Union could bring them in certain fields, they are reluctant to accept the –particularly economic– quid pro quos that go with community solidarity, or to give up their international neutrality. Yet, in a world in economic crisis and prey to troubling political and security reconfigurations, including on European soil, the European Union represents a body that can provide direction and security and which should be able, given its size, to make the voice of its members heard at the world level. This is something that might bring about a shift in the position of these laggards, as this column points out.
On December 1, 2014 Vladimir Putin announced the cancellation of the South Stream pipeline, a seven years old, 63 billion cubic meter (bcm) per year and $19 billion project which aim was to provide natural gas to southern Europe while bypassing Ukraine. The Russian President declared that another project would be developed through Turkey instead with a possible hub linking it to European networks at Greece’s border. Of a similar capacity, this pipeline would provide Turkey with 14 bcm ...
(1287 more words)
Extrait de la table ronde du 3 juin 2014 Hugues de Jouvenel interviewe Pierre Bréchon et Frédéric Gonthier à l'occasion de la table ronde qu'ils animaient le 3 juin 2014 à Futuribles International sur « L'évolution des valeurs des Européens ». Pierre Bréchon et Frédéric Gonthier ont dirigé deux ouvrages parus récemment : Atlas des Européens. Valeurs communes et différences nationales (Paris : Armand Colin, 2013) et Les valeurs des Européens. Évolutions et clivages (Paris : Armand Colin, 2014).
Extrait de la table ronde du 5 mai 2014 avec Jacques Lesourne Le 5 mai 2014 s'est tenue à Futuribles International une table ronde au cours de laquelle Jacques Lesourne présentait son dernier livre "L'Europe à l'heure de son crépuscule ?" (Paris : Odile Jacob, 2013). Quelques minutes avant cette table ronde, Jacques Lesourne répondait aux questions d'Hugues de Jouvenel.
As we are putting this issue to bed, Europe is undergoing one of its most serious diplomatic crises since the end of the Cold War. Ukraine is currently torn between those who favour closer relations with Europe and pro-Russian activists, Crimea having seceded and become part of Russia once again. The sound of marching armies is perhaps not far off, which seems staggering to several generations of Europeans just a century after the outbreak of the First World War. That was a war with enormous consequences for the continent. The retrospective analysis of the political and strategic choices that brought it about is not without interest from the standpoint of foresight studies.
Jean-François Drevet homes in here on three elements relating to strategy or forward planning from the outbreak and conduct of the 1914-18 war, which had outcomes that were at variance, to say the least, with what the parties concerned had anticipated. These are the Franco-Russian Alliance, which, though presented as a force for peace, led to a generalization of the conflict; the Schlieffen Plan which, by violating Belgian neutrality, led to a British intervention that was decisive in the defeat of Germany; and the French strategy of all-out attack, which proved very costly in human lives in the age of the machine gun. Such errors of foresight, committed by competent, well-informed personalities persuaded of the rightness of their positions, shouldn’t be forgotten, says Jean-François Drevet, particularly in a current context of economic and financial crisis in which the forces of international high finance –the contemporary equivalent in power terms of the early 20th century’s armies– regularly flout the warnings and calls for regulation emanating from the rest of society.
Comme chaque année depuis 2008, l’Observatoire Cetelem publie son Observatoire de la consommation, consacré en 2014 aux magasins et à Internet, avec le constat d’une interdépendance croissante entre ces deux canaux « imposée par les consommateurs ». Pour la première fois depuis 2008, le moral des consommateurs européens remonte et 40 % d’entre eux envisagent d’augmenter leur consommation en 2014. A noter le cas particulier des Français, qui considèrent à la fois la situation du pays et leur situation ...
(698 more words)
Social capital, a recent notion that appeared in the 1990s, refers to the nature and quality of the bonds linking individuals in a society and their ability to develop trust and maintain relationships. We learn much about these topics from the surveys of European values that form the core of this special issue of Futuribles. Vincent Tournier presents the various lessons in this article.
