Few observers have paid attention to the fact that China has been working on the geopolitical concept of “ecological civilisation” for almost 20 years now. Proposed in 2007 by President Hu Jintao, this concept was promoted to the rank of constitutional principle of the People’s Republic in 2018. In 2021, President Xi Jinping made it one of the key pillars of China’s collective narrative, setting the goal of carbon neutrality by 2060.[1]
For Western observers, accustomed to seeing China as one of the most polluted countries on the planet — in 2008, car traffic had to alternate in Beijing to allow the Olympic Games to take place in a more or less breathable atmosphere — this announcement was more often than not seen as one of those slogans that the Chinese are so fond of. After the Great Leap Forward and the New Silk Road, why not “ecological civilisation”?
Responsible for 23% of the planet’s greenhouse gas emissions and producing around 60% of its electricity from coal-fired power stations, China in 2024 is still a long way from being able to claim to be a model green society. And yet, on a per capita basis, the Chinese ecological footprint (8 tCO2eq. [tonnes of CO2 equivalent]) is comparable to that of Europeans (7 tCO2eq. and even close to 9 tCO2eq. for the French) and much lower than that of North Americans (14 tCO2eq.). It is even lower than that of Europeans if we add to the latter’s direct footprint, i.e. that contained in the products they import, particularly from China.
In fact, there are several reasons why the Chinese, who have proved their ability to project themselves into the very long term, should give greater visibility and substance to their project for an ecological civilisation:[2]
- The first, which was partly at the origin of the concept, is socio-environmental: the aim is to respond to the discontent of China’s urban populations who, despite the progress made, are still subject to more than critical levels of air pollution.
- The second is economic: China’s stated ambition of becoming the world’s leading economic power by 2050, ahead of the United States, has lost credibility since the Covid crisis. For a number of reasons — demographics, ageing, the property crisis, the return of protectionist measures around the world — Chinese growth has had to fall into line with the more muted rhythms of developed countries. On the other hand, China has an industrial base and a technological lead that enable it to dominate the rapidly developing and highly strategic global green technology markets.
- The third is geopolitical. Given its language, its ideogram-based script and its specific cultural and civilisational characteristics, China will find it difficult to overtake the United States in the field of cultural soft power. Moreover, it is not seeking to export its civilisational model, still less to impose it on the rest of humanity.[3] On the other hand, its leaders have embraced the concept of green soft power, according to which countries that are able to share their green technologies and their exemplary ecological credentials with others will strengthen their geopolitical influence.
The Chinese project for an ecological civilisation therefore covers several dimensions — ecological, health, industrial, socio-political and geopolitical — which are in the process of converging.
The economic and industrial dimension
The 14th five-year plan (2021-2025) has set aside a large part for ecology, with plans for massive investment in biotechnologies, electric vehicles and renewable energies. China’s dominance is already overwhelming in the global markets for electric batteries, wind power and photovoltaic panels, with, in all three cases, more installed capacity in China than in the rest of the world as a whole.
By 2024, China will produce more than half of the electric cars sold worldwide.[4] European carmakers are already anticipating that the ban on the sale of combustion-powered vehicles in Europe from 2035 will open up a boulevard for Chinese manufacturers — or European manufacturers (Volvo, Smart, Daimler, etc.) now controlled by Chinese companies. The offensive by Chinese manufacturers to dominate the world market for electric cars is already well under way. Chinese manufacturers are also better positioned than their European and North American counterparts in entry-level and mid-range vehicles, which will play a decisive role worldwide in the transition away from carbon-free cars.[5] China is also overwhelmingly dominant in the market for electric scooters, which will account for a large proportion of future mobility in the countries of the South.
The societal and socio-political dimension
The project for an ecological civilisation extends to lifestyles and land-use planning. China’s new policy aims to direct the flow of urbanisation towards second- and third-tier cities, which will be linked to the metropolises and to each other by high-speed rail links. New eco-city models (China’s version of our smart cities) will make it possible to significantly reduce energy consumption linked to transport and heating/air conditioning.
Digital control and monitoring of consumption will be one of the keys to the system, and will apply to local authorities, businesses and individuals alike. The ecological monitoring of behaviour (housing, transport) will be integrated into the “social credit” system, based on the methodical and intrusive exploitation of the digital traces left by each individual.[6]
The concept of an ecological civilisation is also playing an increasingly important role in the collective narrative, and echoes that of Chinese civilisation, one of the oldest civilisations on the planet; a civilisation to which the West owes many of the technical innovations (paper, printing, gunpowder, the compass, etc.) that enabled it, from the 16th century onwards, to extend its hold over the world. The Chinese have not forgotten this lesson from history, and this time they have every intention of gaining a geopolitical advantage from their industrial lead in the field of green technologies.[7]
The geopolitical dimension
China’s green shift will enable it to increase its geopolitical influence in a number of ways:
- The first will be to weave a network of customers and affiliates to whom it will provide, in exchange for land and natural resources, the electric vehicles, photovoltaic panels and digital tools essential to their development. After Europe, the African continent will obviously be a partner of choice for the deployment of such a strategy.