First, he stresses the diversity of social capital in Europe, as measured by the level of interpersonal trust and community participation (trade unions, political parties, religious movements, sporting associations etc.) and also by more concrete probing regarding the neighbours one would be happy (or unhappy) to have. He then offers various strands of explanation of the level of trust or mistrust: a correlation with the degree of statism, level of wealth (inequalities in income and wealth being more influential factors in generating mistrust than the degree of statism) and religion (countries with Protestant traditions showing a higher level of trust) etc. He concerns himself lastly with the links that exist between interpersonal and political trust (opinions about democracy and institutions, the preference for a “strong man” to govern the country etc.), which are admittedly real but are not to be over-exaggerated.
In all these areas Tournier presents the overall findings and the finer variations within each country. He also looks more closely at the situation of France and at the argument that social relations are deteriorating and mistrust increasing there. This would seem to be a catastrophist view, which the findings of the Values Study do not entirely support when analysed more subtly.
Drawing on the findings of the three waves of Values studies carried out in Europe in 1990, 1999 and 2008, Abel François proposes an analysis of (essentially Western) Europeans’ economic values on the basis of their perception of the market economy. That perception is measured by three questions relating to competition, ownership of the means of production and incomes, which bring out a relatively positive view, overall, of the market economy (except with regard to income inequalities), but also great divergences between countries and between the various waves of studies.
Abel François then proposes to examine these findings using a combined indicator of the perception of the market economy which aggregates the three basic questions. This enables him to distinguish three groups of countries based on the way the indicator has moved between 1990 and 2008, but it leads him also to downplay the strictly cultural factors underlying these developments. It is, he argues, factors more directly linked to the current economic situation and the economic success of countries (factors he describes as “sociotropic”) and the personal situation of the respondents (“egotropic” factors) that influence the perception of the market economy, with respondents regarding it more favourably when they believe that it brings them personal advantages or is favourable to the community to which they belong.
It is almost 30 years now since the European Values Studies (EVS) were launched. They were carried out in 14 European countries at first (in 1981), then gradually extended to the whole of the continent, as broadly conceived (47 countries in 2008). By means of precise questionnaires relating to all fields of private and social life –many of the surveys being repeated identically over the four waves of studies so far completed, with others regularly updated to cover social developments that were difficult to anticipate 30 years ago– we have a great wealth of material at our disposal, enabling us to gauge social change in the various European countries and compare by broad cultural areas the trends at work in terms of values and behaviour. From the second wave of studies onwards, Futuribles provided a sounding board for the valuable analyses that were to be drawn from them (special issue of July-August 1995) and continued with the venture after the third wave (July-August 2002 issue). The fourth wave of studies begun in 2008 presents an opportunity once again to open the columns of our journal to the researchers who have delved into the analysis of the latest findings and the long-term comparisons to be made from them, brilliantly coordinated by Pierre Bréchon who, in this introductory article, demonstrates the considerable contribution made by the Values studies to the understanding of developments within European societies.
This article, which draws on the Values studies regularly conducted in Europe, aims to compare Europeans’ political values through their positioning on a Left-Right scale, and their development between 1990 and 2008, and also to analyse the underlying values that go furthest to explaining this positioning. Raul Magni Berton begins by presenting the Left/Right split in the various countries surveyed, as it emerges from the self-positioning of individuals (or their refusal to position themselves), highlighting, among other things, the relative stability of this split in the various countries, the importance it retains in Western Europe and a mild “leftward” trend in Europe.
The author then analyses 11 value conflicts that are likely to explain the political positioning of individuals: attitude to equality, moral progressivism/conservatism, state/market, attitude to law-and-order, nationalism/universalism, solidarity/individualism, attitude to work, degree of materialism, authoritarianism/criticism, attitude to religion, and sexism/sexual equality. Drawing on the observed correlations between these values and the political positioning of individuals, Raul Magni Berton shows, among other things, that religious values are less and less predictive of political standpoints in Western Europe, whereas those relating to egalitarianism, the state and law-and-order play an increasing role. On the other hand, very few significant correlations can be seen in Eastern Europe, which shows the major importance of the –both political and historical– context, and somewhat undermines the idea that the notions of Left and Right are universal in character. This is also confirmed by the country-by-country analysis of differences proposed at the end of the article.
Several articles in this special issue on Europeans’ values have foregrounded an important factor influencing their development: individualization, in the sense of the pursuit of autonomy and of the valuing of individual choices, which is to be distinguished from individualism, which refers, rather, to a withdrawal into oneself, as Pierre Bréchon reminds us here. How, then, has the individualization of European societies evolved in recent decades and what does this mean in terms of the more general development of values in Europe?
After reminding readers of the indicators from the Values survey that enable us to gauge this process of individualization, Bréchon stresses the geographical differences involved. While the countries of Northern Europe and France display a high level of individualization, those of Eastern and Southern Europe are below average in this regard, some of them standing out with a particularly low level (Poland, Romania, Turkey etc.). He shows the major role of the religious dimension in this geography of individualization, with the Protestant countries being the most individualized and those of Orthodox or Muslim religion having the lowest degree of individualization.
Lastly, Bréchon analyses the other socio-demographic variables (age, income, level of education etc.) linked to individualization and stresses the high correlation between individualization and sociability: the most individualized societies are also the most trusting and tolerant in most areas, the most altruistic and the most politically active. In fact, the observed advance in individualization of European societies is not at all synonymous with individualistic withdrawal, but actually goes together with a greater respect for others and the development of a “shared sociability”.
Following this article, Pierre Bréchon, who coordinated this special dossier on Europeans’ values, lists the major lessons to be learned (in particular, the strengthening of the values of individualization, in parallel with the persistence of firm social bonds and a growing demand for collective regulation), stresses the continuing existence of differences between geographical and cultural zones, and offers some possible future perspectives.
Several countries, having been faced for over five years with a serious economic crisis that has grave social consequences, have seen the growth of populist political parties with, in many cases, xenophobic overtones. But do these political expressions echo the trends in Europeans’ values and behaviour with regard to tolerance and xenophobia? It seems not, at least up to 2008, the date of the last survey of European values, as analysed here by Guillaume Roux.
Roux begins by drawing up a geographical chart of tolerance in Europe: the values of tolerance are everywhere in the majority, but the levels are highest in Northern Europe and lowest in Southern Europe and in the former Soviet bloc countries, with Western Europe presenting a more mixed profile. Over the last two decades, these seem to be durable differences, even though, in general, the values of tolerance have progressed in many countries (doubtless in connection with increased individualization) and the homogeneity of Western Europe is a little diminished by comparison with 1990.
Roux goes on to analyse Europeans’ behaviour towards ethnic minorities (preference for the employment of nationals and xenophobia). Even though the situation varies greatly from one country to another, we find a geographical distribution similar to that for tolerance, with the countries of northern Europe showing the least xenophobic attitudes in 2008 and those in the south and the former Soviet bloc having the most xenophobic behaviour. Generally, over a long period (1990-2008), the trend is for xenophobia to decline, but the coherence between the values of tolerance and attitudes towards ethnic minorities remains stable, confirming the partially cultural dimension of positioning with regard to xenophobia.
The agitation surrounding the parliamentary vote extending marriage to same-sex couples in France in spring 2013 has shown the importance a section of the population still accords to traditional family values. Is this phenomenon specific to France? And does it represent a minority standpoint or even a wavering view? Thanks to the European Values Studies, we have substantial elements of an answer so far as most countries of the European continent are concerned and in some cases we can identify trends over almost 30 years. Sandrine Astor and Nathalie Dompnier offer a detailed analysis of these here, showing how Europeans’ perceptions with regard to couples and marriage are changing.