- The second will involve asserting a green soft power and increasing China’s influence in international institutions. The participation of Chinese scientists in the work of the IPCC (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change) is already recognised. In the Conferences of the Parties on climate change (COP), China’s positions, which were for a long time reserved and wait-and-see, have become cooperative, and they could become more active and proactive.[8] China is already using these forums to forge special relationships with the countries of the South. In the future, it will be able to point the finger at the poor performers in the transition, starting, of course, with the United States.
After the New Silk Road, deploying Chinese technologies and infrastructures as far as Europe and Africa, come the “Green Silk Road”, developing the energy, forestry and agricultural resources of the equatorial and tropical belts. Two networks that will enable the Middle Kingdom to weave a durable and solid web on planet Earth.
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The Chinese concept of an ecological civilisation, which was initially just a strategic intention, is therefore gradually taking on the dimension of a coherent political and civilisational project, even if, paradoxically, the project’s weakest point today remains its purely environmental dimension. China’s leaders are having to extricate themselves from a heavy legacy of coal mining (China continues to build and export coal-fired power stations), bring local governments into line who are less convinced by the environment than the Party’s strategists, and find compromises between economic growth objectives and ecological ambitions.[9]
Despite these weaknesses, the concept of ecological civilisation raises a number of questions for Westerners:
- The concept of ecological planning, which is at the heart of the Chinese project, has been adopted by several European countries, including France (which created, in 2022, a General Secretariat for Ecological Planning, attached to the Prime Minister). The European “green taxonomy”, which classifies industrial sectors according to their ecological impact (2022), is not unrelated to the system of ratings and incentives deployed in China to encourage private companies to improve their ecological performance.
- The notion of civilisation, long regarded with suspicion, is making a strong comeback in political and geopolitical analyses, with the idea that one of Europe’s weaknesses is its inability to think of itself as a civilisation. Peter Sloterdijk explains, after Hubert Védrine, that “Europeans have ceased to be interested in Europe and to identify themselves as such”. The notions of ecological civilisation, “recivilisation” and the art of living are highlighted in many recent essays. Jean Viard argues in favour of a “civilisation of the ecological individual”.[10] “The art of living, explains Giuliano da Empoli, co-founder of the magazine Le Grand Continent, is the great antidote to totalitarianisms, which want to put numbers on and control every movement. The art of living is the opposite […]. It’s something we’re very attached to in the physical dimension of Europe”. But is this art of living compatible with an ecological ambition? Do we not see certain ecologists, including liberals, proposing the use of an “individual carbon account”,[11] a formula which, in its principle and operation (exploiting digital traces), is not so far removed from Chinese social credit!
Lastly, the concept of ecological civilisation takes its place on a geopolitical stage heavily dominated by civilisational conflicts and references to ancient civilisational empires (Russian, Indian, Persian, Ottoman, etc.). Could it help to “re-civilise” the global geopolitical scene? To ward off the undesirable prospect of a “clash of civilisations” by proposing the more positive prospect of civilisational competition for the best ecological bounty?
Despite its current weaknesses, the concept of ecological civilisation should not be underestimated. By methodically declining it, China is in the process of imposing a new geopolitical frame of reference, green power. It has launched a ball that the West will find difficult not to pick up.
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N.B.: this article has been translated from French by DeepL, and revised by the author and Futuribles.
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Aglietta Michel and Espagne Étienne, Pour une écologie politique. Au-delà du Capitalocène, Paris: Odile Jacob, 2024. ↑
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Maréchal Jean-Paul, “China’s Climate Realpolitik”, in “China’s Ecological Power: Analysis, Critiques, and Perspectives”, Green, special issue, no. 1, September 2021, pp. 23-30. ↑
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Valantin Jean Michel, “Comment la Chine a fait de l’Europe son ‘espace utile’”, Le Grand Continent, 25 April 2023. ↑
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Le Bec Antoine, “Automobile: vers un leadership chinois?”, Futuribles, no. 462, September-October 2024, pp. 51-71. ↑
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Ibid. ↑
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Dubois de Prisque Emmanuel, “Le système de crédit social chinois. Comment Pékin évalue, récompense et punit sa population”, Futuribles, no. 434, January-February 2020, pp. 27-48. ↑
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Monjon Stéphanie and René Élodie, “The New Tools of Environmental Governance in China: Top Down Control and Environmental Credit”, in “China’s Ecological Power: Analysis, Critiques, and Perspectives”, op. cit, pp. 138-146. ↑
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Dahan Amy, “How China’s Position Has Evolved in the COPs and on the Global Climate Geopolitical Stage”, in “China’s Ecological Power: Analysis, Critiques, and Perspectives”, op. cit, pp. 13-18. ↑
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Monjon Stéphanie, “Les paradoxes de l’engagement de neutralité carbone de la Chine”, Analyse prospective, no. 281, 13 December 2022, Futuribles International. ↑
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Berger Laurent and Viard Jean, Pour une société du compromis, La Tour d’Aigues: L’Aube, 2024. ↑
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Buéno Antoine, Faut-il une dictature verte? La démocratie au secours de la planète, Paris: Flammarion, 2023. ↑