The authors concern themselves first with the conception Europeans have of marriage as an institution, as well as with how accepting they are of unmarried partnerships, highlighting geographical divides, age and generational effects, and, in passing, stressing correlations with other variables (religion, religious practice). The authors then examine the elements that are regarded as important in the success of marriage, stressing the great stability of the hierarchy of factors –those relating to marital harmony and personal fulfilment coming out on top and increasing in importance by comparison with those relating to material conditions or similarity of socio-cultural background. Here again the divergences observed between different countries are pointed out, and these attest once again to the influence of the dominant social model. Lastly, the article analyses the evolution of the conceptions of male and female roles within the couple, stressing the advance of egalitarian conceptions in Western and Northern Europe, whereas more conservative views of the family persist in Eastern Europe.
Overall, the trends noted and the development of critical judgements of marriage as an institution do not seem to have affected the continuing attachment to certain values specific to it (fidelity, understanding, children) and, indeed, to the social norm it represents. It is simply that a more flexible vision of the couple, more in keeping with individual freedom and sexual equality, is tending to develop in Europe.
Comme je m’en suis expliqué dans un récent éditorial , la crise économique et sociale, loin de revêtir un caractère purement conjoncturel, résulte sans doute d’une mutation structurelle entre un modèle de société qui n’en finit pas de mourir et un autre qui n’en finit pas de naître. Et si certains s’opposent à cette mutation radicale ; d’autres en revanche en sont déjà les acteurs. Ce phénomène ne résulte pas seulement d’une transformation profonde ...
(789 more words)
Le sport le plus populaire et le plus médiatisé de la planète n’échappe pas aux tentatives de régulation politique. La Commission européenne vient à cet effet de publier une étude  dont le contenu peut surprendre à l’heure de la rigueur budgétaire. Lors de la saison 2010-2011, ce sont près de trois milliards d’euros qui ont été mobilisés pour les seuls transferts de joueurs. Cette somme est sept fois supérieure à celle déployée lors de la saison ...
(1182 more words)
Depuis le début de la crise économique, les consommateurs européens sont de plus en plus nombreux à réduire leurs dépenses et à s’intéresser à de nouvelles pratiques de consommation. Ces tendances sont confirmées par le baromètre 2013 de l’Observatoire Cetelem de la consommation, issu d’une enquête très riche auprès de 6 500 individus dans 12 pays européens . Près de 9 Européens sur 10 souhaiteraient limiter leurs dépenses « à l’essentiel » dans les années à venir. Seuls ...
(766 more words)
In this March-April 2013 issue, which Futuribles is devoting very largely to the social and political impact of religions, Franck Frégosi studies the place of Islam in European societies. After a short account of the history of the presence of the Muslim religion in Europe (from Arabic settlement in Spain in the Middle Ages to the Ottoman Empire and the migrations which followed the end of colonialism), Frégosi presents the various faces of Islam in Europe, which involves ethnic divides ensuing from the different regions of origin of European Muslims, a generation gap between the Islam practised by the younger generations and that of their elders, and ideological rifts.
He then explores the three avenues of Islam’s current expression in Europe and the prospects for these: a minority Islam which favours a certain orthodoxy; a relatively radical, standardized Islam laying claim to universal applicability; and a trend towards secularization. Frégosi also stresses the limited character of the economic integration of Muslims in Europe and the difficulties they encounter in the area of employment –in France, for example, given the recurrent concern that manifestations of religion should be excluded from the public sphere and calls for the same to apply in the arena of private business. In his view, these various elements suggest that European Islam is in a mature phase, a phase of adaptation to the prevailing tradition of secularism in Western Europe.
In this March-April 2013 issue, which Futuribles is devoting very largely to the social and political impact of religions, Philippe Portier looks at the development of relations between Churches and states in Western Europe. He begins by noting the importance of the religious heritage and outlines the two dominant models: the “confessional state” model, in which one religion is officially singled out (this applies mainly in the Protestant and Orthodox countries) and the model of Church/state separation, in either its flexible (in Central Europe) or rigid form (mainly in France).
However, Portier goes on to highlight an increasingly marked long-term trend for a “combining of trajectories”: in other words, a simultaneous movement of “deconfessionalization” in the countries of Catholic tradition (Italy, Spain) –and also in the Lutheran (Norway) and Orthodox (Greece) nations– and of a re-entry of religion into the public sphere (particularly in France). As Portier sees it, these developments might well represent the emergence of a common model of secularism which, without totally erasing national differences in the regulation of faiths, could be said to be shifting all these countries toward a relatively unified system of “co-operative separation”.
In this March-April 2013 issue, which Futuribles is devoting very largely to the social and political impact of religions, particularly on the continent of Europe, Pierre Bréchon, who coordinated the dossier, offers an analysis of the socio-political effects of the religious dimension in Europe. Drawing on the results of the last European Values Study (2008), he shows, for example, the influence of the religious factor on value-systems: the cultural differences between countries depending on the dominant religion; the influence of individual religious identities (religious affiliation, practice) in the attachment to certain values; the respective importance of the geographical and religious dimensions in value-systems etc.
It emerges, more or less, that the dominant values found in the various “georeligious” spaces identified square with those of the individuals claiming allegiance to the corresponding religion or denomination. Protestants, for example, manifest more modern values (less attachment to the traditional family model, greater liberalism on moral issues, greater politicization etc.), as do those who have no religious affiliations. Muslims and Orthodox Christians have a more traditional system of values (family, morals, authority, national pride etc.), while Catholics occupy an intermediate position. Pierre Bréchon goes on to study the specific impact of the religious variables in value-systems by way of a “ceteris paribus” statistical analysis, cross-comparing other variables (sex, age, income etc.).
He concludes that it is religious geography which introduces the most notable differences into value-systems, not the individual dimensions of religiosity (such as declared affiliations) and that, while denominational allegiance is not to any great extent a discriminating factor, degree of religiosity does, on the other hand, have distinctly more of an influence on values (in the direction of greater traditionalism) –and this is the case whatever the denomination concerned.
Quel avenir pour les relations entre l’Europe et l’Asie d’ici 2020 ? À l’occasion de son neuvième sommet de novembre 2012, l’ASEM (Asia-Europe Meeting), un forum de dialogue entre les 27 États de l’Union européenne et les 10 États de l’ASEAN (Association des nations de l’Asie du Sud-Est), a demandé à l’ASEF et à l’université des Nations unies sur les études comparatives de l’intégration régionale (UNU-CRIS) de conduire une étude ...
(592 more words)
En 2010, 3,8 millions de touristes chinois ont voyagé en Europe, et ce nombre pourrait quadrupler d’ici 2020. Dans cette étude, Z_Punkt analyse les moteurs et les particularités de ce tourisme à la chinoise, avant d’explorer ses perspectives d’évolution. Le tourisme à l’étranger constitue un loisir récent pour les Chinois, qui se démocratise progressivement grâce à l’assouplissement de l’octroi des visas et à l’essor de la classe moyenne. En 2011, 39,2 ...
(475 more words)
Dans l’édition 2013 de son rapport annuel, Cetelem analyse l’état du marché automobile européen 1 et identifie cinq leviers d’action pour le dynamiser à l’avenir. En 2012, près de 80 millions de véhicules neufs pourraient être mis en circulation dans le monde. Néanmoins, alors qu’une croissance très forte est attendue dans certains pays comme la Chine et les États-Unis, le marché européen est lui beaucoup plus morose : les ventes devraient y diminuer de 7 % cette ...
(885 more words)
Cette étude conjointe de la Deutsche Post et de DHL imagine cinq scénarios socioéconomiques à l’horizon 2050 et envisage leurs impacts sur la logistique en Europe.Ces scénarios étudient notamment l’évolution du commerce et de la consommation, des usages sociaux et technologiques, mais aussi le changement climatique. 42 experts ont participé à leur rédaction.Scénario 1 : Économie non-apprivoisée - effondrement imminentLa consommation de masse incontrôlée et l’exploitation anarchique des ressources accélèrent le réchauffement climatique et les catastrophes naturelles ...
(367 more words)